n 


UNIVERSITY   OF  CALIFORNIA 


Received 
Accessions  A 


elf  No. 


Mam  Lib. 


,-* 


. 


• . 


Arrx 


I 


The  New  Tactics 


:  :  :  OF  :  :  : 


INFANTRY, 

( Studies  in. ) 


BY    MAJOR   W.    VON    SCHERFF, 


TRANSLATED   BY 


COLONEL  LUMLEY  GRAHAM, 

LATE  18TH  (ROYAL  IRISH)  REGIMENT. 


tJFIVBESXTT 


GEORGE  A.   SPOONER, 

IvKA-VKN  WORTH, 
I  SL 


55" 


C.    J.    SMITH    &    Co.,    PRINTERS, 
LEAVENWORTH,    KAN. 


TABLE  or  CONTENTS, 


PART   I. 
WAR   TIME. 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION .  9 

CHAPTER    I.     THE  OFFENSIVE  AND  THE  DEFENSIVE  .  14 

CHAPTER  II.     THE  OFFENSIVE 20 

1.  THE  PREPARATORY  STAGE 29 

2.  THE  STAGE  OF  EXECUTION      .        .        .        .  51 

3.  THIRD  STAGE  OF  THE  ATTACK   ....  70 

4.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS  UPON  DRILL        .        .  79 
CHAPTER  III.     THE  DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE    ...  83 

1.  THE  STAGE  OF  RESISTANCE     ....  89 

2.  THE  STAGE  OF  COUNTER-ATTACK       .        .     .  108 

3.  SOME  REMARKS  ON  DRILL       .        .        .        .  115 
CHAPTER  IV.     THE  TEMPORISING  COMBAT     .        .     .  119 

(THE  DEMONSTRATIVE.) 


PART   II. 
THE   PEACE   SCHOOL. 

INTRODUCTION 131 

CHAPTER  I.  THE  TRAINING  OF  SOLDIERS  INDIVID- 
UALLY AND  COLLECTIVELY  .  .  138 

CHAPTER  II.  THE  HIGHER  INSTRUCTION  OF  OFFI- 
CERS    154 

CHAPTER  III.    THE  GREAT  MANOEUVRES        .        .     .  165 


SOME  REMARKS  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR. 


AMONGST  the  many  important  subjects  now  under  discus- 
sion in  the  military  world,  none  is  more  important  than,  in- 
deed, I  believe  I  may  safely  say,  none  is  so  important  as, 
the  subject  of  the  following  studies. 

By  this  time  soldiers  of  all  nations  are  agreed,  almost 
without  exception,  that  with  the  new  arms  new  tactics  are 
required.  Some  have  long  held  this  opinion  and  have  been 
striving  to  spread  it  ever  since  the  rifled  musket  came  into 
general  use.  The  introduction  of  rifled  cannon  and  of 
breechloaders  made  the  necessity  for  change  more  impera- 
tive and  more  obvious,  so  that  at  length  almost  everyone 
who  reflects  at  all  upon  such  matters  has  become  a  convert. 
The  few  who  hold  to  the  saying  ''new  arms  old  tactics,"  are 
not  likely  to  exercise  much  influence  upon  future  war,  and 
may  safely  be  ignored. 

But  though  we  may  all,  in  England  as  elsewhere,  be  con- 
vinced of  the  necessity  for  new  tactics,  there  is  plenty  of 


6  Some  Remarks  by  the  Translator. 

reason  for  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  nature  of  this  in- 
novation which  it  is  desirable  to  introduce.  And  here  it  is 
that  much  study  is  required,  and  that  the  opinions  of  prac- 
tical men  like  Major  von  Scherff  who  write  under  the  fresh 
impression  of  the  best  possible  experience  in  such  matters, 
that  of  the  battle-field,  are  extremely  valuable,  particularly 
to  men  who,  like  most  Englishmen  of  the  present  day,  are 
from  the  force  of  circumstances  compelled  to  be  more  theo- 
retical than  practical  in  such  matters. 

Now  we  all  know  that  many  things  which  appear  very 
good  in  theory  turn  out  very  badly  in  practice,  but  why  so? 
Simply  because  the  theory  had  not  a  practical  foundation. 
The  Prussian  soldiers  who  first  used  the  needle-gun  were,  it 
may  be  said,  mere  theorists,  but  the  theories  were  based 
upon  practical  considerations  and  careful  study,  so  that  they 
developed  themselves  into  most  successful  execution.  Still 
actual  practice  showed  the  Prussians  that  their  theories 
were  at  fault  in  many  points,  and  they  have  ever  since  been 
busy  in  profiting  by  the  lessons  from  which  they  feel  that 
they  have  still  much  to  learn. 

We  English  have  now  as  fine  an  opportunity  as  can  fall 
to  the  lot  of  theorists,  having  had  the  advantage  of  watch- 
ing some  gigantic  tactical  experiments  carried  out  in  a 
most  exhaustive  manner  at  the  cost  of  our  neighbors,  and 


Some  Remarks  by  the  Translator.  7 

receiving  afterwards  the  benefit  of  their  opinions  upon  the 
result. 

Let  us  only  study  these  opinions  carefully  upon  their 
own  merits,  and  neither  adopt  them  with  blind  enthusiasm 
because  they  are  "Prussian,"  or  reject  them  with  stolid 
prejudice  because  they  are  "Un-English,"  and  "not  suited 
to  our  national  characteristics." 

By  the  way,  I  have  more  than  once  heard  it  gravely  as- 
serted that  fighting  in  skirmishing  order  is  not  "suited  to 
our  national  characteristics."  If  I  thought  so,  I  should  say 
the  sooner  we  get  a  new  suit  of  "characteristics"  the  better, 
but  I  don't  think  so,  having  read  of  our  famous  old  "light 
division,"  and  having  seen  what  our  men  could  do  in  the 
Kafir  bush  under  Eyre.  The  reader  will,  I  hope,  pardon 
me  for  drawing  his  attention  to  one  remarkable  point  of 
difference  between  "Studies  on  Tactics,"  written  by  soldiers 
who  knew  battle  by  practice  like  Major  von  Scherff,  and 
those  written  by  men  who,  like  many  of  our  later  English 
essayists,  only  know  it  by  theory,  I  mean  the  great  stress 
which  the  former  class  lays  upon  the  moral  effect  of  a  tacti- 
cal formation,  whilst  the  attention  of  the  latter  class  is 
almost  entirely  confined  to  the  material  and  mechanical  side 
of  the  question.  This  is  quite  natural,  for  I  believe  those 
who  have  seen  most  of  war  attach  the  greatest  importance 


8  Some  Remarks  by  the  Translator. 

to  moral   as  distinguished  from  mere  material  considera- 
tions. 

I  cannot  conclude  these  few  introductory  remarks  more 
fitly  than  with  the  concluding  sentence  of  Major  von 
Scherff's  studies:— 

"  May  we  be  able  to  find  time  and  opportunity  for  these 
lessons,  lest  war  should  have  to  teach  us  what  we  ought 
already  to  have  learnt  in  peace,  what  like  is  battle  ?  " 

L.  G. 

March,  1873. 


STUDIES 


ON    THE 


NEW  TACTICS  OF  INFANTRY 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  general  adoption  of  the  rifled  musket,  soon  followed 
by  that  of  the  rifled  cannon,  has  impressed  a  very  different 
character  upon  the  tactical  literature  of  all  European  arm- 
ies, if  we  compare  that  of  the  last  fifteen  years  or  so  (that 
is  to  say,  from  the  time  of  the  Crimean  war),  with  that  of 
the  previous  period;  and  the  great  wars  which  have  been 
waged  during  these  later  years  have  contributed  powerfully 
to  the  same  result; — for  whilst  the  tactical  writings  of  the 
period  antecedent  to  the  date  above  mentioned  were  almost 
without  exception  mere  text-books,  calculated  to  set  before 
the  reader  and  to  make  him  practically  acquainted  with  the 


io  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

great  principles  of  modern  tactics  as  then  determined  (which 
was  often  done  in  a  masterly  manner);  on  the  other  hand, 
the  more  recent  works  have  been,  and  are  to  the  present 
day,  mostly  of  a  controversial  nature,  written,  with  more  or 
less  ability,  but  not  always  quite  to  the  point,  to  discuss  the 
changes  in  tactics  apparently  rendered  necessary  by  the 
new  firearms.  Speaking  generally,  the  debate  has  been 
narrowed  to  two  questions  :— 

What  general  influence  do  the  new  arms  exert  upon  the 
commander  with  reference  to  tactical  operations ;  upon  his 
selection  of  the  offensive  or  defensive? 

How  do  they  affect  his  manner  of  conducting  either?  (a 
question  of  elementary  tactics,  drill). 

Now,  although  upon  the  former  of  these  two  questions 
opinions  are  pretty  well  reconciled,  and  nearly  unanimous, 
the  latter  has  not  been  settled  definitively  even  by  the  last 
war  between  France  and  Germany,  and  we  still  see  military 
men  everywhere  occupied  with  theoretical  argument  and 
practical  experiment  upon  elementary  tactics,  especially 
with  reference  to  infantry,  seeking  after  a  solution  of  the 
problem. 

The  necessity  of  finding  such  has  been  brought  home  to 
all  more  closely  by  the  war  of  1870 — 71,  and  has  been  ac- 
cepted more  readily  than  perhaps  was  the  case  before. 

In  that  campaign  the  Prussian  company-column  triumph- 
antly asserted  its  position  as  satisfying  in  the  most  com- 
plete manner  hitherto  discovered  the  altered  requirements 


Introduction^  1 1 

of  tactics.    Still  it  is  just  in  the  Prussian-German  army  itself 
that  the  conviction  has  gained  ground  most  thoroughly; 

1.  That  what  has  hitherto  been  accomplished  in  this  way 
is  by  no  means  absolutely  exhaustive;  that — 

2.  We  owe  the  successful  result  of  this  formation  mainly 
to  our  long  familiarity  with  it  in  peace  time:  hence  that— 

3.  Our  present  peaceful  leisure — who  knows  how  long  it 
may  last? — must  be  taken  advantage  of  to  provide  our  in- 
fantry tactics  with  a  firm  foundation  based  upon  the  expe- 
rience gained  in  war;  to  establish  a  system  more  adapted  to 
our  present  requirements  than  has  been  hitherto  the  case; 
so  as  to  be  able  without  prejudice  to  act  on  the  field  of 
battle   as   we   have   been   accustomed   to  do  on  the  drill- 
ground,  and  to  be  less  dependent  than  we  have   hitherto 
been  upon  the  personal  inspiration  of  subordinate  officers, 
however  well  justified  this  dependence  may  have  been  up 
to  this  time. 

It  is  the  school  of  peace — no  one  will  now  deny  it — which 
provides  an  army  with  the  cement  necessary  for  enabling  it 
to  withstand  the  enormous  friction  of  the  battle-field.  It  is 
the  established  system  to  which  the  men  have  been  long 
accustomed  which  gives  to  a  standing  army  its  immense 
superiority  over  the  dilettantism  of  the  mere  levy. 

Whatever  system  of  battle-formations  we  adopt,  the 
simpler,  clearer,  more  unchangeable  it  is,  so  much  the  bet- 
ter for  our  requirements  in  every  way;  it  will  never  check 
self-reliance  or  the  exercise  of  individual  skill,  unless  it  is 


12  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

based  on  false  principles,  whilst  where  these  qualities  are  at 
a  low  ebb — a  case  which  may  possibly  arise— it  will  be  a 
powerful  aid  in  critical  moments. 

The  present  time  seems  to  be  in  some  measure  favorable 
to  the  discovery  of  such  a  system,  for  the  following  reasons. 
As  the  possession  of  rifled  guns  and  breechloaders  will  soon 
be  common  to  all  armies,  the  era  of  progress  in  the  manu- 
facture of  firearms  may,  speaking  generally,  be  considered 
closed  for  the  immediate  future.  Although  improvements 
may  still  be  made  constantly,  we  may  yet  consider  ourselves 
for  the  present  safe  from  such  sudden  surprises,  from  such 
startling  and  revolutionary  novelties  as  were  rifled  guns  and 
breechloaders  when  they  first  appeared. 

Even  repeating  rifles  and  shrapnel  shell  contain  at  least 
no  unexpected  elements.  On  the  other  hand  the  practical 
experience  of  a  great  war,  rich  to  excess  in  examples  of 
battle,  and  in  which  both  parties  had  the  advantage  of  the 
most  improved  armament,  gives  to  theory  the  so  much 
needed  aid.  The  following  study  is  intended  to  contribute 
towards  a  work  which  is  admitted  to  be  both  necessary  and 
possible. 

It  does  not  pretend  of  itself  to  accomplish  this  work. 

Based  upon  theoretical  materials  which  may  be  considered 
as  in  every  way  exhaustive,  and  upon  the  practical  exam- 
ples of  the  last  great  wars,  it  will  place  the  questions  re- 
quiring decision  impartially  before  the  reader,  not  refraining 


Introduction.  1 3 

at  the  same  time  from  the  expression  of  the  writer's  indi- 
vidual opinion  or  from  criticism. 

It  will  deal  in  turn,  and  as  far  as  at  present  appears  nec- 
essary, with  the  two  main  questions  above  alluded  to. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    OFFENSIVE    AND    THE    DEFENSIVE. 

EVERY  improvement  in  firearms  produces  a  powerful  im- 
pression that  the  Defensive  has  thereby  gained  an  accession 
of  strength.  This  feeling  is  all  the  more  natural  because  a 
purely  defensive  attitude  in  the  open  field  was  first  rendered 
possible  by  the  invention  of  firearms  and  of  gunpowder.  In 
earlier  days  battles  took  the  form  of  encounters  in  which 
both  sides  took  the  offensive,  or  else  the  defender  was 
driven  to  make  use  of  fortification  to  an  extent  far  surpass- 
ing the  practice  of  the  present  day. 

Firearms  and  the  Defensive  are  as  much  allied  in  our 
minds  as  are  "1'arme  blanche"  and  the  Offensive;  in  neither 
case  can  we  well  imagine  the  allies  separated.  "The  better 
the  firearm,  the  stronger  the  defence"  is,  therefore,  a  maxim 
the  justice  of  which  has  always  exerted  its  influence  upon 
military  operations  since  firearms  have  become  general,  and 
which  has  not  yet  quite  lost  its  power. 

So  it  was  after  the  Crimean  war,  when  the  rifled  musket, 
and  so  after  the  Bohemian  campaign,  when  the  breechloader, 
respectively  made  their  dtbut  in  the  field.  In  each  case 
theory  raised  its  voice  very  loudly  in  favor  of  the  principle 
of  the  Defence,  and  if  the  book-tacticians  of  those  days  had 
been  worthy  of  credit,  the  war  of  1870 — 71  should  have 
bloomed  into  one  of  the  finest  specimens  of  a  war  of  posi- 
tions, in  which,  as  is  well  known,  the  art  of  beating  gives 
place  to  that  of  not  being  beaten. 

This  theory  was  deduced  in  a  curious  manner  from  our 
latest  war-experience,  each  time  in  an  indirect  way,  that  is 


The  Offensive  and  the  Defensive.  15 

to  say,  the  new  arm  was  in  both  campaigns  victorious  in 
Offence ;  nevertheless  we  are  told  that  it  should  properly 
give  more  power  to  the  Defence.  The  fact  that  in  1859  the 
Austrian  rifle  did  not  hold  its  own  against  the  smoothbore 
with  which  the  French  were  still  mostly  armed,  was  ac- 
counted for  by  the  action  of  the  French  rifled  cannon.  But, 
as  was  still  maintained,  "rifled  guns  and  muskets  must  in- 
fallibly make  the  Defensive  invincible." 

It  is  a  remarkable  and  interesting  fact  that  at  a  time  when 
these  defensive  theories  had  obtained  pretty  general  ap- 
proval, both  in  literature  and  even  in  other  ways,  the  Aus- 
trians  in  1866  would  have  nothing  to  say  to  them,  and  set- 
ting at  naught  the  dictates  of  nature  and  tradition,  rushed 
almost  fanatically  into  the  Offensive — to  be  everywhere 
beaten ;  and  that  when  the  tables  were  turned  and  many 
voices  were  raised  against  that  one-sided  theory  to  reject  it, 
the  French  in  1870  went  upon  the  opposite  tack,  and,  like 
the  Austrians,  acting  contrary  to  their  nature  and  traditions, 
servilely  followed  a  Defensive  system — to  be  in  like  manner 
everywhere  beaten ! 

These  striking  contradictions  show  plainly  enough  that 
the  formula  of  the  "certain  shot"  is  not  infallible,  when  we 
have  to  decide  upon  the  absolute  merit  of  this  or  that  tacti- 
cal formation. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  the  critics  recovered  themselves 
pretty  soon  from  the  first  panic,  so  to  say,  which  was  created 
by  the  general  introduction  of  rifled  arms,  and  resting  upon 
the  experiences  of  1859,  they  met  the  theory  of  the  absolute 
Defensive  with  the  argument  that  it  was  not  so  much  the 
accuracy  of  the  new  arms  as  their  low  trajectory  which  ren- 
dered them  such  valuable  allies  to  the  Defence.  With  re- 
gard to  breechloaders,  it  was  asserted  even  before  1866  that 
their  rapidity  of  fire  would  serve  the  assailant  at  least  as 
well  as  it  would  the  defender.  In  fact  the  more  portable, 
moveable,  handy,  and  quick-firing  a  gun  is,  so  much  the 
more  suited  is  it  to  the  attacking  party,  which  is  compelled 


1 6  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry, 

to  be  constantly  in  movement,  a  condition  unfavorable  to 
the  use  of  firearms.  The  development  of  artillery  from  the 
gun  of  position  to  its  present  degree  of  perfection  was  a 
consequence  of  this  conviction,  just  as  the  rapid-firing  in- 
fantry of  Frederick  the  Great,  acting  as  it  did  on  the  offen- 
sive, was  an  example  of  its  justice. 

Thus  a  very  decided  opposition  to  the  defensive  hobby 
grew  out  of  purely  technical  considerations.  Is  it  necessary 
to  enlarge  upon  the  decisive  question  of  morale? 

We  think  not,  after  1870,  after  1866,  after  the  whole  of 
Prussia's  history.  Indeed  it  may  appear  superfluous  to 
moot  the  question  at  all  at  the  present  day,  and  in  our 
country !  The  theory  of  the  superiority  of  the  Offensive  is 
for  the  time  being  so  firmly  rooted  that  a  reaction  is  not 
much  to  be  feared. 

And  yet  even  with  us  the  time  of  the  doubters  has  not 
long  passed  away;  a  single  instance  of  failure  on  the  part  of 
the  Offensive — always  a  possible  event — would  again  wake 
up  these  theorists,  who,  in  accordance  with  their  critical 
German  nature,  would  once  more  produce  their  coldly  rea- 
soned "demonstrations  founded  upon  the  nature  of  the  arm." 

After  all  we  might  remain  indifferent  to  this  if  the  ques- 
tion raised  in  tactical  literature,  "Defensive  or  Offensive  ? " 
had  not  led  to  another  tactical  inquiry,  which  in  its  bearing 
on  the  principles  of  the  training  of  our  infantry  is,  perhaps, 
no  less  important  than  the  former  one. 

The  well-known  school-definitions  describe  "victory"  as 
the  end  aimed  at  in  every  "conflict;"  moreover,  the  pro- 
nounce the  "Offensive"  to  be  almost  without  exception  the 
only  "road  to  victory;"  whilst  they  proclaim  the  "Defensive" 
to  be  a  "negation  of  victory,"  which  to  become  decisively 
victorious  must  needs  "change  its  nature"  and  become 
Offensive.  We  thus  come  to  the  following  conclusion : 

"That  to  obtain  a  decisive  victory  we  must  adopt  the 
Offensive  from  the  first,  or  else  take  to  it  after  a  Defence  suc- 
cessfully conducted." 


The  Offensive  and  the  Defensive.  17 

Though  these  maxims  are  only  of  primary  and  absolute 
importance  to  the  strategical  side  of  the  discussion,  yet 
they  doubtless  have  the  value  of  a  principle  also  from  the 
tactical  point  of  view.  A  victory  gained  simply  by  acting 
tactically  on  the  defensive,  without  any  offensive  return  or 
pursuit,  and  merely  compelling  the  enemy  to  retreat,  will 
never  decide  a  campaign,  but  will,  at  the  most,  prepare  the 
way  for  this  result. 

But  in  every  battle  it  should  be  our  aim  at  once  to  attain 
the  decisive  result,  which  consists  in  the  tactical  annihila- 
tion of  the  enemy. 

When,  therefore,  we  come  to  treat  of  tactical  formations, 
we  shall  necessarily  resume  the  discussion  as  to  the  funda- 
mental conditions,  and  as  to  the  chances  of  these  two  only 
possible  methods  of  attaining  victory. 

But  we  find  in  war,  besides  the  decisive  battles  alluded 
to,  a  great  number  of  engagements,  that  is  to  say,  of  oppor- 
tunities for  fighting,  in  which  certainly  one  side,  and  per- 
haps the  other  also,  does  not  attempt  to  attain  to  any  deci- 
sive result ;  in  other  words,  to  gain  a  victory  in  the  sense  of 
a  definitive  overthrow  of  the  enemy  ;  where  the  possession  of 
a  certain  point  or  portion  of  a  position,  or  the  gain  of  a 
certain  amount  of  time,  is  of  more  importance  to  you  than 
is  the  actual  loss  of  men  at  the  same  time  caused  to  the 
enemy. 

Such  engagements  must  always  naturally  assume  an 
offensive  or  defensive  character,  but  never  represent  the 
Offensive  or  Defensive  in  the  sense  of  seeking  to  obtain  vic- 
tory by  the  adoption  of  either  principle.  Hence  it  ensues 
that  the  way  in  which  troops  are  handled  will  differ  accord- 
ing to  which  of  the  two  objects  you  have  in  view,  and  thus, 
that  the  formations  which  suit  the  one  case  will  not  be  en- 
tirely adapted  to  the  other. 

In  order  then  to  promote  a  clear  system  of  instruction  in 
time  of  peace,  the  end  we  are  now  aiming  at,  it  appears 
necessary,  both  in  theory  and  practice,  to  establish  the  dis- 


1 8  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

tinction  between  the  fighting  which  aims  at  a  decisive  result, 
and  that  which  aims  at  no  decisive  result  ( to  which  we  ivill  apply 
the  term  "Temporising  combat"),  more  clearly  than  has  been 
done  heretofore. 

Then  in  treating  of  fighting  which  aims  at  a  decisive  result, 
the  further  question  crops  up  of  Offensive  or  Defensive  ?  and 
we  shall  have  occasion  again  to  inculcate,  both  theoretically 
and  practically,  that  there  should  be  no  such  thing  as  a  De- 
fensive without  a  development  of  the  Offensive  from  it. 

This  study,  then,  would  give  the  foundation  upon  which 
the  details  of  a  sound  modern  system  of  infantry  tactics 
may  be  based,  a  foundation  which,  assuming  the  form  of  a 
"  Battle-guide,"  would  establish  principles  somewhat  such 
as  follow : 

1.  Every  officer  with  an  independent  command  finding 
himself  in  front  of  the  enemy  has  at  once  to  make  up  his 
mind  as  to  the  following  points : — whether  he  can  or  should, 
cannot  or  should  not,  aim  at  a  decisive  result ;  this  will  de- 
pend upon  whether  he  is  strong  enough,  upon  the  general 
situation,  whether  other  troops  are  engaged  before   him, 
what  there  is  behind  him,  and  so  forth ;  or  whether  his  sit- 
uation is  likely  to  be  improved  by  a  temporising  combat  or 
not.     This  would  be  undertaken  to  give  time  for  reinforce- 
ments to  arrive,  for  the  purpose  of  misleading  the  enemy, 
or  for  gaining  better  information  ; 

2.  Should  he  feel  bound  to  answer  both  questions  in  the 
negative,  he  should  do  his  utmost  to  avoid  or  break  off  all 
engagements ; 

3.  If  he  thinks  himself  justified  in  entering  into  a  decisive 
action,  he  should  adopt  the  principle  of  the  Offensive;  should 
he,  without  being  momentarily  strong  enough  for  such  a 
course,  be  able  to  reckon   upon    receiving  sufficient   rein- 
forcements, he  should  carry  on  a  temporising  combat  in  such 
a  manner  that,  as  far  as  possible,   the   enemy   may   be   de- 
prived of  the  initiative  in  assuming  the    Offensive,    whilst 


The  Offensive  and  the  Defensive.  19 

threatened  with  it  at  the  same  time  by  him  (see  the  chapter 
on  the  temporising  combat). 

4.  Only  under  very  peculiar  and  exceptional  circum- 
stances, or  when  the  nature  of  the  ground  peremptorily  de- 
mands it,  should  he  accept  battle  from  the  first  in  a  defen- 
sive position. 

We  will  now  proceed  to  consider  the  three  chief  forms  of 
tactical  action,  which  result  from  the  foregoing  considera- 
tions: the  Offensive,  the  Defensive-Offensive,  and  the  Tempo- 
rising Combat. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE    OFFENSIVE. 

THE  outward  evidence  of  victory,  hence  the  object  we 
strive  for,  is  the  forcible  expulsion  of  the  enemy  from  that 
spot  on  which  he  wishes  to  maintain  himself.  All  action  of 
troops  in  battle  consists  in  the  employment  of  the  power 
either  of  dealing  blows  or  of  withstanding  them.  Both 
taken  together  constitute  the  fighting  capacity  of  a  body  of 
troops,  that  quality  without  which  the  troops  as  a  body 
cannot  exist,  and  the  loss  of  which  entails  their  destruction 
as  such.  This  power,  then,  of  giving  blows  and  of  with- 
standing them — in  other  words,  the  attacking  power  and 
the  resisting  power,  encounter  one  another  in  every  action, 
with  a  view  to  mutual  destruction ;  victory  inclines  to  the 
side  gifted  with  the  greatest  fighting  capacity.  In  order  to 
be  victorious,  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  be  stronger  than 
your  adversary  at  a  given  time  and  place. 

This  greater  degree  of  strength  is  obtained  either  by  the 
physical  and  numerical,  or  by  the  moral  superiority  of  one 
force  over  the  other  ;  if  possible,  by  all  combined. 

The  sum  total  of  these  advantages  represents  the  attack- 
ing power  of  the  force  on  the  offensive,  and,  in  like  manner, 
the  resisting  power  of  that  on  the  defensive.  Now,  in  order 
that  a  force  on  the  offensive  may  be  able  to  develop  with 
effect  its  maximum  of  attacking  power,  and  make  use  of  it 
to  the  utmost,  it  should  adopt  a  formation  favorable,  as  far 
as  possible,  to  the  following  requirements  :— 

To  the  very  greatest  mobility ;  for  the  possibility  of  a  sue- 


The  Offensive.  21 

cessful  Offensive  is,  above  all,  dependent  on  forward  move- 
ment ;  further, 

To  the  greatest  possible  security  from  the  effects  of  the  enemy's 
fire ;  that  most  dangerous  foe  to  the  Offensive,  because  it 
damages  most  intensely  the  assailant's  attacking  power, 
both  physical  and  moral,  and  may  cause  him  to  hesitate, 
retire,  give  way  before  reaching  the  decisive  point : 

Lastly,  to  the  greatest  possible  development  of  its  own 
fire,  at  any  rate,  at  the  moment  of  actual  collision,  and,  if 
possible,  at  an  earlier  stage  of  the  combat  also ;  for  the 
superiority  of  the  assailant  in  this  respect  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  give  his  attack  the  amount  of  power  requisite 
to  ensure  a  real  victory. 

The  old  system  of  tactics  met  these  requirements  by  pro- 
viding formations  in  mass;  either  in  line  or  column. 

The  revolutionary  wars  introduced  the  extended  order — the 
swarm  of  skirmishers. 

The  massive  formations  as  developed  by  the  Napoleonic 
wars,  and  as  maintained  down  to  the  latest  war-era,  fulfilled 
more  or  less  well  all  the  above-mentioned  general  require- 
ments for  every  offensive  formation,  or  fulfilled,  some 
more,  others  less  well,  as  measured  by  the  armament  of  those 
days. 

Formation  in  extended  order,  in  other  words  the  action 
of  individuals,  seems  at  that  period  to  have  been  a  mere 
accessory,  rendered  necessary,  to  speak  generally,  rather  by 
the  altered  method  of  conducting  military  operations  (tak- 
ing advantage  of  ground),  than  by  the  nature  of  the  arms. 

The  attempts  made  from  time  to  time  to  raise  this  ex- 
tended order  to  the  first  rank  failed  during  the  revolutionary 
period,  owing  to  the  inefficiency  of  those  who  undertook 
the  enterprise ;  and  these  attempts  were  not  renewed,  be- 
cause they  were  as  yet  not  necessary ;  nevertheless,  the 
combat  of  Saalfeld  may  be  cited  as  an  example  of  an  action 


22  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

in  which  victory  was  gained  entirely  by  the  use  of  entended 
order  offensively. 

Since  the  first  steps  were  taken  in  the  manufacture  of  the 
new  arms,  this  formation  has  forced  its  way  more  and  more 
into  the  foreground;  in  1859,  the  rifle  placed  it  upon  an 
equality  with  the  old  formation;  in  1870-71,  the  breech- 
loader established  its  superiority  over  it. 

The  following  fact  is  finally  established  in  opposition  to 
all  previous  theories,  that  in  the  war  of  1870-71,  the  enemy's 
position  (whether  in  the  open  field  or  on  the  borders  of 
woods  and  villages),  was  invariably  carried  by  swarms  of 
skirmishers,  followed  only  at  greater  or  less  distance  by  lines 
and  columns  in  close  order. 

We  may  therefore  affirm,  that  individual  order  has  actually 
become  the  only  battle-formation  for  infantry. 

We  place  the  expression  individual  order  in  contrast  to 
order  in  mass,  and  understand  by  the  latter  term,  a  formation 
in  which  each  individual  soldier  has  his  assigned  place, 
which  he  must  not  leave;  by  the  former,  a  formation  in 
which  each  soldier  has  likewise  a  place  assigned  to  him,  but 
in  a  general  way,  and  with  the  power  of  changing  it  at 
pleasure  within  certain  fixed  limits. 

We  substitute  the  expressions  "order  in  mass"  and  "indi- 
vidual order"  for  those  in  general  use,  namely,  "close  order" 
and  "extended"  or  "dissolved"  (aufgelost)  order, — first, 
because  the  formation  of  skirmishers,  which  is  implied  by 
both  the  latter  terms,  may  often  take  very  close  order ;  and, 
secondly,  because  the  actual  dissolution  of  order  is  never 
recognised.* 

These  are  but  words :  of  little  consequence  in  argument, 
when  the  disputants  understand  one  another's  meaning,  but 
in  practice  not  altogether  void  of  meaning  and  valueless. 

*  Henceforth  in  the  translation,  I  shall  take  the  liberty  of  making  use  of  the  ex- 
pressions "  close  order"  and  "  extended  order,"  because  more  convenient  and  more 
familiar  to  English  ears  than  the  literal  translation  of  "massenordnung"  and 
"  einzelordnung."— (Tr.) 


The  Offensive.  23 

We  hardly  require  any  further  arguments  to  prove  that  ex- 
tended order  is  more  adapted  to  the  three  above-named 
main  requirements  for  offensive  action  than  any  formation 
in  close  order. 

Moreover,  we  may  safely  allege,  that  no  considerations  of 
that  kind  weighed  against  the  general  and  much  earlier 
adoption  of  extended  order  for  infantry  attack.  The  actual 
objection  lay  rather  in  the  instinctive,  though  it  might  be 
unexpressed,  conviction,  that  with  the  means  of  training 
troops  then  available,  it  would  be  impossible  with  skirmish- 
ers to  obtain  the  amount  of  attac king-power  indispensable  to 
offensive  action. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  thought  seriously  that  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  skirmish- 
ers ;  and,  secondly,  no  great  reliance  was  placed  on  the  moral 
force  of  extended  order.  This  arose  from  the  traditions  of 
the  period,  and  tradition  hinders  men  oftener  than  we  think 
from  finding  Columbus'  egg. 

The  promotion  of  extended  order  to  the  rank  of  a  tactical 
formation  only  became  possible  when  value  began  to  be 
attached  to  the  development  of  the  soldier's  faculties  by  in- 
struction, and  on  the  other  hand,  this  only  took  place  when 
the  improvement  of  firearms  began  to  make  the  extended 
order  more  and  more  necessary. 

Thus,  as  is  generally  the  case  in  this  world,  supply  met 
demand,  one  having  produced  the  other,  until  we  reached 
the  present  stage,  when  we  have  to  perfect  the  means  which 
have  supplied  the  demand. 

The  controversial  literature  of  later  years,  and  war-expe- 
rience, have  supplied  such  inexhaustible  materials  for  show- 
ing how  this  may  be  accomplished  that  it  would  be  difficult 
to  say  anything  new  upon  the  subject  ;  we  only  require 
these  materials  to  be  arranged  methodically.  This  arrange- 
ment must  evidently  be  in  keeping  with  those  general  prin- 
ciples applicable  to  the  Offensive,  which  have  held  good  in 
all  ages. 


24  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

We  must  now,  before  proceeding  further,  revert  briefly  to 
these  principles,  although,  in  doing  so,  we  shall  go  over 
long-familiar  ground. 

Every  attack  has  to  go  through  three  stages  :— 
The  period  of  preparation, 

The  moment  of  accomplishment,  and  of  the  greatest 
strain  on  the  faculties,  and 

The  period  of  reaction  and  of  recovery. 

It  is  sufficient  to  indicate  these  stages ;  we  are  not  here 
called  upon  to  prove  their  "raison  d'etre." 

Let  us  only  premise,  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding, 
that  by  the  expression  "preparation  of  the  attack,"*  we  by 
no  means  understand  the  same  thing  as  the  "opening  of  the 
fight."f 

The  "opening  of  the  fight"  implies  the  several  acts  of 
reconnoitring  the  enemy  and  the  ground,  of  gaining  time 
for  deployment,  of  coming  to  a  determination  upon  the 
object  to  be  fought  for,  and  upon  the  means  to  be  em- 
ployed; that  is  to  say,  of  making  your  dispositions  and 
giving  out  your  orders ;  all  of  which  belongs,  according  to 
our  previous  classification,  to  the  domain  of  the  "Temporis- 
ing combat." 

In  the  observations  which  follow,  we  will  look  upon  this 
period  as  passed  by,  and  will  treat  of  the  "preparation" 
simply  as  the  first  step  of  an  attack,  the  direction  of  which, 
and  the  means  to  be  employed  in  making  which,  have  al- 
ready been  quite  settled. 

If  in  any  matter  connected  with  war  we  may  consider 
thorough  energy  of  will  as  the  most  necessary  condition  of 
success,  this  will  apply  most  certainly  to  the  attack,  in  which 
our  warlike  energy  is  most  completely  drawn  upon. 

This  being  then  admitted,  we  must  actually  take  into  con- 


*  Vorbereitung  des  Angriffs. 
t  EInleitung  des  Qefechts. 


The  Offensive.  25 

sideration  whatever  relates  to  the  theory  of  the  attack,  and 
to  its  practical  execution. 

This  will  be  the  place  to  treat  more  particularly  of  those 
elements  which  produce  energy  of  action. 

First  of  all  comes  clearness  of  judgment — clearness  in  two 
ways — both  with  regard  to  the  end  to  be  attained  and  to  the 
means  to  be  employed. 

This  might  appear  to  some  so  self-evident  as  not  to  de- 
serve particular  mention,  and  yet  whoever  studies  military 
history  with  care  will  find  how  much  powder  has  been 
wasted,  how  much  human  blood  has  been  uselessly  spilt, 
from  want  of  this  clearness. 

The  critic  cannot  fail  to  observe  that  a  large  proportion 
of  the  actions  in  every  war,  both  ancient  and  modern,  have 
been  commenced  without  consideration,  carried  on  without 
energy,  and  brought  to  a  close  without  advantage,  by  one 
or  both  parties. 

We  are  now  speaking  of  temporising  combats,  or  of  those 
undertaken  for  reconnoitring  purposes  ;  these  have  an  actual 
object,  and  a  real  use ;  we  refer  to  that  scuffling  sort  of  fight 
in  which  some  commanders  think  themselves  bound  to  en- 
gage every  time  that  they  see  an  enemy,  and  which  is  often 
commenced  by  a  go-a-head  advance-guard  before  its  leader 
has  calculated  what  he  wishes  to  gain,  or  can  gain  by  it  ; 
before  he  has  asked  himself  the  question,  whether  it  may 
not,  on  the  whole,  be  prejudicial  to  the  general  operations. 
Once  commenced,  the  fight  must  be  carried  on  by  the 
troops  which  successively  come  up,  because  in  military 
affairs  most  especially  the  saying  comes  true,  that  he  who 
says  A  must  also  say  B.  It  is  only  lucky  when  a  "skrim- 
mage,"  of  this  kind,  at  least,  ends  without  any  decided  re- 
sult, or  when  he  who  commenced  it  without  knowing  why, 
finds  as  the  affair  goes  on,  means  and  energy  enough  to 
bring  it  to  a  decisive  conclusion. 

But  still,  this  sort  of  thing  does  no  good.     Therefore  in 


26  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

the  chapter  on  the  Offensive  and  Defensive,  it  is  recommended 
that  a  commander  should  avoid  all  fights  which  do  not  offer 
any  positive  and  attainable  objective.  Therefore,  again,  we 
consider  it  of  primary  importance  that  whoever  determines 
upon  the  Offensive  should  undertake  it  with  his  whole  energy, 
and  should  make  full  use  of  all  the  means  at  his  disposal. 

This  also  may  seem  self-evident ;  and  yet  how  many 
attacks  one  sees  made  with  half  or  a  quarter  of  the  force 
available,  under  the  influence  of  that  barrack-square  theory, 
false  as  it  is,  of  the  possibility  of  renewing  the  attack  with 
the  second  line,  and  of  that  equally  false  school-theory  of 
the  necessity  of  holding  back  the  reserves. 

This  is  the  moment  to  devote  a  few  words  to  the  import- 
ance of  the  introductory  (as  distinguished  from  the  prepara- 
tory} period  of  the  attack,  of  the  form  and  conduct  of  which 
we  shall  treat  in  the  chapter  on  the  temporising  combat. 

The  enormous  effect  of  artillery  and  infantry  fire  more 
than  ever  impels  masses  of  troops  which  come  under  it  to 
bring  things  to  as  rapid  a  conclusion  as  possible :  more  than 
ever,  therefore,  is  the  habit  of  quick  decision  necessary  to 
the  leader,  and  more  than  ever  should  the  masses  be  kept 
back  until  the  plan  of  action  is  determined,  for  which  the 
introductory  period  is  alone  available,  the  possibility  of  a 
subsequent  change  of  plan  being,  moreover,  much  more 
restricted  than  formerly. 

As  soon  as'the  leader  has  determined  upon  his  mode  of 
action,  he  has,  so  to  say,  cast  the  dice,  and  victory  depends 
upon  the  throw. 

From  that  moment,  no  hesitation,  no  half  measures,  are 
allowable.  The  commander's  judgment  as  to  "where"  and 
"when"  will  unalterably  and  irrevocably  determine  the  re- 
sult of  the  operation. 

This  is  the  work  of  the  introductory  stage,  and  this  it  is 
which  makes  that  stage  decisive  to  the  leader  of  an  attack. 
The  determination  has  been  taken.  Now  to  the  conditions 
of  execution. 


The  Offensive.  27 


>We  have  already  shown  that  to  have  a  numerical  and 
moral  superiority  over  the  enemy  at  a  specified  time  and 
place  is  a  main  condition  of  success:  to  this  must  be  added, 
as  elements  of  victory,  mobility,  certainty,  and  a  formation 
calculated  to  get  full  value  from  the  arms. 

•  Your  attack  vmist  have  its  fixed  objective ;  it  must  be  conducted 
as  directly  as  possible,  and  without  a  check;  it  must  be  executed 
with  the  whole  of  the  force  at  your  disposal. 

These  three  principles,  as  universal  experience  shows  us 
are  the  necessary  foundation  of  all  attack. 

With  all  disposable  force!  You  can  never  be  too  strong 
when  making  an  attack,  for  you  never  can  be  perfectly  sure 
of  what  forces  you  may  encounter,  or  at  what  moment  the 
defender  may  make  a  counter  attack,  which  will  only  be 
omitted  by  an  apathetic  foe.  But  the  repulse  of  every  at- 
tack exercises  a  demoralising  influence  on  the  assailant,  and 
the  possibility  of  renewing  the  assault  with  fresh  troops, 
which  can  alone  justify  the  non-employment  in  the  first 
instance  of  your  whole  available  force,  will  always  be  dimin- 
ished by  a  first  unsuccessful  attempt.  Whether  the  attack 
prove  successful  or  not,  it  is  better  that  all  your  forces 
should  be  concentrated,  as  both  the  physical  effect  upon 
the  enemy  and  the  moral  stimulus  upon  yourself  will  be 
thereby  augmented,  and  danger  will  be  diminished,  both 
directly  and  indirectly,  if  the  masses  are  held  together  under 
the  influence  of  one  chief. 

Infantry  being  able  to  maintain  a  standing  fight  is  not, 
like  cavalry,  put  "hors  combat"  by  a  repulse,  and  the 
stronger  the  force  the  more  true  this  is.  Hence  the  reserve 
which  infantry  proceeding  to  the  attack  leaves  behind  it 
should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum,  being-  only  intended  to 
cover  its  rear  in  case  of  need,  perhaps  to  hold  a  defile  which 
may  happen  to  be  in  dangerous  proximity ;  it  will  be  best  if 
this  reserve  for  the  infantry  is  furnished  by  the  other  arms. 

An  attack  made  with  only  a  part  of  your  force  at  once 
awakens  the  idea  of  the  possibility  of  non-success. 


28  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

Now  a  commander  should  weigh  in  his  own  mind  all  the 
chances  of  defeat,  and  seek  beforehand  to  provide  against 
them ;  but  if  once  soldiers  engaged  in  an  assault  have  the 
idea  of  retreat  in  their  heads  they  are  already  half  beaten. 

It  is  possible  for  the  attack  to  fail,  but  it  is  impossible  for 
us  to  go  back.  The  sword  cuts  or  flies  to  pieces,  the  army 
conquers,  or  there  will  only  be  its  fragments  to  collect. 

To  make  an  attack  in  such  a  spirit  as  this,  you  require 
your  whole  available  strength ;  otherwise  it  ceases  to  be  an 
attack,  and  becomes  merely  a  tentative  advance  with  a  retreat 
quickly  impending. 

As  directly  as  possible,  and  without  a  check!  It  naturally 
must  deaden  the  energy  of  your  attack  and  diminish  your 
chance  of  success  if  you  take  a  round-about  way  to  reach 
your  object.  Quickness  of  execution  is  one  of  the  chief 
elements  of  success,  and  is  most  seriously  impaired  by  any 
deviation  from  the  straight  direction  of  the  onset.  However 
great  the  advantage  of  directing  your  attack  upon  the  flank 
of  an  enemy,  it  is  nevertheless  imperative  that  the  measures 
for  doing  this  should  be  taken  when  they  can  be  carried  out 
unseen  and  unmolested  by  fire  ;  as,  for  instance,  during  the 
introductory  period ;  and  such  a  manoeuvre  will  never  be 
favorable  to  success  if  attempted  by  an  oblique  movement 
under  fire,  or  by  a  change  of  front  (which  takes  up  a  long 
time,  and  is  therefore  prejudicial),  after  you  are  already  en- 
gaged. The  destructive  effect  of  the  enemy's  projectiles 
will  produce  confusion  as  the  inevitable  consequence  of  such 
a  complicated  attempt ;  this  will  be  followed  by  hesitation 
and  a  full  stop ;  the  attentive  foe  will  take  advantage  of 
such  a  dangerous  movement  for  making  a  doubly  damaging 
counter  stroke. 

Straight  to  the  front— forward  is  the  word  of  command 
suited  to  the  attack,  and  the  only  command  which  is  sure 
of  its  moral  impulse  upon  the  soldier. 

The  fixed  objective!  Only  the  first  point  to  be  reached 
should  be  given  as  the  object  of  attack.  Nothing  can  be 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  29 

more  prejudicial  than  to  make  a  determination  as  to  a 
second  objective  before  the  first  is  attained.  The  previous 
indication  of  what  is  to  happen  z/the  first  point  is  carried  is 
as  premature  as  the  simultaneous  direction  of  the  attacking 
force  on  objects  which  are  not  in  the  same  line. 

No  attack  should  have  more  than  one  objective  at  a  time ; 
whatever  follows  will  require  further  orders. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  supreme  command  to  confine  opera- 
tions to  the  end  in  view,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  operating 
force  to  keep  strictly  within  the  limits  assigned.  An  offen- 
sive action  to  be  carried  out  with  calculated  energy  (to  which 
mere  "Man"  is  in  strong  contrast),  should  advance  by  spurts 
from  one  mark  aimed  at  to  another.  We  must  make  allow- 
ance for  the  moment  of  reaction,  the  natural  consequence 
of  every  attack,  and  of  the  extreme  tension  of  the  nerves, 
which  is  its  inevitable  accompaniment.  Before  this  moment 
of  weakness  has  passed  away,  a  leader  with  clear  and  sure 
views  will  not  proceed  to  the  solution  of  further  problems. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  force  which  ignores  these  natural 
pauses  in  the  conflict,  and  which  oversteps  those  lines  of 
demarcation  between  its  stages  in  a  fragmentary  way  will 
not  be  as  reliable  for  manoeuvre — as  much  in  hand — as  could 
be  wished.  That  blind  forward  rush  beyond  a  position 
which  has  been  carried,  that  reckless  charge  upon  the 
enemy,  without  a  thought  of  your  neighbors,  has  gathered 
many  a  laurel,  but  has  also  compromised  many  a  success, 
and  has  led  to  many  a  repulse :  it  has  only  cost  the  perpe- 
trators their  lives,  but  it  has  cost  the  army  victory. 

Therefore,  only  one  object  at  a  time!  So  much  for  the  gen- 
eral subject.  Let  us  now  turn  to  the  special  formations  for 
the  three  stages  of  the  attack. 

I.    THE    PREPARATORY   STAGE. 

The  necessity  of  preparing  the  way  for  an  attack  by  the 
fire  of  artillery  and  skirmishers  has  already  been  inculcated 
in  former  lessons  on  warfare.  We  shall  therefore  have  less 


3O  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

to  deal  with  the  general  question  than  with  the  strength  of 
troops  intended  for  this  purpose,  and  with  the  mode  of 
handling  them.  The  old  principle  of  extending  only  as  few 
skirmishers  as  possible,  of  letting  "out  of  hand"  only  as 
many  as  are  absolutely  necessary  for  the  end  in  view,  how- 
ever well  suited  to  the  epoch  such  a  maxim  may  have  been, 
has  suffered  considerable  modification  from  the  improve- 
ment in  firearms. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  accession  of  strength  which 
has  accrued  to  the  Defence  from  improved  firearms  has  pro- 
duced its  first  result  in  the  increased  necessity  for  preparatory 
action,  and,  consequent  upon  this,  in  the  augmentation  of  the 
force  employed  for  this  purpose. 

The  rule  which  formerly  was  considered  so  important,  of 
only  reinforcing  a  line  of  skirmishers  little  by  little,  soon 
proved  itself  in  practice  to  be  more  dangerous  and  more 
productive  of  loss  that  the  extension  of  a  sufficient  number 
from  the  very  first,  that  is  to  say,  from  the  time  of  coming 
within  the  zone  of  rifle  fire.  After  substituting  the  latter 
rule  for  the  old  one,  we  must  next  determine  what  is  a  suf- 
ficient number. 

In  view  of  the  increased  powers  of  resistance  of  the  De- 
fence, the  answer  must  certainly  be,  as  many  rifles  as  from  the 
nature  of  the  ground  can  be  brought  effectively  into  play. 

If  the  preparation  of  an  attack  is  really  to  be  effectual,  in 
other  words,  if  it  is  to  shake  the  defender  physically  and 
morally,  it  is  of  primary  importance  that  the  same  should 
be  continued  without  interruption  from  the  very  commence- 
ment to  the  moment  of  actual  impact.  If  the  last  rush  only 
takes  place  some  time  after  the  preparatory  fire  has  been 
interrupted,  although  this  may  possibly  have  materially 
weakened  the  defenders,  there  will  be  no  question  of  seri- 
ously shaking  their  morale,  always  supposing  them  to  be 
good  troops.  On  the  contrary,  the  fact  of  the  artillery  fire 
having  been  really  or  apparently  silenced,  will  have  exalted 
their  courage. 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  31 

Now,  as  the  fire  of  every  skirmisher  armed  with  a  breech- 
loader may  be  looked  upon  as  uninterrupted,  and  as  each 
individual  requires  for  the  full  use  of  his  arm,  when  in 
movement,  about  one-and-a-half  paces  in  width,  we  may 
reckon  the  greatest  possible  strength  desirable  for  troops 
engaged  in  the  preparatory  operation  at  one  man  to  every  one- 
and-a-half  paces  of  the  front  of  attack.  This  calculation  will, 
then,  without  considering  the  question  of  loss  which  we  shall 
deal  with  hereafter,  represent  the  maximum  strength  of 
skirmishers  told  off  for  the  preparation.  As  at  this  moment 
we  have  only  to  consider  the  amount  of  fire  to  be  developed, 
we  must  look  upon  every  man  placed  in  the  line  of  skir- 
mishers who  cannot  contribute  to  this,  owing  to  want  of 
space,  as  hurtful  to  the  general  effect,  inasmuch  as  he  is  un- 
necessarily increasing  the  materials  for  loss. 

Given,  therefore,  a  body  of  troops  of  a  specified  strength, 
it  will  be  at  once  necessary  to  determine  how  broad  can, 
should,  or  must  be  its  front  of  attack. 

In  order  to  do  this,  we  must  examine  another  phase  of  the 
requirements  to  be  demanded  from  the  fire  which  prepares 
the  way  for  attack. 

We  have  already  noticed  the  necessity  for  an  uninter- 
rupted fire  from  the  very  commencement  of  the  action  up 
to  the  moment  of  actual  collision.  And  to  be  more  precise, 
it  is  necessary  to  remark,  that  we  time  this  commencement 
from  the  moment  at  which  the  advanced  troops,  whose  mis- 
sion consists  in  preparing  the  way  for  the  attack  by  attempt- 
ing to  shake  the  enemy's  powers  of  resistance,  have  reached 
(we  will  explain  later  how)  the  point  from  which  their  fire 
will  be  most  effective.  It  is  not  at  present  necessary  for  us 
to  explain  our  reasons  for  choosing  this  moment.  In  the 
present  condition  of  firearms  this  point  would  be  between 
400  and  200  paces  from  the  spot  at  which  we  propose  to 
force  the  enemy's  position. 

Now  it  is  not  in  human  nature  for  even  the  best  troops 
in  the  world  to  hold  out  for  more  than  a  few  minutes  whilst 


32  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

they  and  their  opponents  are  keeping  up  a  rapid  independ- 
ent fire,  such  as  it  would  be,  upon  one  another  at  so  close 
and  effective  a  range  (for  we  presume  both  parties  to  be 
equally  well  armed).  Not  to  mention  the  actual  loss,  which 
is  often  not  at  all  in  proportion  to  the  expenditure  of  am- 
munition, the  moral  effect  of  such  a  fire  upon  the  nerves  is 
such  that  the  crisis  will  be  hurried  on  very  quickly  by  the 
excitement  thus  produced. 

We  must  not  imagine  the  defender  with  the  advantage, 
which  he  has,  of  the  more  favorable  position,  to  be  in  other 
respects  inferior  to  the  assailant ;  we  must  not  suppose  him 
to  bolt;  therefore,  after  a  very  short  time,  the  attacking 
force  will  either  be  seized  with  the  impulse  to  rush  forward 
to  close  quarters,  or  to  turn  tail.  Hence,  it  is  advisable,  in 
order  to  meet  either  the  one  case  or  the  other,  for  the  main 
body  destined  to  give  the  actual  shock  to  be  up  in  line  with 
the  advanced  skirmishers  (who  are  not  of  themselves  strong 
enough  to  do  the  work)  by  this  time,  or  better  still,  a  little 
sooner. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  naturally  the  interest  of  the  main 
body  not  to  come  up  with  the  advanced  skirmishers,  that  is 
to  say,  into  the  zone  of  serious  loss,  before  their  fire  has 
been  doing  its  work  for  some  time ;  if  possible  indeed,  not 
until  the  probable  moment  of  the  crisis. 

Until  then,  it  should  endeavor  to  keep  as  far  as  practica- 
ble out  of  the  effectual  range  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  by 
reconciling  as  far  as  possible  these  contradictory  require- 
ments, nay,  necessities,  we  obtain  the  distance  which  should 
intervene  between  the  main  body  and  the  advanced  line 
which  is  preparing  the  way  for  it. 

Assuming,  from  the  lessons  of  the  late  war,  that  a  rapid, 
independent  fire  from  both  sides,  such  as  above  supposed, 
cannot  well  last  above  five  minutes  without  bringing  things 
to  a  crisis,  we  may  fix  the  distance  of  the  main  body  from 
the  advanced  troops,  when  this  critical  period  commences, 
at  not  exceeding  500  paces. 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  33 

On  perfectly  open  ground,  the  main  body  will  not  be  able 
to  get  nearer  until  the  decisive  moment  when  the  com- 
mencement of  the  rapid  fire  in  front  will  force  it  to  push 
on.  But  even  if  it  should  follow  the  first  line  of  skirmishers 
at  no  more  than  about  300  paces  distance,  it  will  still  be 
necessary  to  interpose  an  intermediate  body  between  the 
two,  keeping  in  mind  that  the  said  skirmishers  are  in  single 
rank  with  intervals  of  from  one  to  one-and-a-half  paces. 

The  advance  of  this  line  to  within  effective  range  will 
naturally  be  attended  with  loss,  and  probably  very  serious 
loss,  the  materials  for  repairing  which  immediately  it  is 
necessary  to  have  close  at  hand,  if  you  wish  the  preparation 
for  the  attack  to  be  uninterrupted. 

This  support  must  be  stronger,  or  may  be  weaker,  accord- 
ing to  the  degree  of  cover  afforded  by  the  ground  as  you 
approach  the  enemy.  It  may  be  considered  as  a  maxim 
approved  by  practice,  and  generally  received  in  theory, 
that  the  support  should  be  at  least  half  as  strong  as  the  line 
of  skirmishers,  and  range  between  that  strength  and  one 
equal  to  theirs. 

But  in  order  to  give  the  necessary  impetus  to  the  attack, 
it  will  be  undoubtedly  advisable  that  our  main  body  should 
at  least  equal  in  strength  the  total  of  the  two  front  lines, 
both  of  which  are  actually  only  intended  to  prepare  the 
way. 

This  question  of  what  is  requisite  for  each  separate  stage 
of  the  attack  has  led  us  back  by  a  roundabout  way  to  our 
starting-point,  namely,  what  should  be  the  extent  of  front 
for  an  attacking  force  of  specified  strength  ? 

This  normal  extent  of  front  may  be  estimated  from  the  fol- 
lowing premises:  that  an  attacking  force  will  devote  from 
one-half  to  two-thirds  of  its  total  strength  to  the  main  body, 
from  one-half  to  one-third  of  that  strength  to  the  advance, 
and  that  from  one-half  to  two-thirds  of  the  latter  force  will 
be  extended  at  intervals  of  from  one  to  one-and-a-half 
paces.  In  other  words,  and  with  due  consideration  for  at- 


34  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

tendant  circumstances:  the  normal  front  of  attack  of  a  battalion 
on  open  ground  should  not  exceed  300  paces* 

It  remains  now  to  be  mentioned,  that  in  making  this  cal- 
culation, we  have  as  yet  entirely  left  out  of  count  the  third 
stage  of  the  attack.  We  must  return  to  it  presently. 

Further,  it  appears  from  what  has  come  out  on  our  way 
to  this  result,  that  the  normal  front  of  attack  of  a  specified 
force  increases  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  cover  afforded 
by  the  ground  which  it  has  to  traverse.  In  other  words,  the 
more  cover  there  is,  the  closer  can  the  main  body  keep  to 
the  advance,  whilst  the  losses  of  the  latter  will  be  at  the 
same  time  smaller;  the  more  both  these  conditions  are 
realised,  the  more  superfluous  will  be,  or  at  least  the  less 
strong  need  be,  the  intervening  supports ;  what  we  spare  in 
this  way  we  can  employ  eventually  for  strengthening  the 
advance  which  should  in  principle  be  as  strong  as  possible ; 
but  as  every  rifle  in  the  advance  should  be  in  action,  this 
accession  of  strength  will  produce  an  extension  of  front. 

This  brings  us,  then,  to  the  influence  of  the  ground  on  the 
attack,  and  at  the  same  time,  to  another  branch  of  the  in- 
quiry, bearing,  as  above  remarked,  upon  the  preparatory 
stage  ;  we  mean,  the  form  in  which  the  troops  should  be  led  on. 

This  consideration  will  also  naturally  lead  us  to  determine 
the  extreme  limit  of  the  offensive  front  of  an  attacking 
force.  If,  in  discussing  this  subject,  we  assume  the  most 
trying  conditions  to  be  in  force,  namely,  that  the  ground  is 
open,  the  question  of  how  to  handle  a  line  of  skirmishers 
(and  of  this  only  we  have  here  to  treat)  will  be  also  solved 
for  the  more  favorable  conditions  of  more  or  less  broken 
ground.  Let  us  fix  the  point  to  be  attained,  namely,  that 
from  which  rapid  independent  fire  should  be  opened,  at  300 
paces  from  the  enemy's  main  position. 

Three  different  methods  have  been  proposed  in  theory, 

*  200  rifles  for  the  advanced  line  of  skirmishers,  200  for  the  support,  400  for  the 
main  body;  officers,  supernumeraries,  and  casuals  will  make  up  the  rest  of  the  effec- 
tive strength. 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  35 

and  tried  in  practice,  of  bringing  up  a  line  of  skirmishers  to 
this  point  under  heavy  fire. 

1.  The  advance  of  the  whole  line  in  one  body  with  or  with- 
out firing; 

2.  The  advance  of  the  whole  line  by  a  succession  of  rushes, 
between  which  the  men  lie  down  and  fire  by  word  of  com- 
mand ; 

3.  The  advance  of  the  line  by  fractions,  those  on  the  move 
being  covered  by  the  fire  of  those  halted. 

All  three  methods  demand,  as  an  absolute  necessity,  the 
greatest  possible  expedition  ;  thus,  as  far  as  applicable,  the 
use  of  running;  also,  the  practice  of  lying  down  at  every 
forced  or  voluntary  halt.  Being  universally  recognised, 
these  points  require  here  no  further  discussion.  The  rapid 
advance  without  a  halt  and  without  firing,  must,  undoubt- 
edly, be  acknowledged  to  be  the  most  effective  course,  as 
long  as  it  seems  possible.  But  it  can  only  be  followed  to  a 
certain  extent,  rather  owing  to  reasons  founded  upon  the 
inner  nature  of  man  than,  perhaps,  upon  the  force  of  out- 
ward circumstances ;  and  let  us  not  be  misled  by  some  ex- 
ceptions under  peculiarly  favorable  conditions.  After  hav- 
ing attained  to  that  distance  from  the  enemy  where  a  line 
of  skirmishers  begins  to  experience  loss,  particularly  from 
infantry  fire,  which  cannot  be  put  down  simply  to  chance 
shots,  from  that  moment  advance  in  the  mode  referred  to 
becomes  difficult,  slackens,  finally  comes  to  a  standstill. 

One  mode  of  overcoming  the  first  stage  of  this  difficulty 
will  be  to  open  fire  yourself.  It  will  in  all  probability,  have 
no  effect  worth  mentioning  upon  your  adversary,  still  it  will 
to  a  certain  extent  animate  your  own  people,  as  it  will  con- 
vey to  them  the  impression  that  they  are  no  longer,  as  it 
were,  opposed  unarmed  to  the  enemy.  The  danger  of  this 
course  consists  in  the  probability  of  the  fire,  commenced  at 
first  sparingly  by  individuals,  becoming  general,  and  there- 
by slackening  the  advance,  which  is  to  be  avoided,  as 
progress  is  apt  to  become  slower  and  slower,  till  at  last 


36  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

you  come  to  a  halt,  the  attitude  best  suited  to  the  use  of 
firearms. 

To  act  in  a  really  practical  manner  we  are  here  more  than 
ever  called  upon  to  study  human  nature.  A  theory  which 
is  only  based  upon  "that  can,  that  should,  that  must  not 
be,"  runs  the  risk  of  much  too  bitter  checks,  when  put  in 
practice,  for  us  to  prefer  laying  too  little  rather  than  too 
much  stress  upon  the  moral  side  of  the  question  (the  effect 
on  the  spirit  of  the  soldier),  in  our  peace-habits.  This 
reflection  should  induce  us,  in  our  peace  exercises,  to  do 
what  is  perhaps  the  best  in  principle,  in  all  cases  to  make 
allowance  for  human  weakness  as  far  as  would  actually  be 
necessary. 

For  this  reason  we  should  be  inclined  to  make  it  a  fixed 
rule  that  the  advance  be  made  entirely  without  firing  under 
artillery  fire,  and  till  within  the  outer  space  of  infantry  fire. 
In  other  words,  the  body  of  troops  which  is  intended  to 
prepare  the  way  should  extend  on  reaching  the  zone  of 
artillery  fire  directed  upon  it  (whether  at  once  entirely  or 
only  by  degrees  is  immaterial,  but  at  all  events  the  part 
destined  to  act  as  support  should  extend  before  it  becomes 
a  target  even  for  artillery  fire);  the  skirmishers  should  then 
advance  as  rapidly  as  possible  without  firing  until  they  come 
under  the  infantry  fire  directly  against  them. 

The  advanced  body  should  get  over  the  ground  from  its  first 
entry  into  action  up  to  within  1000  or  800  paces,  if  possible  witl 
in  600  paces  of  the  enemy,  in  one  line.    We  have  here  purposely 
made  no  mention  of  firing.     It  will  be  better  to  do  without 
it,  if  possible,  but  if  not,  no  harm  will  be  done,  as  long  as  il 
is  well  regulated  by  command,  and  does  not  become  t< 
wild. 

From  this  point  onwards  where  the  losses  from  th< 
enemy's  infantry  cease  to  be  accidental,  and  where  we  cai 
make  out  our  opponents  clearly,  or  at  any  rate  their  posi- 
tion, being  at  the  same  time  plainly  visible  to  them,  it  will 
in  most  cases  be  advisable  to  adopt  one  or  other  form  ol 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  37 

gradual  advance.  Each  of  the  two  above  indicated  methods 
offers  undeniable  advantages  ;  that  of  successive  rushes  in  one 
body  gives  greater  promise  of  maintaining  order ;  whilst  the 
fractional  plan  gives  greater  security.  If,  on  our  own  part, 
we  speak  out  decisively  in  favor  of  the  latter  method,  we 
do  not  found  our  opinion  so  much  upon  the  more  or  less 
cogent  reasons  which  theorists  have  up  to  this  time  adduced 
(for  instance,  the  advance  being  covered  by  fire),  as  upon 
the  following  considerations: — 

We  have  hitherto  been  supposing  the  case  of  an  attack, 
conducted  by  a  comparatively  small  body,  but  if  we  now 
imagine  instead  a  similar  operation,  but  executed  by  a  force 
of  several  battalions  side  by  side,  and  all  having  the  same 
objective,  it  is  evident  that  the  long  line  of  skirmishers 
necessary  to  prepare  the  way  for  such  an  attack  cannot 
possibly  be  directed  by  one  leader  either  by  voice  or  bugle 
amidst  the  tumult  and  the  din  of  battle.  But  in  addition  to 
this  evident  difficulty,  there  are  other  causes  which,  in  the 
case  of  long  lines,  lead  to  a  fractional  advance.  The  resist- 
ance will  not  always  be  equally  vigorous  along  the  whole 
front ;  the  fire  brought  to  bear  by  the  defender  against  the 
assailant  during  the  different  stages  of  his  advance  will  be 
weakened  perhaps,  sometimes  at  one  place,  sometimes  at 
another,  often  only  for  a  few  moments ;  a  lucky  shell,  or  the 
fortunate  exposure  of  a  part  of  the  enemy's  line  of  defence, 
if  quickly  taken  advantage  of,  may  favor  the  onset  at  par- 
ticular points ;  whilst  at  the  same  moment  the  difficulties  of 
the  attack  are  doubled  on  other  parts  of  the  front ;  even  a 
plain,  to  all  appearance  as  open  as  possible,  will  offer  here 
and  there  little  accidents  of  ground  favorable  to  the  assail- 
ant, which  he  will  take  advantage  of,  if  intelligent;  and  so 
forth.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  long  line,  a  fractional  advance 
becomes  the  most  natural  course,  and  is  adopted  at  once 
instinctively,  and  because  the  impulse  to  action  felt  at  one 
point  cannot  be  very  quickly  communicated  along  the  whole 
line.  But  what  must  inevitably  and  without  doubt  occur  in 
the  case  supposed  will  very  often  be  found  the  best  course, 


38  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

and  even  necessary,  with  shorter  lines.  Even  with  a  front 
of  a  few  hundred  paces,  when  a  whole  line  is  advancing  in 
one  body,  alternately  rushing  on  and  lying  down  by  word 
of  command,  it  will  sometimes  happen  that,  even  in  the 
most  apparently  open  ground,  some  group  or  other  of  skir- 
mishers will  find  its  fire  most  unexpectedly  masked  by  an 
undulation  which  had  not  been  before  remarked.  The  course 
then  which  must  imperatively  be  followed  whenever  the 
front  is  very  extensive  had  better  be  adopted  as  the  general 
rule  under  all  circumstances. 

There  are,  however,  two  arguments  which  may  be  adduced 
in  favor  of  the  system  of  successive  rushes  in  one  body  as 
against  that  of  the  fractional  advance.  In  the  first  place,  it 
is  urged  that  the  moral  impulse  to  go  forward  will  be  more 
easily  maintained  if  all  jump  up  and  run  on  together;  that 
the  difficulty,  which  is  well  recognised,  of  inducing  skir- 
mishers to  leave  cover,  however  slight,  will  be  more  easily 
overcome  if  the  officers  of  the  whole  line  set  the  example, 
enforcing  at  the  same  time  with  voice  and  signal  (whistle). 
Again,  a  fractional  advance,  particularly  if  the  fractions  are 
small,  will  very  likely  lead  to  sections  getting  in  front  of 
one  another,  the  fire  of  those  behind,  on  which,  however, 
one  has  to  count,  thus  being  masked  by  those  in  front,  and 
the  whole  line  being  thus  easily  thrown  into  disorder. 

These  arguments  are  not  without  force,  but  they  do  not 
appear  sufficiently  conclusive  to  warrant  the  adoption  of  the 
system  which  they  support  as  one  of  universal  application 
(one  fixed  by  regulation),  because  in  practice  the  exceptions 
will  be  numerous.  It  would  appear  to  be  more  advisable  to 
strive  to  remedy  the  disadvantages  of  the  fractional  system 
by  advancing  only  in  entire  divisions  (zuge*) — (thus  gain- 
ing the  moral  influence  of  the  officers) — and  not  more  than 
from  fifty  to  eighty  paces  at  a  time  beyond  the  adjacent 
fraction  which  is  halted ;  moreover,  by  practising  this  ma- 
noeuvre so  constantly  at  drill  as  to  make  it  into  a  second 
nature. 

*  Three  of  which  form  a  company  when  drawn  up,  as  for  action,  two  deep.— (Tr.) 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  39 

However  much  one  may  be  tempted — for  the  sake  of 
order — to  make  strict  regulations  as  to  the  succession,  for 
instance,  in  which  the  separate  divisions  are  to  move  for- 
ward, it  will  be  well  to  guard  against  this  temptation,  as  it 
will  lead  to  artificial  refinements  impossible  of  execution 
under  fire.  It  will  be  found  advisable  in  peace  to  allow  the 
leader  of  the  line  of  skirmishers  and  his  subordinates  that 
liberty  of  action  which  would  in  war  result  from  their  ap- 
preciation of  their  own  fire  and  of  that  of  the  enemy.  The 
utmost  we  should  do  in  this  way  is  to  fix  a  limit  of  time,  at 
drill,  for  each  section  to  remain  halted  (it  might  be  whilst 
two  or  three  rounds  are  fired).  On  service  this  matter  would 
settle  itself. 

This  brings  us  to  another  question  affecting  the  mode  in 
which  a  preparatory  force  should  be  handled — namely,  that 
of  command. 

It  is  a  military  principle,  which  we  are  hardly  required  to 
defend  in  this  place,  that  a  movement  directed  on  one  object 
should  be  under  one  head. 

In  order  to  act  up  to  the  spirit  of  this  principle,  it  is  nec- 
essary that  wherever  a  body  of  troops  is  employed  to  gain 
some  one  object,  which  body  is  not  a  separate  unit,  but  is 
composed  of  different  sections  independent  of  one  another, 
it  is  necessary,  we  say,  to  assign  to  each  section-commander 
a  share  of  the  work  to  be  done  as  his  special  object. 

In  spite  of  all  theorising  upon  the  idea  of  the  tactical  unit, 
the  most  fanatical  admirer  of  the  company-column  must 
confess  that  the  company  is  too  small  a  body  to  carry  out 
an  attack  through  all  its  three  stages,  always  supposing  the 
operation  to  be  on  a  large  scale. 

Tivelve  company-columns  will  not  be  able  to  carry  out, 
each  independently  for  itself,  the  preparation  and  execution 
of  an  attack,  not  to  mention  its  third  stage ;  whilst  three  bat- 
talions are  quite  competent  to  do  it.* 

*  It  may  be  as  well  to  remind  the  reader  that  a  German  battalion  equals  four  com- 
panies.— (Tr.) 


40  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

What  is  generally  true  of  the  companies  is  also  applica- 
ble, only  in  a  modified  form,  to  separate  battalions. 

Three  battalions,  each  acting  independently,  will  be  able 
to  get  well  through  the  first  two  stages  of  an  attack,  but  it 
will  be  hardly  equal  to  the  third  stage. 

We  shall  return  to  this  subject  in  dealing  with  the  further 
stages  of  the  battle ;  we  only  touched  upon  it  in  this  place 
in  order  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  (a  certain  one,  we 
think),  that  when  it  appears  necessary,  as  above  pointed 
out,  to  subdivide  the  object  of  attack  into  separate  objec- 
tives, it  will  be  well  not  to  assign  one  of  these  to  a  smaller 
body  than  a  battalion. 

But,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  the  front  of  attack 
suited  to  a  battalion  may  be  estimated  at  about  300  paces, 
from  which  it  appears  evident  that  it  would  hardly  do  to 
assign  to  several  battalions  formed  side  by  side  the  same 
special  object  of  attack,  such  as  a  house,  the  entrance  to  a 
village,  the  corner  of  a  wood,  or  such  like. 

We  shall  return  to  this  subject  likewise  when  we  treat  of 
the  execution  of  the  attack ;  for  the  present  it  will  suffice  that 
it  should  be  generally  allowed  that  in  practice  each  battalion 
on  the  front  of  attack  should  and  will  have  its  own  special 
point  to  carry. 

This  being  allowed,  we  must  next  inquire  whether  it  is 
better  for  the  battalion  to  have  the  two  lines  recognized  as 
necessary  for  the  preparatory  stage,  namely,  skirmishers  and 
supports,  under  one  command  as  respects  front  or  depth. 

To  be  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  one  head  for 
one  task,  we  will  at  once  dismiss  the  case,  as  not  seriously 
debateable,  of  the  possibility  of  all  the  companies  of  a  bat- 
talion sharing  about  equally  in  the  formation  of  the  advance 
and  of  the  main  body:  we  have  only,  then,  to  consider 
whether  two  companies  ranged  side  by  side  should  from  the 
first  form  both  skirmishers  and  supports,  or  whether  these 
companies  should  be  drawn  up,  one  behind  the  other,  one 
acting  as  skirmishers,  the  other  as  support. 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  41 

To  solve  this  question,  it  will  be  necessary  to- examine  a 
little  more  closely  the  task  which  each  line  has  to  perform, 
and  how  their  action  is  combined.  The  first,  or  skirmishing 
line  has,  in  the  supposed  case  of  a  battalion  with  an  assigned 
object  of  attack,  most  undoubtedly  a  task  complete  in  itself, 
and  with  one  object  in  view.  This  task  consists  in  endeav- 
oring to  overwhelm  with  its  fire  from  a  front,  not  originally 
exceeding  300  paces,  some  always  smaller  portion  of  the 
enemy's  position  which  has  been  pointed  out,  and  thus  to 
shake  the  defenders  before  the  onslaught  of  the  main  body. 

The  point  which  the  latter  is  to  force  should  be  first  quite 
clearly  made  out,  the  most  f^/orable  spot  being  chosen, 
after  you  have  approached  pretty  close  to  the  enemy's 
position.  Upon  this  point  the  fire  will  then  be  concentrated 
as  much  as  possible,  which,  with  a  front  of  only  300  paces, 
may,  with  our  present  arms,  proceed  from  the  whole  line, 
even  if  the  selected  point  chance  to  be  opposite  one  flank. 

It  is  evident  that  all  this  may  be  attained  most  success- 
fully by  unity  of  command,  and  that,  on  the  other  hand, 
considerations  of  space  by  no  means  render  this  unity  im- 
possible. The  advantages  of  this  unity  of  command  have, 
indeed,  misled  French  tacticians  into  wishing  to  break  up  a 
whole  battalion  into  skirmishers,  when  the  attacking  force 
consists  of  several  battalions.  This  is  carrying  it  too  far, 
and  the  arrangement  must  break  down,  because  no  one  sep- 
arate objective  can  be  assigned  to  such  a  line.  Let  us  now 
compare  the  case  of  a  skirmishing  line  composed  of  one 
company  with  that  of  one  made  up  of  two  halves  of  differ- 
ent companies  (of  course  we  suppose  the  number  of  skir- 
mishers in  both  cases  to  be  equal).  In  the  latter  case,  we 
see  the  line  led  by  two  independent  commanders  of  equal 
powers,  in  close  proximity  to  one  another.  This  must,  of 
necessity,  produce  greater  difficulties  in  the  way  of  com- 
mand than  when,  as  in  the  former  case,  the  skirmishers  are 
all  under  one  leader.  When  it  comes  to  advancing  by  suc- 
cessive fractions,  the  full  value  will  not  be  got  out  of  the 
two  half  companies  as  it  will  out  of  the  one  company  accus- 


42  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

tomed  to  the  signs  and  signals  of  its  officers.  Moreover, 
the  opinions  of  the  two  commanders  as  to  the  moment  at 
which  it  is  advisable  to  extend  the  full  number  of  skir- 
mishers, or  as  to  when  it  is  necessary  to  ask  for  further  rein- 
forcements from  the  supports,  will  agree  no  better  than  will 
their  views  as  to  the  time  when  the  line  should,  according 
to  the  existing  state  of  affairs,  commence  the  rapid  inde- 
pendent fire,  which  must  be  continued  to  the  very  moment 
of  the  final  rush. 

As  we  must  understand  the  effective  range  for  this  fire  to 
extend  from  200  to  nearly  400  paces,  it  is  evident  that  the 
line  of  skirmishers  runs  the  risk  of  partial  checks  from  the 
different  appreciation  of  the  proper  distance  from  which  to 
commence  rapid  firing,  which  may  be  formed  by  the  two 
officers,  each  of  whom  will  only  direct  his  attention  to  the 
other,  so  far  as  to  avoid  being  left  behind  by  him.  Now 
these  partial  checks  are  the  worst  things  that  can  happen 
in  the  preparatory  stage. 

Besides,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  two  leaders  will 
agree  as  to  the  best  point  for  forcing  the  enemy's  line ; 
hence,  there  will  not  be  the  concentration  of  fire  which  is  so 
requisite  for  the  success  of  the  whole  enteprise,  for  we 
should  prefer  the  less  well-chosen  point  of  attack  which  has 
been  well  fired  upon  to  one  better  selected  but  less  well 
fired  upon. 

Again;  whilst  a  skirmishing  line  composed  of  one  entire 
company  gravitates  naturally  to  its  center,  because  the  one 
chief  will,  and  must,  have  influence  enough  over  his  lieu- 
tenants to  control  their  perhaps  conflicting  aims,  it  is  not  a 
mere  matter  of  fancy  to  affirm  that  two  separate  companies 
moving  side  by  side  will  have  a  decidedly  centrifugal  ten- 
dency, and  (for  we  must  always  make  allowance  for  human 
nature)  will  be  sure  to  act  accordingly  in  reality,  in  spite  of 
all  theory. 

It  will  not  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  reply  that  the  battalion 
commander  will  be  on  the  spot  to  remedy  all  these  draw- 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  43 

backs  arising  from  the  subdivision  of  units.  It  is  the  busi- 
ness of  this  officer  to  conduct  the  entire  attack ;  the  most 
important  part  of  his  duty  is  to  point  out  the  proper  direc- 
tion for  the  main  body  to  follow,  as  on  this  the  success  of 
his  battalion  will  depend.  If  he  undertakes  in  person  the 
guidance  of  his  advanced  companies,  those  of  his  main  body 
will  be  very  likely  to  take  a  wrong  direction,  even  to  get 
quite  out  of  hand  (and  this  is  no  idle  supposition,  but  an 
event  of  which  there  have  been  numerous  examples  in  war). 
He  must,  therefore,  confine  himself  to  assigning  a  general 
direction  to  the  advanced  line,  whilst  he  certainly  will  do 
well  to  leave  the  execution  of  details  to  one  subordinate 
rather  than  to  two.  Then,  again,  the  other  available  remedy, 
namely,  that  of  giving  the  senior  of  the  two  captains  in  the 
front  line  the  command  of  both  companies  seems  insufficient, 
on  account  of  the  uncertain  nature  of  such  an  ill-defined 
office — an  office  inconsistent  with  the  custom  of  the  service, 
which,  indeed,  admits  of  an  officer  taking  over  the  com- 
mand of  those  of  like  rank  in  rear,  whilst  the  chief  recon- 
noitres in  front,  but  is  very  much  opposed  to  the  same 
being  done  under  the  actual  pressure  of  danger  and  emer- 
gency. 

Lastly,  in  order  still  further  to  strengthen  our  argument, 
we  must  allude  to  the  possibility  which  always  exists  of  the 
attack  not  encountering  as  stubborn  a  resistance  as  is  ex- 
pected, in  which  case  the  skirmishers  do  not  require  any 
strong  support.  In  this  case,  also,  it  is  doubtless  more  ad- 
vantageous to  have  at  first  only  broken  up  one  company, 
instead  of  two  side  by  side,  into  skirmishers. 

There  could  be,  neither  in  theory  nor  in  practice,  any  fair 
argument  to  oppose  to  the  formation  of  the  skirmishing  line 
under  one  sole  leader,  were  it  not  for  the  second  phase  of 
the  question,  that  of  reinforcements. 

Now,  considering  the  line  of  supports  merely  as  such,  that 
is  with  reference  to  their  special  task,  it  appears  to  us  just 
as  important  for  them  as  for  the  skirmishers  to  be  under 
one  chief.  If  with  regard  to  the  latter,  the  thing  has  a  more 


44  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

positive  significancy ;  with  regard  to  the  former,  the  same 
is  more  of  a  negative  kind.  In  practice,  we  so  constantly 
meet  with  two  conditions  easily  arising,  which  both  combine 
to  produce  the  same  undesirable  consequence,  that  it  would 
appear,  to  say  the  least,  expedient  to  discover  something  to 
counteract  them.  We  mean  that  the  skirmishers  in  front 
always  wish  to  have  the  supports  as  near  as  possible,  or  even 
up  with  them,  and  are  disposed  to  assert  that  they  might 
have  done  wonders  "if  only  the  supports  had  been  closer;" 
on  the  other  hand,  the  supports  in  rear  are  always  anxious 
to  give  up  their  thankless  post  of  "bullet-catchers,"  and  of 
their  own  accord  to  join  the  skirmishers,  whilst  the  mutual 
tendency  of  the  two  lines  to  unite  is,  no  doubt,  the  stronger, 
the  nearer  the  relation  between  them. 

This  tendency,  which  with  a  view  to  an  attack  executed 
with  calculated  energy,  and  not  with  mere  Man,  should  be  in 
every  way  opposed,  because  it  will  all  too  readily  lead  either 
to,  what  we  have  already  alluded  to,  the  overcrowding  of 
the  skirmishers,  or  to  an  immoderate  extent  of  front,  this 
tendency  will  be  at  least  weakened  if  the  connection  between 
skirmishers  and  supports  is  made  less  intimate.  In  other 
words,  if  in  place  of  the  captain  who  has  rushed  away  to 
his  front  division  into  the  thick  of  the  battle,  we  have 
another  captain  to  influence  the  support  which  is  independ- 
ent, and  to  be  used  only  when  he  is  convinced  of  the  neces- 
sity, the  evils  which  we  have  pointed  out  will  be  more  easily 
avoided  than  with  the  other  method.  The  independent 
leader  of  the  supporting  line  being  of  course  kept  informed 
of  the  progress  of  the  fight  in  his  front,  whilst,  on  the  other 
hand,  from  his  position  in  rear,  better  able  to  overlook  the 
situation  of  the  skirmishers  than  one  who  is  in  the  midst  of 
them,  can  judge  more  calmly  and  justly  of  the  time  and 
place  at  which  he  should  give  reinforcement,  and  of  the 
number  of  men  to  be  employed,  and  as  they  are  his  own 
people,  he  will  take  care  that  his  subalterns  do  not  expose 
them  prematurely  to  loss. 

The  one  leader  of  the  skirmishers  takes  the  initiative ;  the 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  45 

leader  of  the  second  line  has  only  to  follow  in  the  same 
direction ;  far  from  him  be  the  temptation  to  take  a  line  of 
his  own.  He  must  consider  himself  the  second  drop  upon  the 
same  spot  in  the  stone  which  the  third  drop  will  penetrate . 

Perhaps  it  may  be  said,  "So  far  so  good;  but  now  comes 
the  moment  when  this  support  must  actually  be  given,  when 
gaps  have  been  torn  in  the  skirmishing  line  either  by  the 
enemy's  fire  or  by  an  undue  extension  involuntarily  pro- 
duced by  accidents  of  ground.  These  gaps  must  be  filled 
up.  What,  then,  must  infallibly  happen  ?  Why,  that  one 
company  will  be  doubled  up  with  the  other.  Then  what  a 
medley;  what  disorder!  And  this  will  upset  all  your  theo- 
ries." 

Before  replying  to  this  new  objection  we  must  go  back 
and  cast  a  glance  upon  the  influence  which  some  of  our 
later  considerations  have  upon  the  subject  of  the  maximum 
front  of  attack  permissible  to  a  body  of  troops — a  subject  to 
which,  it  will  be  remembered,  we  promised  to  return. 

We  shall  once  more  take  the  case  of  a  battalion  without 
supposing  it  to  be  fighting  by  itself.  When  an  attacking 
line  is  composed  of  several  battalions,  those  on  the  flanks 
have  from  the  first  no  neighbors  to  keep  them  within  limits; 
but  in  the  case  of  the  center  battalions  also  it  may  happen 
that  the  restriction  to  their  lateral  extension  may  either 
not  exist  from  the  first,  or  may  cease  in  the  course  of  the 
action. 

Up  to  what  point  may,  ought,  or  must  a  battalion  thus 
placed  make  use  of  its  freedom  to  extend  ? 

We  leave  out,  as  not  here  to  be  discussed,  all  mention  of 
the  tendency  to  turning  and  surrounding  movements ;  as 
presupposed,  we  have  only  here  to  do  with  a  force  whose 
objective  is  in  front 

With  regard  to  this  we  have  already  above  stated,  per- 
haps thus  forestalling  subsequent  speculations,  that  a  force 
of  this  nature  should  at  least  devote  half  its  strength  to  the 


46  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

main  body.  We  have  also  admitted  the  justice  of  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  advanced  line  should  be  as  strong  and  dense 
as  possible,  at  the  same  time  laying  great  stress  upon  the 
importance  of  being  able  to  concentrate  its  fire  upon  the 
point  where  the  enemy's  line  is  to  be  broken.  Lastly,  we 
have  noticed  how  necessary  it  is  for  each  commander  to 
have  sole  direction  of  the  attack  which  he  has  to  make. 

From  these  three  factors  we  may  deduce  the  maximum 
front  which  a  leader  may  allow  his  attacking  line  to  take 
up,  consistently  with  vigorous  action.  He  may  at  the  out- 
side extend  half  of  his  force  as  an  advanced  (preparatory) 
line.  This  half  may,  in  order  to  render  the  preparatory  fire 
effective,  and  supposing  it  to  meet  with  only  moderate 
losses,  increase  its  original  front  by  perhaps  two-thirds  the 
space  it  occupies  when  extended,  i.e.,  for  a  battalion,  from 
300  to  500  paces. 

The  indispensable  condition  remains  that  the  line  should 
be  able  to  concentrate  its  fire,  which  will  always  be  practi- 
cable, that  the  ground  should  permit  the  main  body  to  ap- 
proach so  near  to  the  skirmishers  as  to  be  able  to  reinforce 
them  at  once,  which, may  be  doubtful;  and  lastly,  most  im- 
portant of  all,  that  the  commander  should  be  able  to  make 
his  influence  felt  unmistakably  from  one  extremity  of  the 
line  to  the  other,  which  will  always  be  difficult,  particularly 
as  he  must  dismount.  But  as  soon  as  any  one  of  the  above 
conditions  is  riot  complied  with,  the  operation  ceases  to  be 
calculated  and  directed  on  a  fixed  object ;  it  becomes  a 
mere  chance  affair.  Thus  we  fix  the  limits  for  the  extent  of 
front. 

Now  let  us  return  to  the  question  of  mixing  up  one  tactical 
unit  with  another  (Eindoublirung). 

The  expression  is  objectionable,  and  it  stands  for  a  prac- 
tice which  is  still  more  so,  yet  a  practice  which  is  now-a- 
days  unavoidable. 

If  you  had  said  to  a  tactician  of  the  time  of  Frederick  the 
Great:  "It  must  come  to  this;  every  single  foot  soldier  will 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  47 

shoot  whenever  he  chooses  and  has  the  chance ;  and  the 
battalion,  company,  or  platoon  volley  will  be  a  thing  of  the 
past" — he  would  only  shrug  his  shoulders  with  contempt 
for  such  "an  awful  state  of  disorder." 

Nevertheless,  the  time  has  come  when  the  army,  without 
disowning  its  old  traditions,  has  got  on  very  well  in  this 
very  state  of  disorder. 

May  not  the  same  thing  occur  in  the  matter  of  mixing  up 
tactical  units  ?  It  is  an  undoubted  fact  that  the  practice  of 
doubling  in  files  out  of  their  proper  order  (a  greater  innova- 
tion when  made  than  any  we  have  now  to  attempt)  has 
ilready  been  adopted  as  a  matter  of  regulation  in  the  army, 

ias  been  employed  by  generals  with  war-experience,  and 
carried  out  by  our  recruits  twenty,  thirty,  forty  years  ago. 

Cannot  our  present  recruits  also  do  as  much  ?  To  this  it 
will  be  answered  that  the  practice  was  abolished  because 
impracticable ;  and  no  one  will  deny  that  this  was  at  the 
time  a  wise  measure,  because  in  their  then  existing  state 
of  development  elementary  tactics  did  not  require  the 
formation. 

But  now  the  state  of  things  is  very  different.  The  prac- 
tice of  mixing  up  men  out  of  their  proper  order  is  no  longer 
to  be  avoided. 

It  is  no  longer  possible  for  skirmishers  within  effective 
range  of  the  enemy,  and  in  face  of  the  breechloader,  to  take 
ground  to  a  flank,  or  to  diminish  their  intervals,  without 
suffering  fearful  loss,  hence  nothing  is  left  for  a  reinforce- 
ment coming  up  from  the  rear  but  to  double  itself  up  with 
the  skirmishers. 

We  shall  return  to  this  theme  once  more  when  we  describe 
the  actual  execution  of  the  attack  in  which  the  bodies  re- 
ferred to  will  attain  greater  dimensions  than  in  the  case 
with  which  we  are  now  dealing.  But  if  it  be  once  estab- 
lished that  we  cannot  avoid  the  practice  either  on  a  large  or 
on  a  small  scale  it  would  appear  well  to  accept  it  frankly. 


on  3 


48  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

As  the  proverb  has  it,  a  danger  once  recognised  ceases  to 
be  a  danger.  Well,  then,  on  the  same  principle,  regulated 
disorder  ceases  to  be  disorder.  In  the  question  now  before 
us  we  do  not  then  escape  this  conclusion — we  must  break 
up  tactical  formations  either  by  mixing  up  the  divisions  of 
the  same  company  together  or  by  mixing  one  company  up 
with  another.  We  maintain  that  the  latter  measure  is  only 
in  appearance  worse  than  the  former.  If  once  the  original 
distribution  of  troops  in  line  of  battle  is  disturbed,  it  does 
not  much  matter,  during  the  heat  of  action  (and  we  are  only 
treating  of  that  period)  by  whom  the  disturbance  is  occa- 
sioned. When  such  mixing  up  of  men  occurs  in  action,  in 
those  moments  of  danger  and  of  excitement  strained  to  the 
highest  pitch,  personal  influence  on  its  own  merits  will 
affect  the  soldier  more  than  the  influence  of  his  immediate 
superior  merely  as  such.  He  will  follow  the  lead  of  the 
brave  man,  the  hero,  whether  belonging  to  his  own  company 
or  not. 

It  is  in  such  moments  that  a  superior  officer,  often  entirely 
unknown  to  the  men  about  him,  will  carry  them  away  with 
him,  and  that  lieutenants  have  gained  their  spurs  with  th( 
aid  of  men  whom  they  never  came  across  before  or  since. 
In  such  moments,  we  assert,  it  does  not  matter  whether  the 
original  order  is  disturbed  by  men  of  the  same  or  of  another 
body.  But  when  the  fight  is  o'er,  when  it  is  advisable  to 
restore  the  original  order  of  things  after  the  momentary  dis- 
order, this  will  be  more  quickly  accomplished  if  only  two 
units  are  in  question  instead  of  the  fractions  of  one  unit,  for 
every  soldier  knows  his  own  company ;  thus  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  quickly  find  out  the  men  of  their 
company  in  the  crowd.  But  many  a  man  may  forget  t< 
which  division  (zug)  he  happens  to  be  attached  on  the  par- 
ticular day,  and  the  officer  who  knows  the  whole  company 
by  sight  cannot  be  expected  to  remember  whether  Johi 
Smith  forms  part  of  his  division  on  this  occasion. 

We  do  not  deny  that  many  and  weighty  arguments  may 
be  brought  against  the  aforesaid.  Nevertheless,  after  weigh- 


The  Preparatory  Stage.  49 

ing  one  argument  against  the  other,  we  are  still  inclined  to 
propose  the  following  principles  for  the  preparation  of  the 
attack  : — 

1.  In  order  to  prepare  the  way  effectively  it  is  necessary 
to  bring  up  your  skirmishing  line  to  between  200  and  400 
paces  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  to  overwhelm  with  a  con- 
centrated and  uninterrupted  fire  the  particular  part  of  it  on 
which  you  intend  to  direct  your  assault.  * 

2.  In  order  to  do  this,  the  attacking  force  should  be  di- 
vided into  an  advance  and  a  main  body. 

3.  These  two  bodies  should  be  in  such  proportion  to  one 
another  that  from  one-fourth  to  one-half  of  the  total  strength 
should  be  allotted  to  the  advance. 

4.  The  advance  is  again  divided  into  skirmishers  and  sup- 
ports ;  the  former  bringing  as  many  rifles  into  play  as  the 
nature  of  the  ground  will  allow,  the  latter  being  intended  to 

Rmake  good  the  losses  of  the  former,  must,  on  open  ground, 
be  of  equal  strength  to  them,  but  under  favorable  circum- 
stances need  only  be  half  as  strong. 

5.  The  better  the  cover  afforded  by  the  ground  the  greater 
may  be  the  extension  of  the  skirmishers  during  their  ad- 
vance.    The  limits  to  be  assigned  to  this  extension  depend 
on  the  necessity  which  exists  of  ensuring  unity  of  command 
throughout  the  attack,  and  of  being  able  to  concentrate  the 
skirmishers'  fire  upon  one  point.     The  front  for  a  battalion 
of  1000  men  will  range  between  300  and  500  paces. 

6.  For  the  sake  of  unity  of  command  it  will  be  advisable 
for  every  battalion  taking  part  in  the  attack  to  form  its  line 
of  skirmishers  with   one   company,   and   its   supports   with 
another. 

7.  The   skirmishers    should    advance    from   the    extreme 
range  of  the  artillery  fire  bearing  upon  them  as  far  as  the 
extreme  effective  range  of  the  enemy's  infantry  in  one  body. 
The  company  which  furnishes  them  should  always  be  ex- 
tended in  one  line  before  it  becomes  a  target  for  the  enemy's 


50  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

fire,  even  if  at  first  it  had  formed  some  supports.  This  ad- 
vance from  1 200  to  800,  if  possible,  to  600  paces  of  the 
enemy,  takes  place  as  long  as  may  be  without  opening  fire, 
individual  firing  by  word  of  command  being  only  allowed 
when  you  can  no  longer  dispense  with  its  animating  effect, 
or  when  special  reasons  for  it  arise  (such  as  the  necessity 
of  driving  in  advanced  parties  of  the  enemy,  &c.). 

As  soon  as  the  line  of  skirmishers  reaches  the  zone  of  loss 
from  aimed  infantry  fire  it  changes  its  mode  of  progression  to 
that  of  the  alternate  rushing  forward  and  lying  down  of  sepa- 
rate fractions. 

As  far  as  it  is  possible  (the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the 
advantage  taken  of  particularly  favorable  moments  forming 
exceptions),  these  rushes  are  made  by  whole  divisions,  and 
not  over  more  than  from  fifty  to  eighty  paces  at  a  time ; 
whether  in  succession  from  a  flank  or  chequerwise  is  imma- 
terial. Each  time,  the  divisions  which  are  halted  and  lying 
down  cover  by  a  steady,  well-directed  fire  the  advance  of 
the  others.  Only  when  the  skirmishers  have  advanced  to 
within  the  most  effective  range  of  the  enemy — say  from  400 
to  200  paces — will  an  unmistakable  command  or  signal  be 
given,  upon  which  a  rapid  independent  fire,  as  much  concen- 
trated as  possible  upon  a  point  previously  indicated,  will  be 
opened  and  will  be  maintained  until  the  moment  of  the 
actual  assault. 

8.  The  distance  of  the  supports  from  the  skirmishers  and 
their  mode  of  advance,  will  be  regulated  as  provided  for  the 
portion  of  the  attacking  force,  which  remains  in  close  order 
(see,  further  on,  the  execution  of  the  attack}. 

9.  The  skirmishers  will  be  reinforced  by  the  supports,  as 
far  as  practicable,  by  doubling  in  separate  sections  (such  as 
"divisions"  or  "groups")  between  separate  sections  of  the 
front  line  ;  but  the  details  of  execution  will  always  be  subor- 
dinate to  producing  the  best  possible  effect  upon  the  enemy. 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  5 1 


II.     THE    STAGE    OF    EXECUTION. 


I  Whilst  it  was  the  task  of  the  preparation  to  pave  the  way 
for  the  attack,  the  work  of  breaking  the  enemy's  power  of 
resistance  by  employing  the  greatest  possible  amount  of 
k  striking  power,  devolves  upon  the  execution. 
In  spite  of  all  the  preliminary  work  the  assailant  cannot 
dispense  with  this  extreme  measure,  because,  as  we  shall 
see,  the  defenders  have  considerable  means  at  their  disposal 
to  support  their  power  of  resistance,  both  directly  and  indi- 
rectly, to  such  an  extent  that  the  preparatory  force  will  only 
succeed  in  exceptional  cases  in  rendering  them  incapable  of 
further  efforts. 

Although  we  must  needs  return  to  this  question,  and  treat 
it  more  at  length,  when  we  deal  with  the  Defensive,  we  still 
cannot  avoid  reference  to  the  indirect  means  at  the  disposal 
of  the  defender. 

These  means  are ; — fire  intended  to  shatter  and  break  up 
the  striking  power  of  the  assailant  before  he  is  able  to  come 
to  close  quarters. 

In  the  effect  of  this  fire,  delivered  as  it  is  by  the  defender 
from  the  halt  on  the  assailant  who  is  on  the  move,  lies  the 
great  risk  for  the  latter  of  seeing  his  numerical  and  moral 
superiority  (whether  original  or  acquired)  demolished  and 
annihilated.  We  must  study  the  nature  of  this  fire  if  we 
wish  to  discover  an  antidote  against  it  for  the  attack,  and 
the  inquiry  will  lead  us  at  first  beyond  the  domain  of  in- 
fantry tactics  into  that  of  artillery. 

Without  wishing  here  to  enlarge  upon  the  employment  of 
the  latter  arm  in  attack  and  defence,  we  must,  however,  go 
so  far  as  to  point  out  that  the  attacking  force  is  not  seri- 
ously endangered  by  the  artillery  of  the  defender  at  the  ex- 
treme ranges  of  which  the  latter  is  capable,  but  only  when 
it  gets  so  near  that  the  gunner,  who  ought  not  to  waste  his 
ammunition  on  chance  shots,  can  see  the  object  he  is  aim- 


52  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

ing  at  clearly,  and  can  mark  the  effects  of  his  fire.  If  the 
defender's  artillery  act  otherwise,  all  the  better  for  the 
assailant. 

We  need,  therefore,  only  trouble  ourselves  with  the  de- 
fender's artillery  from  the  point  at  which  (taking  into  con- 
sideration the  power  of  its  present  materiel),  it  is  able  to 
have  a  fair  prospect  of  hitting  a  mark  of  such  size  as  an 
attacking  force  is  likely  to  present  in  the  first  moment  of 
deployment,  supposing  it  to  be  handled  according  to  our 
present  ideas  of  war. 

Not  to  waste  our  time  in  sophisms  by  taking  into  con- 
sideration conditions  of  ground  and  attacking  masses,  such 
as  would  not  actually  be  met  with  once  In  a  hundred  times, 
we  may  content  ourselves  with  making  the  following  de- 
ductions from  what  has  gone  before :  that  an  attacking 
force  composed  of  several  battalions  and  batteries  (more 
than  three  or  four),  in  line  of  columns  (Rendezvous  Forma- 
tion), will,  without  supposing  conditions  of  ground  unusu- 
ally favorable  to  the  defender's  artillery,  come  within  the 
zone  of  aimed  fire  at  about  3000  paces  from  the  enemy. 

Conditions  of  ground  favorable  to  the  attack,  and  other 
circumstances,  such  as  dull  weather,  the  smoke  occasioned 
by  a  fight  which  is  already  raging,  &c.,  may  shorten  this 
distance  very  much,  just  as,  on  the  other  hand,  circum- 
stances may  arise  to  lengthen  it.  But  as  we  are  here  deal- 
ing with  average  chances  for  both  sides,  we  hold  that,  at  a 
distance  of  3000  paces  from  the  enemy  an  attacking  force 
should  form  line  of  battle,  and  should  in  most  cases,  reason- 
ing from  what  has  already  been  adduced,  go  straight  to  the 
point. 

The  advanced  troops  begin  the  action  supported  to  the 
utmost  by  artillery,  if  possible  superior  to  that  of  the  de- 
fenders. Though  we  have  here  only  to  do  with  infantry 
tactics,  we  must  needs  take  notice  of  a  moment  when  sup- 
port from  the  sister-arm  is  so  necessary  and  important- 
even,  it  may  be  said,  decisive. 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  53 

From  this  moment  up  to  that  of  actual  collision  the  as- 
sailant is  exposed  to  two  kinds  of  fire-effect — that  is  to  say, 
to  that  of  aimed  and  chance  shots,  a  distinction  which  has 
perhaps  hitherto  not  been  as  much  noticed  by  enquirers 
theoretical  and  practical  as  is  required  for  the  solution  of 
the  question  of  formation.  The  artillery  of  the  defence,  and 
soon  also  its  infantry,  become  the  objects  of  the  assailant's 
fire.  Thus  the  chief  attention  and  chief  efforts  of  the  de- 
fenders are  in  great  measure  distracted  from  that  portion  of 
the  assailant's  force  upon  which  the  actual  execution  of  the 
attack  will  devolve.  The  more  the  advanced  troops  of  the 
assailant  succeed  in  doing  this  the  better  for  his  prospects ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  defender  will  do  well  to  resist 
the  temptation.  Nevertheless,  his  fire  will  be  of  some  use, 
if  directed,  not  on  the  front  line  of  skirmishers,  but  on  the 
supporting  line  and  batteries.  Its  effect  upon  the  main 
body  will  be  at  all  events  secondary  and  accidental.  Thus 
we  see  that  if  the  fire  of  the  defenders  does  not  prevent  the 
strong  advanced  line  of  the  assailants  from  approaching 
their  position,  it  runs  the  risk  of  being  silenced  by  the  latter, 
and  that  if  this  fire  is,  on  the  other  hand,  concentrated  on 
the  advanced  line,  the  progress  of  the  main  body  will  be 
thereby  indirectly  facilitated. 

The  possibility  of  success  for  the  Offensive  is  founded 
upon  these  contradictions  so  difficult  for  the  Defensive  to 
reconcile,  and  in  order  to  take  full  advantage  thereof  the 
advanced  line  of  the  assailant  should  be  a  strong  one,  for 
the  main  body  will  thus  be  exposed  to  smaller  risks.  In 
speaking  of  the  preparatory  stage,  we  have  already  given  our 
reasons  for  requiring  that  the  advanced  line  should  repre- 
sent from  one-third  to  one-half  the  total  force.  It  should 
have  in  addition  the  whole  disposable  artillery. 

Thus  we  come  to  the  following  result:  that  the  advanced 
troops  of  the  assailant  will,  and  can  alone,  taken  as  a  whole, 
be  the  objects  of  the  defender's  fire ;  and  that,  up  to  the 
moment  when  it  dissolves  itself  into  one  mass  with  the  ad- 
vanced line,  a  moment  which  must  come  sooner  or  later,  as 


54  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

we  shall  see  further  on,  the  main  body  will  only  suffer  loss 
more  or  less  accidental  from  the  enemy's  fire ;  a  rule  which 
will  only  be  altered  either  by  unskilful  massing  of  the  main 
body,  or  by  want  of  energy  on  the  part  of  the  advanced 
troops  and  of  the  accompanying  artillery.  The  nearer  a 
second  line  follows  a  first  one  on  which  the  enemy's  fire  is 
directed,  the  greater  share  of  its  losses  must  the  former 
suffer.  It  is  therefore  advisable  to  keep  as  much  distance 
between  the  lines  as  may  be  possible  consistently  with  the 
time  required  to  bring  those  in  rear  into  action  at  the  right 
moment.  Now,  in  treating  of  the  preparatory  stage,  we  have 
already  found  that  from  the  moment  when  the  advanced 
line  begins  its  rapid  independent  firing,  the  main  body  should 
not  be  more  than  500  paces  in  rear,  if  it  wishes  to  arrive  in 
time.  And  the  distance  between  the  lines  cannot  be  allowed 
to  be  much  greater  even  during  the  period  of  advance  which 
precedes  the  rapid  independent  firing.  The  arguments  in 
favor  of  maintaining  unity  of  command  of  troops  making  an 
attack  on  one  object,  in  respect  of  depth,  that  is  of  the  ad- 
vanced and  main  body  being  under  the  same  leader,  have 
been  partly  given  already ;  and  as  we  have  established  that 
it  is  a  condition  indispensable  to  this  unity  of  command  that 
the  front  should  not  exceed  500  paces,  we  must  now  like- 
wise assign  the  same  limits  to  the  depth,  limits  to  be,  as  a 
general  rule,  not  materially  exceeded  without  exposing  the 
commander  to  the  risk  of  losing  control  over  one  or  other 
half  of  his  force. 

It  must  therefore  be  a  fixed  rule  that  the  main  body  of 
a  battalion  should  in  the  first  moments  of  the  attack  not 
keep  more  than  600  paces  in  rear  of  its  first  line  of  skir- 
mishers. 

As,  on  principle,  there  can  be  no  check  in  the  attack  from 
the  moment  of  its  first  commencement  up  to  that  of  actual 
collision,  without  seriously  compromising  its  chances  of 
success ;  as  however  the  advance  in  rushes  and  by  fractions 
to  which  the  front  line  is  forced  when  under  the  enemy's 
effective  musketry  fire  must  needs  delay  its  progress,  whilst 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  5  5 

the  main  body,  on  the  contrary,  keeps  moving  steadily  on, 
the  latter  will  by  the  time  the  rapid  independent  firing  begins 
have  reduced  its  distance  from  the  former  to  a  maximum  of 
from  400  to  300  paces. 

If  it  now  keeps  moving  on,  as  it  must  do,  the  time  allowed 
for  the  rapid  independent  firing  from  the  halt  will  not  exceed 
from  two  to  three  minutes,  but  as  there  is  still  a  space  to 
traverse  beyond  the  skirmishers  of  from  200  to  400  paces 
which  cannot  be  crossed  without  the  aid  of  the  most  intense 
fire,  the  preparatory  force  will  have  time  enough  for  its  task. 

It  remains  to  inquire,  given  the  above-named  distances 
between  lines,  how  soon  will  the  main  body  begin  to  suffer 
from  the  fire  directed  on  the  advanced  troops  ? 

The  answer  will  be  different  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  fire  intended — that  of  infantry,  or  that  of  artillery.  Who- 
ever has  taken  part  in  an  attack  will  testify  that  real  danger 
for  the  second  line  begins  with  the  rifle  bullets,  to  which  in- 
deed mitrailleuse  shot  and  an  exceptional  stray  shrapnel 
may  be  added. 

The  modern  infantry  musket  propels  its  bullets  to  the 
distance  of  from  1200  to  1800  paces.  The  individual  infantry 
soldier  on  opening  fire  is  not  able  to  judge  his  distance  ac- 
curately ;  his  misses  are,  and  must  therefore  be,  very  numer- 
ous indeed ;  and  they  will  be  all  the  more  numerous  the 
greater  the  distance  at  which  he  commences  firing;  but  all 
these  ill-aimed  shots  render  the  ground  lying  behind  the 
objects  aimed  at  extremely  dangerous  to  traverse,  but  dan- 
gerous to  an  extent  utterly  incalculable.  Modern  artillery, 
on  the  other  hand,  possesses  much  more  effective  means  of 
controlling  its  aim,  also  of  correcting  it  and  of  estimating 
the  distance.  But  the  peculiarity  of  its  projectiles  renders 
its  misses  only  dangerous  to  the  extent  of  the  error  in 
estimating  distance,  which  experience  shows  us  to  be  (and 
this  is  advantageous  to  the  assailant)  more  often  too  low 
than  too  high. 

That  is  to  say,  a  body  of  troops  following  in  second  line 


56  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

will  not  suffer  from  artillery  fire  directed  on  the  first  line 
unless  it  come  within  about  300  paces  of  it ;  but  if  the  first 
line  is  the  object  of  infantry  fire,  the  second  line  will  prob- 
ably share  its  losses  from  the  moment  it  gets  within  extreme 
rifle  range. 

It  follows  from  these  various  considerations  that  in  calcu- 
lating how  far  the  formation  of  an  attacking  force  can  con- 
tribute to  guard  its  striking  power,  physical  and  moral,  from 
being  impaired,  we  have  to  divide  the  action  of  the  main 
body  into  three  stages:  first,  from  the  commencement  of 
the  movement  to  attack  up  to  within  from  1200  to  1800  paces 
of  the  enemy's  position  ;  secondly,  from  thence  until  close 
up  to  the  advanced  line,  i.e.,  to  within  500  paces  of  the  de- 
fenders; lastly,  during  the  remainder  of  the  distance.  In 
the  first  stage  we  must  aim  at  not  affording  so  good  a  mark 
to  the  enemy's  artillery  as  to  give  him  a  prospect  of  reaping 
great  and  undoubted  advantage  from  aiming  at  it,  thereby 
diverting  his  attention  from  our  advanced  troops,  and 
especially  from  the  artillery  accompanying  them.  This 
same  artillery,  and  the  advanced  troops  moving  on  with  its 
support,  are  at  this  moment  much  too  threatening  a  danger 
to  the  defence  for  them  to  be  ignored  without  very  cogent 
reasons.  If  then  the  advanced  line  is  strong  enough,  and  if 
the  main  body  follows  it  at  not  less  than  from  500  to  600 
paces,  it  would  appear  certainly  advisable  to  form  the  latter 
in  columns  of  moderate  size,  with  a  front  not  exceeding 
from  50  to  80  paces,  and  a  depth  of  from  25  to  30  paces 
(from  6  to  12  files),  with  intervals,  if  thought  expedient,  of 
about  100  paces.  The  marks  thus  afforded  would  hardly  be 
attractive  to  the  enemy's  guns. 

We  come  now  to  the  second  zone — that  of  unaimed  rifle 
fire.  In  attaining  this  the  main  body  will  pass  beyond  its 
own  guns,  which  have  in  all  probability  advanced  so  far  to 
prepare  the  way.  To  the  chance  hits  of  the  defender's 
infantry  are  now  added  those  of  his  artillery,  whether  the 
shots  are  aimed  at  the  assailant's  guns  and  fall  short,  or  at 
his  advanced  line  with  too  much  elevation.  If  their  atten- 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  57 

;ion  is  not  fully  occupied  by  the  advanced  line,  the  enemy's 
runners  will  from  this  moment  onwards  take  as  their  mark 
:he  main  body  which  is  gradually  approaching.  At  this 

>riod,  the  fire,  both  aimed  and  unaimed,  will  be  so  intense 
ipon  the  whole  space,  but  at  the  same  time  (unless  led  to 
roncentrate  itself  by  the  assailant's  adoption  of  particularly 
inskilful  formations  in  mass)  so  equally  spread  and  in  a 

tanner  so  impossible  to  calculate,  that  in  whatever  forma- 
:ion  the  assailant  advances  along  the  whole  front,  as  long  as 
ic  avoids  too  dense  bodies,  his  losses  will  remain  much  the 

ime. 

We  decidedly  assert  that  it  is  neither  necessary  nor  will 
t  be  of  any  use  to  try  and  invent  tactical  formations  calcu- 
ated  to  diminish  loss  at  this  stage  of  the  proceedings ; 
ther  is  it  possible  and  expedient  to  search  for  formations 
tending  to  weaken  the  moral  effect  which  the  inevitable 
losses  are  sure  to  produce,  and  thus  indirectly  to  contribute 
to  the  striking  power  of  the  attack  that  assistance  which 
these  formations  cannot  give  directly. 

Great  losses  bring  the  attacking  force  to  a  standstill,  be- 
cause even  those  who  remain  unwounded  are  disheartened 
by  the  sights  which  meet  their  eyes,  and  are  likely  to  lose 
all  hope  of  success. 

When  troops  engaged  in  making  an  attack  are  brought  to 
a  standstill,  in  a  very  short  time  they  begin  to  retire,  that  is 
to  say,  the  attack  fails. 

But  to  overcome  this  fit  of  faint-heartedness  is  really  the 
task  which  one  formation  more  than  another  may  favor. 

Allowing  that  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and 
individual  soldiers,  endowed  with  remarkable  physical  or 
moral  courage,  are  those  who  will  influence  the  masses  and 
carry  them  away  with  them  in  such  moments  of  weakness, 
one  might  be  inclined  to  say  that  the  more  densely  the  mass 
is  packed  together,  the  more  will  the  consciousness  of 
strength  be  developed  in  it,  the  more  plentiful  will  be  those 
strong  elements  within  it,  and  the  more  easily  can  the  con- 


58  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

duct  of  those  setting  a  good  example  be  witnessed  by  all, 
thus  imparting  the  desired  impulse  to  the  mass. 

One  cannot  deny  that  there  is  much  truth  in  these  argu- 
ments, and  thus  in  other  days  the  column  formation  was 
adopted  specifically  as  that  of  attack.  On  the  other  hand, 
however,  it  is  objected  that  serious  losses  suffered  at  the 
same  time  and  place  have  a  more  depressing  effect  upon 
the  imagination  than  the  same  amount  of  loss  would  have  if 
spread  over  more  time  and  space ;  so  that  it  may  be  said 
that  the  less  densely  a  given  number  of  men  are  massed, 
the  less  will  they  require  the  example  to  carry  them  on. 
Let  us  make  a  comparison.  Take  a  column  of  400  men — a 
front  of  twenty  file,  a  depth  of  twenty  ranks,  with  intervals 
of  about  a  pace  between  them.  A  shell  falls  well  into  the 
mass,  and  knocks  over  perhaps  eight  or  ten  men.  Well,  the 
moral  effect  of  this  upon  the  whole  body  will  be  much  more 
serious  than  if  these  same  400  men  had  been  drawn  up  two 
deep,  with  intervals  of  two  paces  between  the  files.  Three 
or  four  shells  may  fall  amongst  them  at  the  same  time,  but 
in  different  places ;  one  man  may  be  knocked  over  here,  two 
there,  three  in  another  place  :  perhaps  on  the  whole  as  many 
as  in  the  column ;  nay,  even  more.  Still  the  effect  upon  the 
survivors  will  be  much  slighter. 

The  example  will  be  all  the  more  forcible  in  the  case  of 
shrapnel,  on  account  of  the  small  lateral  dispersion  of  the 
bullets ;  yet  no  one  will  deny  that  in  both  formations  the 
losses  will  be,  as  above  represented,  about  equal,  howevei 
highly  the  practical  result  may  be  estimated. 

So  the  question  of  formation  reduces  itself  to  this— whei 
to  draw  the  line  between  dense  masses  and  open  lines. 

But,  besides  the  actual  and  moral  effect  of  the  enemy's 
fire,  we  have  to  consider  another  agent  having  influence  on 
the  solution  of  the  problem  thus  set  before  us.  The  desired 
formation  will  not  be  one  suited  to  standing  still,  but  to 
movement,  and  to  the  greatest  possible  development  of  fire 
at  the  end  of  that  movement. 


? 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  59 

And  there  are  other  requirements  to  be  satisfied  besides 
the  purely  negative  one  of  not  interfering  with  the' action  of 
firearms.  The  formation  should  be  as  favorable  as  possible 
to  forward  movement,  and  it  should  not  require  to  be 
changed  when  you  come  to  close  quarters. 

The  forward  movement  will  be  favored  both  directly  and 
indirectly  by  the  broader  front  and  lesser  depth,  as  nothing  is 
more  fatiguing  or  trying  to  men  than  to  march  in  a  dense 
mass  one  behind  the  other ;  and  nothing  is  more  damaging 
to  the  moral  influence  of  the  leader,  who  must,  as  things  go, 
always  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  than  to  have  to  diffuse 
it  from  front  to  rear  instead  of  to  the  right  and  left.  He 
has  not  the  same  power  of  superintendence,  and  his  exam- 
ple has  less  effect. 


In  like  manner  a  broad  front  and  small  depth  are  favora- 
ble to  the  use  of  firearms. 

Thus  both  requirements  act  in  the  same  direction  as  the 
tendency  to  the  more  extended  order ;  and  though  this  may 
perhaps  be  obtained  just  as  well  with  a  deep  as  with  a  broad 
formation,  yet  we  must  still  remember  that  its  most  impor- 
tant quality — that  of  concealing  the  inevitable  general  loss 
as  much  as  possible  from  the  observation  of  the  attacking 
troops — is  only  feasible  with  a  broad  front,  in  the  case  of 
troops  who,  as  we  are  assuming,  are  constantly  moving 
onward  and  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  behind. 

The  only  things  which  tend  to  moderate  this  decided 
tendency  to  spread  out  are  the  arguments  already  adduced 
in  favor  of  close  order,  and  in  addition  the  general  desire, 
natural  to  the  party  on  the  offensive,  to  possess  the  numeri- 
cal superiority — that  is  to  say,  masses — at  the  decisive  point ; 
also  the  circumstance  that  extension  of  front  cannot  be  car- 
ried beyond  certain  limits  without  dangerous  results  to  the 
forward  movement ;  all  which  considerations  are  in  favor  of 
a  certain  depth  of  formation. 

Thus  the  question  once  more  takes  the  following  turn : 


6o  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

What  extent  of  front  should  be  allowed,  and  what  depth  can 
be  allowed  to  the  main  body  at  this  stage  of  the  attack  ? 

Our  answer  is :  the  extent  of  front  should  be  such  as 
admits  of  the  personal  influence  of  the  commander  being 
fully  exerted  (remember  that  he  is  now  on  foot);  the  depth 
can  be  such  as,  without  hindering  movement,  is  yet  sufficient 
to  give  the  soldier  the  confidence  and  solidity  to  be  derived 
from  the  feeling  of  companionship  and  from  the  idea  of 
numbers — perhaps  a  front  of  thirty  or  forty  paces,  with  a 
depth  of  six  or  eight  files.  Between  these  little  columns 
may  be  intervals  equal  to  or  double  the  front  of  each. 

We  have  thus  brought  the  main  body  of  the  attacking 
force  through  the  first  zone  in  half-battalion  columns, 
through  the  second  zone  in  company  columns,  and  we  must 
suppose  them  close  up  to  the  advanced  line.  It  remains 
now  to  revert  to  the  supporting  line  of  the  advanced  troops 
(the  company),  and  to  study  its  operations  during  this 
period ;  for,  when  treating  of  the  preparatory  stage  of  the 
attack,  we  dealt  with  the  general  task  which  devolves  upon 
it,  not  with  the  way  in  which  that  task  is  performed. 

We  have  already  mentioned  that  the  advanced  body  of 
the  attacking  force  will,  and  must  be  from  the  commence- 
ment, the  object  of  the  defender's  fire,  being  at  that  time 
the  greatest  source  of  danger  to  the  defence.  As  long,  in- 
deed, as  the  advanced  line  is  unable  to  open  fire,  the  enemy's 
artillery  will  prefer  to  play  upon  the  main  body,  which  offers 
a  better  mark,  and  which,  at  that  period  of  the  attack,  is 
solely  bent  upon  reducing  the  risk  to  itself  by  the  covering 
fire  of  its  own  artillery,  and  by  increasing  its  distance  from 
the  advanced  line. 

The  latter,  meanwhile,  must,  from  the  moment  it  comes 
within  range,  take  care  to  adopt  such  a  formation  as  will 
weaken  the  effect  of  the  defender's  fire,  both  actual  and 
moral ;  for  it  cannot  reckon  upon  any  of  the  assistance  which 
by  its  presence  and  action  it,  in  this  respect,  is  able  to  afford 
to  the  main  body. 


I  The  Stage  of  Execution.  61 

The^considerations  which,  in  consequence  of  this,  weighed 
with  the  main  body  in  its  mode  of  traversing  the  second 
zone  will  have  governed  the  advanced  line  already  in  its 
passage  through  the  first  zone. 

These  considerations,  which  were  founded  upon  the  feel- 
ing that  it  is  desirable  to  advance  in  as  broad  and  open  a 
formation  as  possible,  were  all  the  more  easily  acted  upon 
by  the  advanced  body ;  because  the  objections  to  which  in 
the  case  of  the  main  body  some  force  must  be  allowed,  in 
consequence  of  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  striking 
power,  had  not  here  the  same  weight. 

The  action  demanded  of  the  advanced  line  is  simply  that 
of  its  firearms,  the  effect  of  which  can  well  be  concentrated, 
even  if  the  front  is  broad,  whilst  its  composition,  as  above 
recommended,  of  independent  parties  placed  behind  one 
another,  is  more  calculated  to  overcome  the  moral  difficul- 
ties of  the  situation  than  is  that  of  the  main  body. 

The  formation  of  the  line  of  skirmishers  is  all  that  can  be 
desired  or  expected ;  they  have,  besides,  the  advantage  that 
their  own  busy  action  occupies  their  thoughts,  and  makes 
them  treat  difficulties  more  lightly  (such  is  human  nature). 

But  the  supporting  line  requires  more  external  aid,  be- 
cause it  has  not  the  benefit  of  the  last-named  indirect  assist- 
ance. 

Thus  its  formation  must  be  such  as  not  to  offer  a  good 
mark  for  the  enemy's  artillery,  which,  we  may  assume,  will 
at  first  have  no  better  occupation  than  to  fire  upon  it.  It 
must,  therefore,  give  up  the  column  formation  very  early  in 
the  day. 

Whether  it  will  be  best  to  deploy  into  line  or  to  break 
into  smaller  columns,  such  as  of  divisions  with  a  front  of 
sections,  may  be  left  to  each  commander's  discretion. 
Either  formation  will,  with  our  present  establishment,  per- 
mit of  unity  of  command  as  well  as  of  free  movement. 

A  second  way  of  attaining  the  end  is  to  regulate  the  dis- 


62  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

tance  of  the  supports  from  the  skirmishers,  which  under 
artillery  fire  may  no  doubt  be  increased  to  300  paces  and 
even  more, 

In  this  manner  the  supports  may  traverse  the  first  zone, 
and  a  good  part  of  the  second,  without  hesitation. 

But  the  moment  approaches  when,  the  skirmishers  having 
reached  the  most  effective  range  of  the  enemy's  musketry, 
the  services  of  the  supports  will  be  in  request. 

The  first  condition  for  fulfilling  their  duties  in  this  respect, 
namely,  the  nearer  approach  of  the  supports  to  the  skir- 
mishers, will  be  obtained  of  itself  by  the  delay  caused  to 
the  latter  by  their  advance  in  successive  rushes, — a  course 
which,  if  possible,  the  supports  must  avoid.  But  in  order  to 
be  in  a  position  to  give  the  assistance  required  immediately, 
and  in  the  most  direct  manner,  the  supports  must  adopt 
the  formation  most  suitable  to  a  gradual  but  continuous  ad- 
vance. 

The  leader  of  the  support  should  during  this  forward 
movement  ascertain,  as  far  as  possible,  where  his  assistance 
is  most  likely  to  be  needed,  and  where  it  will  be  most  effec- 
tive, also  the  distribution  of  the  enemy's  batteries  and  other 
forces :  the  point  chosen  at  which  to  force  the  position  may 
be  made  out  with  some  certainty  at  a  distance  of  from  800 
to  600  paces.  The  commander  will  then,  as  far  as  possible; 
assign  to  each  of  his  parties  such  a  task  as  he  may  consider 
the  ascertained  circumstances  to  demand.  As  a  general 
rule,  to  be  modified  at  need,  these  fractions  of  his  command 
will  be  distributed  along  the  rear  of  the  whole  line  of  skir- 
mishers ;  and  whatever  their  formation  may  have  been  up 
to  this  time,  they  will  now  assume  that  of  an  open  line. 

We  make  use  of  this  expression  advisedly,  to  represent  a 
formation  which  really  is  only  that  assumed  at  the  word  of 
command  to  skirmish.  But  as  the  expressions  "to  skirmish," 
and  a  "line  of  skirmishers,"  are  very  nearly  allied  with  the 
idea  of  "fire-action"  on  their  part,  and  as  such  is  by  no 
means  intended  on  the  part  of  our  "open  line,"  it  would  ap- 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  63 

ar  both  expedient  and  necessary  to  make  the  distinction. 

e  may  indicate  the  external  difference  between  the  two 
ormations  more  precisely  by  pointing  out  that  the  files  of 

open  line  do  not  "uncover,"  and  that  rifles  are  carried  at 
he  slope. 

The  different  fractions  of  the  supporting  line  follow  the 
kirmishers  in  the  formation  indicated,  from  this  point,  that 
,  on  arriving  within  from  800  to  600  paces  of  the  enemy, 
nd  when  the  skirmishers  begin  the  decisive  "rapid  inde- 
endent  firing,"  establish  themselves,  as  far  as  they  have 
ot  already  been  obliged  to  double  up  with  them,  as  close 
hind  them  as  possible  without  intermixture.  It  follows 
a  matter  of  course,  that  just  as  the  commander  of  the 
pports  has  regulated  their  distribution  along  the  front  at 
is  own  discretion,  so  he  has  also  the  power,  and  must  ex- 
rcise  it,  to  distribute  them  as  to  depth — for  instance,  to 
keep  back  some  of  his  parties  so  as  to  employ  them  at  need 
in  another  direction.  But  in  whatever  manner  the  whole  of 
this  period  of  the  attack  may  have  been  carried  out,  the 
rule  holds  good  that  when  the  main  body  approaches  to 
within  about  100  paces  of  what  still  remains  of  the  line  of 
supports,  the  latter  throw  themselves  at  once  into  the  line 
of  skirmishers,  so  as  to  give  them  the  impulse  necessary  to 
carry  them  through  the  last  and  most  dangerous  stage,  that 
of  the  storm. 

We  have  already  accompanied  the  main  body  close  up  to 
the  advanced  line.  We  have  seen  how  the  attacking  force, 
starting  from  a  compact  mass,  was  at  once  forced  to  give 
way  to  a  tendency  to  a  more  and  more  increasing  extension 
and  separation  of  fractions,  and  we  have  now  reached  the 
period  when  this  tendency  must  again  yield  to  that  of  con- 
centration. 

Before  going  further,  however,  we  must  most  completely 
admit  an  aim  which  we  have  above  purposely  avoided 
acknowledging  as  a  principle.  We  must  do  justice  to  the 
oft-repeated  and  defended  demand  that  the  main  body  also 
should  move  in  open  line. 


64  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

It  cannot,  indeed,  be  denied  that  there  are  certain  advan- 
tages in  such  a  formation,  which  we  also  recognised  in  our 
examples  of  the  dense  and  open  order,  but  we  cannot  yet 
persuade  ourselves  that  the  great  losses  which  we  have  all 
along  declared  to  be  as  irresistible  as  incalculable,  are  there- 
by to  be  really  prevented. 

We  do  not,  however,  esteem  the  morally  tranquillising 
effect  of  this  formation  so  little  as  to  wish  to  forbid  its  being 
used  on  the  Commander's  own  responsibility,  though  we  con- 
sider it  specially  applicable  to  the  supports  which  are  in- 
tended afterwards  to  skirmish,  but  not  suited  to  the  main 
body,  whose  massive  force  alone  will  tell.  In  peace  exer- 
cises, at  least,  we  should  not  willingly  recommend  it  for  use 
by  the  latter. 

During  the  whole  preparatory  stage  of  the  attack,  of  which 
we  have  as  yet  been  speaking,  the  companies  of  the  main 
body,  whether  ranged  in  column  or  in  line,  having  moved 
forward  uninterruptedly,  have  arrived  close  up  to  the  first 
line  of  skirmishers.  The  supports  which  now,  at  the  very 
latest,  are  joining  the  latter,  take  part  as  well  as  they  can  in 
the  rapid  independent  firing,  which  has  now  reached  its 
utmost  intensity,  perhaps  pouring  in  their  volleys  over  the 
heads  of  the  skirmishers  who  are  lying  down.  The  com- 
mander gives  the  signal  for  the  attack,  which  is  thenceforth 
repeated  and  continued  uninterruptedly  along  the  line  by 
bugle  call,  and  the  whole  line  rushes  forward  as  rapidly  as 
possible  against  the  foe.  The  little  masses  of  the  main 
body  follow,  converging  on  any  point  where  the  advanced 
troops  have  gained  an  advantage,  and  have  forced  their 
way,  pushing  in  like  a  wedge  twenty  or  thirty  paces  behind 
them. 

There  used  to  be  a  theory,  not  indeed  yet  quite  exploded, 
according  to  which  a  storming  party  should  attack  without 
firing  a  shot. 

We  have  accepted  the  distance  of  400  paces  as  sufficiently 
close  to  the  enemy  for  the  advanced  line  of  skirmishers  to 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  65 

perform  its  task,  considering  the  capabilities  of  the  breech- 
loader of  the  present  day;  only  under  peculiarly  favorable 
circumstances  will  it  be  feasible  to  reduce  this  distance  to 
200  paces.  Taking  then  300  paces  as  a  mean  between  the 
two  distances,  we  are  to  expect  a  mass,  no  matter  how 
formed,  to  rush  upon  an  enemy  armed  with  the  breech- 
loader for  two  minutes  without  firing  a  shot !  But  it  will  be 
objected,  this  is  not  intended ;  the  skirmishers  who  remain 
lying  down,  and  over  whom  the  stormers  pass  without  firing, 
have  to  keep  up  their  fire  with  all  their  vigor,  so  as  to  sup- 
port the  column  of  attack.  We  reply,  this  is  simply  impos- 
sible unless  quite  exceptionally  there  chance  to  be  flanking 
positions  favorable  to  the  attack,  but  which  we  must  not 
here  take  into  consideration  in  this  study  of  a  front  assault. 

Skirmishers  who  remain  lying  down,  and  who  have  to  fire 
round  the  flanks  and  between  the  intervals  of  two  or  three 
little  columns  which  are  advancing  beyond  them,  must 
cease  firing  when  these  columns  have  gone  fifty  paces  to  the 
front.  The  smoke  will  prevent  their  fire  from  being  con- 
tinued any  longer  without  endangering  the  rear  of  the  col- 
umns. Whoever  has  been  in  a  position  to  hear  bullets 
whistling  past  him  from  behind,  even  considerably  on  one 
side  of  him,  though  there  could  be  no  doubt  of  their  being 
friendly  bullets,  will  confess  that  such  music  is  even  less 
conducive  to  forward  movement  than  is  the  rain  of  hostile 
shot  coming  from  the  front.  But  independently  of  these 
purely  external  reasons,  which  it  must  be  confessed  may  not 
apply  to  some  parts  of  a  line  of  skirmishers  when  engaged 
in  a  front  attack,  the  principle  of  leaving  skirmishers  behind 
you  lying  down  is  antagonistic  to  that  main  principle  of  the 
Offensive,  that  we  should  use  all  our  available  force  in  mak- 
ing an  attack,  and,  moreover,  it  would  do  no  good. 

We  have  just  established  the  fact  that  a  line  thus  left  be- 
hind can  no  longer  use  its  fire  with  advantage,  and  the  idea 
that  it  may  perhaps  serve  to  cover  the  shattered  fragments 
of  columns  which  have  been  crushed  would  be  expecting 
too  much  after  the  previous  exertions  of  the  skirmishers. 


66  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

"Forward"  is  the  word  for  them :  to  remain  behind  lyini 
down  is  only  a  matter  of  theory ;  at  the  best  it  will  be  use- 
less, generally  even  prejudicial. 

All  this,  it  may  be  said,  never  really  happens ;  on  th< 
contrary,  judging  from  war  experience,  we  might  maintain 
that  the  onslaught  of  the  skirmishers  would  of  itself  suffice. 

But  here  we  are  speaking  of  a  seriously  conducted  and 
well-situated  defence,  so  that,  in  theorising,  we  must  keep 
in  view  all  means  which  by  any  possibility  may  be  useful, 
and  in  difficult  moments  must  needs  be  and  have  been  use- 
ful. 

It  is  to  be  desired  that  the  approach  of  the  main  body 
should  impart  a  fresh  impulse  to  the  advanced  line,  tending 
to  stimulate  the  forward  movement  which  will  culminate  in 
the  decisive  assault.  This  last  forward  movement  must  be 
covered  by  as  vigorous  a  fire  as  possible,  which  can,  how- 
ever, only  proceed  from  the  advancing  troops  themselves. 
Though  it  is  doubtless  true  that  this  fire  will  not  do  much 
harm  to  the  enemy,  yet  it  must  not  cease. 

The  defenders,  who  are  now  threatened  with  the  approach- 
ing assault,  having  been  for  some  minutes  the  mark  for  the 
most  intense  fire,  that  which  follows,  accidental  though  its 
effect  may  be,  as  we  readily  admit,  will  not  be  without  its 
influence  on  the  morale  of  the  defenders.  (We  have  attrib- 
uted a  similar  result  from  unaimed  fire  on  the  assailants.) 
At  this  moment,  also,  the  artillery  of  the  latter  must  be  as 
active  as  possible  to  make  up  for  the  deficiency  of  infantry 
fire.  What  we  have  to  do  is  to  overwhelm  the  point  of 
attack  with  as  tremendous  a  fire  as  possible :  we  must  not 
at  this  moment  think  of  something  to  aim  at ;  on  the  con- 
trary, the  last  stage  of  the  preparatory  fire  will  be  most  effec- 
tive, if  it  prevents  the  defenders  from  daring  to  poke  their 
noses  out  of  cover. 

The  decisive  assault  having  been  thus  prepared,  executed, 
and  supported  up  to  the  last  moment,  when  we  get  to  with- 
in twenty  or  thirty  paces  of  the  enemy,  we  rush  on  with 


The  Stage  of  Execution.  67 

hurrahs  and  beat  of  drum,  and  may  be   pretty  sure   of  the 
result. 

You  require  uncommonly  good  troops  (we  shall  have 
more  to  say  about  this  in  treating  of  the  Defensive)  to  meet 
an  attack  in  force,  such  as  we  have  described,  at  this  mo- 
ment of  its  near  approach,  as  it  should  be  with  the  bayonet. 
We  shall  also  see,  that  at  this  period  of  the  engagement  the 
success  of  the  defenders  will  depend  rather  on  efforts  ex- 
terior to  their  own,  that  is  to  say,  on  counter-attacks  made 
by  other  troops,  than  on  their  own  stubbornness  and  tenac- 
ity— a  circumstance  of  which  we  must  say  more  when  treat- 
ing of  the  third  stage  of  the  attack.  But  having  here  only 
considered  the  attack  of  a  given  body  of  troops  against 
purely  defensive  action,  and  having  thought  out  the  opera- 
tion under  those  conditions,  we  have  only  to  mention  as  a 
final  requirement  necessary  to  success,  that  the  last  decisive 
onslaught  with  shot  and  bayonet  should  be  continued  until 
the  assailants  actually  reach  the  further  limit  of  the  object  of 
attack  (the  further  border  of  wood  or  village,  the  crest  of  a 
hill,  &c.).  On  the  other  hand,  they  must  on  no  account  go  be- 
yond those  limits. 

The  conditions,  then,  for  successfully  carrying  out  an 
attack,  as  far  as  they  depend  on  the  commander's  disposi- 
tions, may  be  summed  up  as  follows: — 

1.  Every  independent  body  of  troops  intended  to  take 
part  in  an  attack  should  have  a  distinct  objective  assigned 
to  it  by  superior  authority,  and  should  direct   its    efforts 
against  this  point,  without  cessation,  with  its  whole  strength 
and  in  the  most  direct  way. 

2.  The  troops  must  be  deployed  for  the  attack  as  soon  as 
they  come  within   reach   of   the    enemy's    artillery.     They 
should  be  divided  into  a  main  and  advanded  body  (compare 
chapter  on  the  preparatory  stage,  page  49),  the  former  keep- 
ing within  500  paces  of  the  advanced  skirmishers ;  in  open 
ground,  and  under  favorable  circumstances,  nearer  to  them. 

3.  The  support  of  the   advanced  skirmishers  should,  as 


68  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

soon  as  it  becomes  a  mark  for  the  enemy's  guns,  assume  by 
degrees  a  more  and  more  extended  formation  behind  the 
skirmishers,  first  deploying  from  column  into  line,  then 
spreading  out  so  as  to  leave  intervals  between  the  divisions, 
and  finally  making  each  division  expand  into  an  open  line. 

The  captain  of  the  support  will  use  his  own  discretion  as 
to  the  reinforcement  of  the  skirmishers,  both  with  regard 
to  time,  place,  and  amount,  establishing  himself  as  close  as 
possible  behind  them  with  whatever  parts  of  his  company 
remain  in  hand,  and  finally  throwing  himself  with  these 
remnants  into  the  line  of  skirmishers  to  take  part  in  the 
heavy  firing,  when  the  main  body  has  approached  within  80 
or  ioo  paces. 

4.  The  main  body  may  get   over  the  ground   from   first 
coming  into  action  until  reaching  the  zone  of  unaimed  in- 
fantry fire,  that  is,  until  within   1500  or  1200  paces  of  the 
enemy,  in  little  columns  (either  half-battalion  or  company), 
if  the  attention  of  the  defender's  artillery  is  so  much  occu- 
pied by  that  of  the  assailant,  or  by  his  advanced  skirmishers, 
that  it  cannot  direct  its  fire  on  the  main  body. 

5.  From  this  point  onwards,  when  either  the  mass  attracts 
the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns  or  begins  to  catch  his  rifle- 
balls,  it  should  resolve  itself  into  company  columns,   with 
intervals  of  from  40  to  80  paces,  in  which  formation  as  near 
an  approach  as  possible  should   be   made  to  the  advanced 
skirmishers,  say  to  within  from  600  to  400  paces  of  them. 
During  this  advance  each  company  may,   at  the   discretion 
of  its  captain,  either  deploy  or  else  form  open  line  from  di- 
vision columns. 

Other  formations,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  deployment 
of  whole  or  of  half-battalions,  the  open  line  from  a  deployed 
company,  the  advance  by  sections  or  by  files  from  a  flank 
of  divisions,  do  not  seem  advisable,  because  they  all  more 
or  less  hamper  the  forward  movement,  and  interfere  with 
the  influence  of  the  officers,  without  sensibly  diminishing 
the  losses. 


I  The  Stage  of  Execution.  69 

6.  As  soon  as  the  main  body  has  arrived  within  about  50 
paces  of  the  line  of  skirmishers,  now  reinforced  by  the 
whole  of  the  supports,  the  commanding  officer  gives  the 
signal  for  the  assault,  which  will  be  made  by  both  advanced 

•  and  main  body  together  in  double  time  (from  120  to  150 
paces  in  the  minute),  whilst  the  drums  beat  the  "storm 
march"  and  the  bugles  constantly  repeat  the  call,  as  lively  a 
fire  as  possible  being  at  the  same  time  kept  up  by  the  ad- 
vanced troops  during  the  movement,  which  continues  thus 
to  within  about  20  or  30  paces  of  the  enemy,  then  terminates 
in  a  rush  at  full  speed  with  a  cheer,  and  the  position  is  car- 
ried. The  advanced  troops  will  generally  make  it  their 
business  to  envelop  the  point  of  entry  whilst  the  main  body 
converges  upon  it  and  breaks  in. 

7.  The  troops  which  force  the  position  must  aim  at  gain- 
ing the  further  border  of  it,  so  as  to  be  able  from  thence  to 
pursue  the  retreating  enemy  with  their  fire,  and  every  por- 
tion of  the  attacking  force  will  try  to  do  this  without  regard 
to  their  original  subdivision  into  advanced  and  main  body. 
It  will  not  signify  if  at  this  stage  portions  of  the  main-body 
companies  pass  beyond  or  mingle  with  fractions  of  the  ad- 
vanced companies,   which  may  yet  be    engaged  with  the 
enemy  within  the  limits  of  the  post  which  has  been  forced. 

An  immediate  rush  forward  beyond  the  border  of  the 
position  is  altogether  inadmissible.  The  assailant  will  do 
much  better  if  he  at  once  prepares  the  point  which  he  has 
captured  for  defence. 

However  much  every  subordinate  officer  should  en- 
deavor to  keep  his  people  together,  all  should  yet  be  pre- 
pared, and  the  men  should  be  ready  and  habituated  to  per- 
form any  task  which  the  necessities  of  the  attack  may  bring 
forth  at  a  moment's  notice,  with  whatever  force  may  be  at 
hand. 

8.  As  soon  as  the  success  of  the  attack  may  be  considered 
complete,  every  officer  must  do  his  utmost  to  restore  order 
as  quickly  as  possible  in  his  immediate  neighborhood,  and 


! 


70  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

by  degrees  throughout  the  whole  mass,  in  spite  of  the  over 
excitement  or  reaction  which  will  probably  prevail. 

III.  THE  THIRD  STAGE  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

We  hardly  require  theoretical  argument  or  graphic 
description  to  prove  that  troops  which  have  made  an  at- 
tack, as  it  necessarily  must  be  made,  in  the  manner  above 
described,  will  have  expended  almost  all  their  power  for  a 
certain  time,  and  require  a  period  of  repose  which  should, 
at  least,  last  until  the  disorder  which,  as  we  have  already 
asserted  and  still  confidently  maintain,  is  inseparable  from 
such  operations  has  been  to  some  extent  remedied.  This 
third  stage  has  at  all  times  been  an  extremely  dangerous 
period  for  the  assailant,  a  period  in  which  the  laurels  which 
have  just  been  won  at  the  price  of  blood,  have  often  been 
again  torn  from  the  victor  by  a  counter  attack  of  the  enemy. 
Hence  it  has  always  been  the  aim  and  the  task  of  the  com- 
mander when  making  his  general  dispositions  for  the  attack 
to  provide  for  this  moment  of  depression,  and  in  examining 
this  part  of  the  question  we  come  to  this  difficult  point,  the 
subdivision  of  the  force  into  separate  lines  of  battle* 

From  what  we  have  already  said  the  rule  must  be  ac- 
cepted as  permanent  that  the  aforesaid  subdivision  should 
only  be  made  with  a  view  to  that   moment  of  weakness  ii 
the  attacking  force,  and  not  with  any  idea  of  being  able  t< 
renew  an  attack  of  the  first  line  of  battle  made  unsucces< 
fully,  by  that  of  a  second  line. 

The  first  fundamental  condition  always  holds  good — that 
the  attack  should  be  conducted  so  as  to  be  successful ;  ii 
consequence  we  are  bound  to  bring  up  as  great  a  force 
we  can  to  the  assault,  and  to  keep  only  as  small  a  portioi 
of  it  back  as  may  appear  necessary  to  overcome  the  tempc 

*  "  Treffen,"  the  original  meaning  of  which  is  to  "strike,"  applied  here  technicall 
to  the  tool  used  to  give  the  blow.  It  is  difficult  to  render  the  term  in  English.  "  Line ' 
does  not  express  it,  for  a  "Treffen"  may  be  broken  up  into  several  lines.  "Line 
battle"  does  it  better,  and  is  perhaps  sufficiently  clear  to  render  the  meaning  int 
ligible,  but  the  expression  is  cumbrous.— (Tn.) 


The  Third  Stage  of  the  Attack.  71 

rary  difficulties  referred  to.  In  order  to  take  the  measure 
of  our  need  properly,  we  must  first  consider  more  closely 
the  task  which  the  force  thus  held  in  reserve  will  have  to 
execute. 

If  the  assailant  only  had  to  deal  with  the  defender's  mere 
power  of  resistance,  there  would  be  no  exception  to  the  rule 
of  bringing  as  many  troops  into  first  line  as  the  space  would 
admit  of  being  employed  effectively.  But  the  Defence  will 
and  must,  at  least  unless  ill-conducted,  make  use  not  only 
of  its  power  of  resistance,  but  likewise  of  that  power  of  strik- 
ing which  is  also  inherent  in  it,  and  this  action  on  its  part 
will  cause  the  greater  danger  to  the  Attack,  the  more  nearly 
it  coincides  with  the  last  extreme  efforts  of  the  assailant.  In 
treating  of  the  Defensive,  we  shall  see  that  its  counter-strokes 
will  best  be  dealt  at  the  actual  moment  of  the  assailant's 
last  rush,  or,  at  least,  immediately  after  this,  because  the 
attacking  force  will  then  be  in  a  condition  most  easily 
affected  by  the  offensive  return. 

We  have  thus  in  this  place  to  occupy  ourselves  with  the 
means  at  the  disposal  of  the  assailants  to  meet  this  danger. 
We  have  already  pointed  out  that  even  beaten  infantry  is 
never  entirely  defenceless  ;  it  will  therefore  here  be  sufficient 
if  we  bring  even  a  comparatively  small  force  of  fresh  troops 
to  the  support  of  men  who,  although,  as  far  as  the  outward 
circumstances  of  the  moment  go,  not  favorably  situated  for 
resistance,  are  yet  under  the  stimulating  effects  which  every 
attack,  particularly  one  which  has  just  succeeded,  produces. 

Unless  we  have  to  deal  with  a  numerical  inequality  be- 
tween the  two  parties  which  sets  all  theory  at  defiance,  a 
reinforcement  consisting  of  one-half  or  one-third  of  the 
forces  engaged  in  first  line  may  be  considered  sufficient  at 
this  moment ;  that  is  to  say,  the  assailant  need  not  keep 
more  than  from  one-third  to  one-fourth  of  his  total  force  in 
reserve  for  this  third  stage. 

This  conclusion  certainly  seems  rather  arbitrary,  and  ex- 
amples may  be  produced  from  military  history  of  cases  in 


72  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

which  forces  even  equal  to  those  engaged  in  front  did  not 
suffice,  and  again  of  others  where  a  very  small  fraction  was 
enough.  But  as  we  must  fix  upon  some  proportion  as  to 
numbers  in  determining  a  normal  order  of  attack,  we  shall 
do  well  to  abide  by  the  rule  above  given,  sanctioned  as  it  is 
by  our  general  experience. 

Of  course  the  commanding  officer  remains  at  liberty  to 
alter  details  according  to  the  actual  circumstances  of  the 
moment ;  only  let  this  general  principle  be  adopted — always 
to  put  our  main  strength  into  the  first  line.  Moreover,  the 
absolute  strength  of  an  attacking  force  will,  as  well  as  its 
distribution,  affect  this  question.  A  single  battalion  which 
has  to  make  a  decisive  attack  will  hardly  be  able  to  keep 
anything  back,  whilst  a  division  composed  of  four  regi- 
ments, each  of  three  battalions,  can  barely  afford  four  bat- 
talions as  reserve,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  an  army  corps 
will  often  only  employ  one  of  its  divisions  in  first  line,  &c., 
&c. 

We  have  hitherto  spoken  of  the  danger  incurred  by  the 
Attack  in  its  last  stage,  and  of  the  remedy,  but  we  must  now 
look  back  to  another  danger  which,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, may  be  encountered  even  earlier. 

The  more  an  attack  is  made  up  of  independent  portions 
side  by  side — in  other  words,  the  more  extensive  its  front, 
the  more  easy  would  it  seem  for  the  defender,  who  is  per- 
haps only  making  an  appearance  of  maintaining  the  defen- 
sive, to  concentrate  his  strength  against  some  point  of  the 
advancing  line,  to  break  through  it,  and  to  put  an  end  to 
the  attack  by  this  very  counter  stroke.  This  danger  natur- 
ally increases  as  the  line  gets  longer,  because  the  difficulty 
of  a  contemporaneous  advance  of  all  parts  of  it  augments  in 
proportion  to  its  length,  and,  at  the  same  time,  thev  risk 
arises  of  involuntary  gaps  being  caused,  which  would  tempt 
the  enemy  to  make  these  offensive  returns. 

When  circumstances  appear  to  produce  this  danger,  we 
must  strive  to  provide  against  it  by  our  order  of  attack,  and 


The  Third  Stage  of  the  Attack. 

we  come  thus  to  the  result  that  a  second  and  third  line  of 
battle  must  follow  the  first,  the  former  being  only  condition- 
ally, but  the  latter  always  necessary. 

A  second  line  of  battle  in  this  sense  (taking  for  granted  the 
existence  of  a  third  line)  will  only  be  necessary  if  the  front 
of  the  attacking  force  is  so  extended  that  its  fire  will  not 
range  effectively  from  one  flank  to  the  other,  and  concentric 
action  against  the  enemy's  counter  attacks  from  both  flanks 
to  center,  or  from  the  whole  line  to  either  flank,  is  thus  not 
feasible. 

It  is  a  strong  point  in  the  breechloader  that  troops  armed 
with  it  can  hardly  be  attacked  successfully  in  front  without 
proper  preparation,  and,  as  we  saw  just  now  how  the  Defence 
was  aided  by  its  inherent  power  of  striking,  so  in  this  case 
we  see  the  Attack  assisted  by  its  inherent  power  of  resist- 
ance, in  consequence  of  which  the  disadvantages  arising 
from  comparatively  thin  lines  are  more  easily  overcome  than 
they  could  be  in  former  days. 

If,  then,  at  this  moment  of  danger  to  the  attacking  force 
(the  risk  of  being  broken  through),  there  is  a  good  prospect 
of  support  from  a  flank,  assistance  from  the  rear  may  all  the 
more  readily  be  dispensed  with,  as  at  the  worst  we  assume 
the  existence  of  a  third  line  of  battle  prepared  to  throw  its 
weight  into  the  scales. 

We  may  thus  say  that  when  the  attack  is  made  by  com- 
paratively small  bodies,  whose  front  when  deployed  does 
not  exceed  from  800  to  1200  paces,  no  second  line  of  battle 
(in  the  old  sense)  is  required  if  a  body  of  troops  follows  in 
reserve  to  perform  the  part  above  indicated  as  devolving 
upon  a  third  line  of  battle.  In  other  words,  an  attacking 
force  not  exceeding  the  strength  of  a  brigade  will  be  best 
formed  in  a  first  line  of  battle,  with  a  reserve  following  at  a 
considerable  distance,  in  the  spirit  of  a  third  line  of  battle. 
This  will  be  preferable  to  forming  two  lines  of  equal  strength, 
with  but  a  small  distance  between  them. 


But  even  where,  in   consequence   of  a  greater  front,  the 


74  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

support  of  a  second  line  of  battle  cannot  entirely  be  dis- 
pensed with,  a  comparatively  small  body  will  answer  the 
purpose.  It  is  merely  a  question  of  filling  up  accidental 
gaps  by  doubling  in  with  the  first  line,  and  thus  taking  part 
in  the  attack,  or  of  opposing  purely  defensive  action  against 
the  enemy's  counter-strokes  (a  course  much  favored  by  the 
breechloader),  until  whatever  reinforcements  are  needed 
come  into  play  from  right,  left,  and  rear. 

It  will  therefore  be  sufficient  in  most  instances,  that  when 
a  second  line  of  battle  is  required,  it  should  be  looked  upon 
(unless  circumstances,  to  be  noticed  hereafter,  should  render 
this  course  unadvisable)  as  a  detachment  pushed  forward 
by  the  third  line,  which  should  furnish  it  of  a  strength  suited 
to  circumstances:  better  this  than  to  weaken  the  first  line 
by  making  a  detachment  for  the  same  purpose. 

We  will  proceed  to  consider  the  specific  task  required  of 
the  body,  which  we  call  the  third  line  of  battle,  so  as  to  bring 
this  question  to  issue. 

Be  it  understood  that  we  purposely  chose  the  expression 
"third  line  of  battle,"  in  place  of  that  which  is,  perhaps, 
more  generally  popular,  namely,  "reserve,"  because  the 
latter  term  is  easily  convertible  with  the  idea  of  standing  still, 
a  part  which  we  do  not  in  the  least  intend  the  body  kept 
back  as  last  line  of  the  attacking  force  to  act. 

The  most  dangerous  counter-attacks  which  the  defender 
can  make  on  the  assailant  are  those  attempted  during  the 
last  stage  of  the  attack,  because  the  latter  will  be  at  that 
period  most  thoroughly  exposed  to  the  effects  of  the 
enemy's  fire,  hence  making  the  nearest  approach  to  that 
shaky  state  which  his  advanced  troops  have  been  trying  to 
produce  in  the  ranks  of  the  defenders. 

But  these  counter-attacks  must  necessarily  be  directed 
against  the  flanks  of  the  attacking  force,  if  the  troops  mak- 
ing them  are  still  to  derive  any  advantage  from  the  fire  of 
their  comrades,  which  by  making  a  front  attack  they  would 
mask.  Only  when  a  flank  attack  is  impossible  will  the  de- 


The  Third  Stage  of  the  Attack.  75 

fender   deliver   his    counter-stroke    straight    to    the    front 
lirectly  after  the  enemy  has  broken  into  the  position. 

In  either  instance,  the  assailant  will  depend  upon  his  third 
]ine  of  battle,  which  must,  in  order  to  meet  the  first   case,  be 
irong  enough  and  near  enough  to  encounter  the  enemy's 
lank  movements  by  a  similar  manoeuvre ;  whilst,  in  the  sec- 
>nd  case,  it  will  only  act  the  part  of  an  "outer"*  reserve  (a 
part  which  will  be  described  more  at  length  in  our  chapter 
on  the  Defensive}  to  the  main  body  reduced  for  the  time  to 
a  defensive  attitude. 

In  both  cases  the  third  line  of  battle  will  find  its  best  field 
of  action  on  one  or  both  flanks  of  the  attack,  and  the  same 
rule  will  hold  good  with  regard  to  its  third  and  most  difficult 
task,  that  of  renewing  an  attack  which  has  failed.  The 
theory  of  allowing  the  remnants  of  a  beaten  force  to  pass 
through  your  ranks,  and  of  being  afterwards  able  to  oppose 
a  successful  resistance  to  the  enemy,  in  other  times  led  to 
the  formation  of  two  equally  strong  lines  of  battle,  one.  in 
rear  of  the  other,  but  it  is  certainly,  now-a-days,  a  theory, 
and  nothing  more. 

It  is  now  only  possible  to  cover  the  retreat  of  a  beaten 
force  from  a  position  on  its  flank,  a  direction  therefore 
which,  as  it  has  been  shown,  the  main  body  of  a  third  line 
of  battle  is  bound  to  take  whatever  the  nature  of  the  de- 
mands upon  it. 

Another  question  still  requires  discussion.  What  should 
be  the  distance  between  the  first,  second,  and  third  lines  of 
battle  ? 

Our  answer  may  well  be  founded  upon  what  has  been 
already  said  about  this  matter  of  distances:  a  second  line 
should  be  kept  so  far  in  rear  as  not  to  come  in  for  a  share 
of  the  losses  of  the  first  line,  i.e.,  about  300  paces,  and  a 


By  outer  ("aiissere")  reserve  the  author  means  a  body  which  keeps  itself  sepa- 
rate from  that  which  it  is  required  to  assist,  i.e.,  does  not  intermingle  with  it,  as  do 
for  instance  the  supports  with  the  skirmishers  whom  they  reinforce.— (TR.) 


76  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

third  line  should  follow  close  enough  to  come  into  action  at 
once  when  required,  i.e.,  about  500  paces  in  rear  of  the  hind- 
most troops  of  the  actual  attack,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  sec- 
ond line  of  battle,  if  there  be  one. 

The  lines  of  battle,  as  we  have  hitherto  viewed  them,  may 
be  looked  upon  as  the  defensive  supplement  to  the  Attack, 
an  element  which  cannot  altogether  be  dispensed  with  as 
long  as  the  Defence  contains  within  itself  any  offensive  prop- 
erties. 

Although  these  lines  may  appear  to  be  so  far  lost  as  re- 
gards the  special  task  of  an  attacking  force,  there  yet  re- 
mains to  them,  under  certain  circumstances,  a  not  unimpor- 
tant place  in  purely  offensive  action,  though  certainly  in  a 
rather  different  form,  and  therefore  in  different  proportions, 
to  what  was  required  of  them  in  former  days,  when  the  sec- 
ond line  was  supposed  to  ''pass  through  the  first,"  or  the 
latter  was  expected  to  "renew"  the  attack.  After  the  first 
line  of  battle  (the  main  force)  has  made  a  successful  attack, 
it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  second  line  to  clear  the  interior  of 
the  captured  post  of  the  straggling  remnants  of  the  defend- 
ing force,  thereby  allowing  the  first  line  to  devote  all  its 
strength  to  gaining  the  further  border  of  the  position,  a 
measure  which  on  principle  should  be  adopted.  The  duty 
of  pursuing  the  enemy  will  be  assigned  to  the  third  line  of 
battle,  the  first  line  being,  as  we  have  already  said,  not  only 
dissuaded  from  doing  so,  but  also  positively  forbidden  to 
join  in  pursuit,  further  than  by  firing  after  the  fugitives. 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  depth  rather  than  breadth  is 
required  in  an  attacking  force  to  enable  it  to  perform  the 
tasks  demanded  of  it,  and  thus  the  question  arises  of  how 
the  different  fractions  composing  this  force  are  best  kept 
under  command. 

Which  is  preferable,  that  there  should  be  unity  in  com- 
mand in  the  lines  of  battle  with  regard  to  front  or  to  depth  ? 

We  should  say,  taking  into  consideration  the  different 
duties  which  we  have  shown  above  to  devolve  upon  the  two 


The  Third  Stage  of  the  Attack. 

lines,  that  as  a  general  rule  the  second  line  requires  unity  of 
:ommand  more  in  the  direction  of  depth,  and  the  third  line 
lore  in  that  of  width. 

This  principle  will  not,  however,  be  so  invariably  applica- 
>le  as  to  be  considered  an  unalterable  rule.  The  tasks  which 
the  different  lines  have  to  execute  will  differ  so  much  ac- 
:ording  to  the  view  taken  each  time  of  the  actual  situation 
of  the  moment,  that  it  will  be  best  to  leave  the  command- 
ing officer's  hands  free. 

However  much  we  may  have  dwelt  in  the  introduction  to 
this  study  upon  the  necessity  and  expediency  of  establishing 
a  more  regular  system  of  drill  for  the  operations  thus  treated 
of,  we  have  now  come  to  the  point  where  greater  latitude 
should  be  allowed  than  has  hitherto  been  done. 

Let  us  have  a  fixed  system  of  drill  to  suit  the  tactical  unity 
of  the  battalion  ;  fixed  rules  to  govern  the  united  actions  of 
several  battalions ;  fixed  principles  to  guide  the  commanders 
of  several  independent  bodies  of  troops  taking  part  in  one 
battle. 

Thus  we  define  the  limits  between  drill  and  manoeuvre: 
now  when  it  comes  to  five,  six  or  more  battalions,  these 
may  be  said  to  manoeuvre,  even  if  they  are  acting  together 
in  the  most  open  plain  with  the  most  complete  unity  of 
purpose. 

As  soon  as  a  body  of  troops  on  the  offensive  is  large 
enough  to  be  divided  into  separate  lines  of  battle,  it  will 
be  well  not  to  bind  it  any  longer  by  any  fixed  drill  regula- 
tions. 

These  regulations  include  the  question  of  command  which 
requires  to  be  left  the  more  open,  that  is,  to  be  decided  more 
according  to  circumstances,  the  larger  the  forces  with  which 
we  have  to  deal.  In  the  present  state  of  tactics,  drill  regu- 
lations cannot  be  allowed  to  rule  any  larger  body  than  a 
regiment.  Whether  the  brigade  should  be  formed  with  its 
regiments  side  by  side,  or  one  behind  the  other,  is  the  briga- 


»«g«u 


7  8  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

dier's  business,  whose  decision  is  thus  the  first  called  for  in 
a  matter  affecting  the  question  of  lines  of  battle,  which  we 
are  now  discussing.  In  proportion  as  the  body  of  troops 
increases  in  size,  and  as  at  the  same  time  more  regard  has 
to  be  paid  to  the  combined  action  of  the  other  arms,  the 
latitude  allowed  to  the  commander  will  also  necessarily  in- 
crease, which,  however,  does  not  do  away  with  the  need  of 
fixed  regulations  respecting  the  original  formation  of  these 
masses  ("Rendez-vous  formation"). 

The  following  principles  will  be  sufficient  to  regulate  their 
general  employment  in  the  attack,  with  reference  to  its  third 
stage  now  discussed. 

1.  An  attacking  force  of  more  than  two   or  three   battal- 
ions must  needs  be  formed  in  more  than  one  line  of  battle, 
so  as  to  be  able  to  meet  a  counter  attack  of  the  enemy,  the 
possibility  of  which  must  always  be  kept  in  view. 

2.  A  second  line  of  battle  becomes  necessary  when  the 
front  of  attack  is  so  wide  that  a  charge  made  against  it  can- 
not be   met  directly  by  the  wings   of  the   assailing  force, 
namely,  if  the  front  exceeds  the  range  of  a  rifle-ball,   say 
from  800  to  1200  paces.     A  third  line  of  battle  is  requisite 
to  help  the  advanced  troops  to  tide  over  the  weak  moment 
of  reaction  through  which  soldiers  who   have   met  with  a 
stubborn  resistance  will  naturally  always  pass,  and  of  which 
the  defender  is  likely  to  take  advantage  for  making  a  coun- 
ter attack  either  on  the  flank  of  the  stormers  as  they  ad- 
vance, or  on  the  position  which  they  have  just  carried. 

Therefore,  whilst  a  second  line  of  battle  is  only  necessary 
under  certain  conditions,  a  third  line  can  never  well  be  dis- 
pensed with ;  that  is  to  say,  we  shall  always  find  it  advisable 
to  keep  back  a  certain  portion  of  the  first  line  to  follow  after 
the  fashion  of  a  third  line. 

3.  From   a  quarter  to  one-third  of  the  total    force   will 
usually  be  sufficient  for  a  third  line,  and  the  second  may  be 
much  weaker.     The  former  will  meet  the  enemy's  counter- 
strokes  by  acting  on  his  flanks,   and,   according  to  circum- 


Some  concluding  Remarks  upon  Drill.  79 

stances,  will  serve  as  an  "outer"  reserve  after  the  position 
has  been  carried,  or  will  undertake  the  pursuit;  the  latter 
will  fill  up  accidental  gaps  in  the  front  line,  oppose  a  purely 
defensive  action  to  the  enemy's  attempts  to  break  through, 
r  clear  out  his  stragglers  after  the  position  is  won. 

4.  The  usual  distance  of  the  second  line  of  battle  from  the 
ain  body  of  the  first  line  will  be  300  paces,  so  that  it  may 

ot  share  the  losses  of  the  latter,  whilst  the  third  line  will 
How  at  the  distance  of  from  800  to  500  paces,  so  regulated 
at  it  may  be  at  hand  when  its  support  is  required. 

Whilst  the  corps  composing  the  second  line  of  battle  will, 
accordance  with  the  duties  required  of  them,  be  disposed 
as  to  cover  the  intervals  of  the   first  line,  those  of  the 
ird  line  will  be  most  advantageously  posted  on  the  flanks 
with  a  view  to  the  part  assigned  to  them,  which,  however, 
oes  not  prevent  them  from  being  at  first  kept  together  in 
e  center  so  as  to  be  available  for  use  on  either  side.     But 
anyhow  they  must  be  drawn  to  a  flank  in  the  extreme  case 
f  having  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  first  line  after  its  repulse. 

5.  The  combined  action  of  the   second  and  third  lines  of 
battle  with  the  first  will   depend  too   much  upon   circum- 
stances to  become  the  subject  of  regulation. 

It  will  generally  be  convenient  to  place  the  corps  in  sec- 
ond line,  under  the  same  command  as  those  in  front  of  them 
in  first  line,  whilst  the  third  line  had  better  form  an  inde- 
pendent command  ;  but  the  commander  of  the  whole  force 
must  have  full  discretion  in  the  matter. 

If  this  arrangement  is  made  we  cannot  avoid,  in  a  second 
line  at  least,  breaking  up  the  tactical  unity  of  the  battalion 
into  two  independent  half  battalions. 

i 

It  appears  evident  from  all  that  has  been  said   upon  the 
attack,  and  the  formations  suitable  to  it,  that  the  drill-book 
rovides  all  that  is  required  in  this  respect.     We  do  not  re- 


j 

a 

I 


IV.     SOME    CONCLUDING    REMARKS    UPON    DRILL. 


provii 


8o  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

quire  to  invent  anything  new  in  drill  to  suit  our  new  tactics, 
only  to  apply  existing  forms  somewhat  differently. 

If,  however,  as  we  stated  in  the  introduction,  we  are  to 
regulate  our  drill  by  the  requirements  of  the  battle-field,  it 
s  most  important  and  necessary  that  certain  of  the  forma- 
tions already  sanctioned  by  regulation  which  have  hitherto 
been  kept  in  the  back-ground  should  be  brought  to  the  front, 
and  vice  versa. 

The  decisive  command  has  already  gone  forth  from  a  de- 
cisive quarter;  for  the  new  regulations  say,  "the  normal 
battle  formation  of  a  battalion  in  the  open  is  that  of  com- 
pany columns ;  the  battalion  column  should  be  avoided  ; 
even  second  and  third  lines  of  battle  should  adopt  the 
former  formation  under  certain  circumstances." 

The  company  column  is  recognised  by  the  regulations 
themselves  as  the  basis  of  skirmishing,  and  experience 
teaches  us  that  we  shall  not  be  going  too  far  if  we  add  to 
the  above  precept  the  following  one:  "Skirmishing  order 
is  the  normal  fighting  formation  for  infantry,"  whether  in 
the  plain  or  in  broken  ground. 

If  these  truths  have  become  the  foundation  of  our  drill  practice, 
ive  may  certainly  be  able  to  dispense  with  a  number  of  close-order 
formations  which  are  still  much  used,  and  which  waste  a  great 
deal  of  time. 

Still,  the  all-important  intention  of  our  drill-practice  in 
what  close-order  movements  we  yet  retain  will  gain  still 
greater  force. 

No  one  will  deny  that  the  more  extended  (individual) 
order  becomes  our  battle  formation,  the  more  important 
will  practice  in  close  order  movements  become,  as  a  means 
of  training,  for  the  individual  soldier.  Just  as  the  one  order 
becomes  more  necessary  to  us,  so  the  other,  at  the  same 
time,  gains  consequence.  The  value  of  the  solidity  of  the 
battalion  column,  of  readiness  in  passing  from  one  forma- 
tion to  another,  of  individual  dexterity  increases  in  like  pro- 


Some  concluding  Remarks  upon  Drill. 


portion  to  the  necessity  for  change  from  the  one  to  the 
other  form  of  battle  under  difficulties.  The  so-called 
"steady  drill,"  that  is  to  say,  the  habit  of  most  complete 
order  and  subordination  at  any  given  moment,  will  there- 
fore gain  importance  from  the  new  requirements  of  tactics, 
and  whatever  can  contribute  to  this,  by  making  our  peace 
practice  fit  us  for  war,  should  not  be  thrown  overboard — far 
from  it. 

Nevertheless  it  is  quite  true  that  simplicity  is  more  than 
ever  desirable  in  our  formations.  Their  value  as  a  means  of 
disciplining  and  preparing  the  soldier  for  what  is  to  follow 
does  not  arise  from  complication,  but  from  sureness  of  exe- 
cution. It  would  appear  therefore  desirable  not  to  multiply 
formations,  or  to  render  those  we  have  more  difficult,  but 
rather  to  strive  after  the  greatest  possible  simplicity,  which 
is  sure  to  bear  good  fruit. 

This  brings  us  to  the  well-ventilated  question  of  which  is 
preferable,  the  two  or  three  deep  formation  ?  It  would  really 
be  desirable  that  this  question  were  settled  once  for  all  by 
regulation.  We  cannot  undertake  in  these  pages  to  give  the 
pros  and  cons  in  this  matter,  but  it  appears  to  us  certain  that 
the  arguments  in  favor  of  introducing  the  two-deep  forma- 
tion, which  were  of  weight  in  their  day  (when  volley  firing 
was  the  regular  mode  of  fighting  of  infantry),  have  now  lost 
their  value ;  the  line  of  skirmishers  is  just  as  quickly  formed 
from  three  ranks  as  from  two  (for  we  need  hardly  quarrel 
about  the  five  or  ten  extra  paces  which  the  men  have  to  go 
over,*)  and  the  three-deep  formation  is  just  as  serviceable  as 
the  two-deep  in  close  order,  if  ever  that  should  happen  to 
be  used  in  battle.  On  the  other  hand,  whatever  arguments 
have  been  in  former  days,  and  are  yet  brought  forward  in 
favor  of  the  three-deep  formation  still  retain  their  full  force. 
If  formation  in  three  ranks  were  made  the  universal  rule,  the 
complicated  formation  of  skirmishers  would  be  simplified, 
and  the  perhaps  preferable  subdivision  of  the  company  into 

*  In  consequence  of  the  greater  depth  of  column ;  the  rear  division  being  as  usual 
sent  out  first  to  skirmish.— (TB.) 


82  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

four  parts  instead  of  three  (four  half  divisions)  would  ensue, 
and  all  this  without  making  any  innovation. 

Having  just  supported  our  plea  of  simplicity  by  the  fore- 
going proposal,  it  may  seem  inconsistent  on  our  part  to 
speak  up  for  greater  latitude  being  allowed  by  regulation  in 
the  instructions  for  brigade  drills. 

As  we  have  already  stated,  nothing  requires  to  be  altered 
in  respect  of  the  rendezvous  formation,  nor  of  any  movements 
beyond  the  range  of  fire  ;  the  prescribed  formation,  one  regi- 
ment behind  the  other,  suits  best  the  probable  order  of  the 
column  of  route  and  the  question  of  space. 

Only  from  the  moment  that  the  brigade  comes  into  action, 
the  commander  should  be  no  longer  bound  to  adhere  to  the 
forms  of  the  drill-book.  After  a  brigade  has  taken  its  fight- 
ing formation  it  cannot  be,  now-a-days,  when  under  fire, 
directed  by  words  of  command  as  per  regulation ;  therefore 
it  requires  such  forms  no  more. 

It  is  in  fact  impossible,  under  existing  circumstances,  to 
fix  upon  a  normal  fighting  formation  for  the  brigade. 

Every  possible  combination  has  been  made  use  of  suc- 
cessfully in  latter  times,  from  that  of  both  regiments  side 
by  side,  with  their  battalions  in  three  lines,  to  that  of  the 
deployment  of  all  the  battalions  in  one  line.  It  would  ap- 
pear therefore  judicious  to  allow  the  Brigadier  even  when  at 
drill,  to  settle  the  how  ?  we  know  how  decisive  are  his  where 
and  when,  and  the  offensive  does  not  demand  more  in  this 
respect  than  do  the  other  phases  of  battle. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE. 

ALL  defensive  action  which  aims  at  a  decisive  result  is 
composed  of  two  elements ;  resistance  and  counter-attack. 

Where  the  latter  element  is  wanting,  the  Defensive  is,  ac- 
cording to  Clausewitz,  the  stronger  form  with  only  a  negative 
object ;  here,  however,  we  have  to  do  simply  with  \hz  positive 
object  of  victory. 

The  Defensive- Offensive  aims  at  the  same  end  as  does  the 
Offensive,  but  in  a  different  manner. 

Whilst  the  latter  begins  by  shattering  the  enemy's  powers 
of  resistance  so  as  next  to  destroy  his  capacity  for  righting, 
the  former  attempts  to  obtain  the  same  result  by  previously 
breaking  the  enemy's  powers  of  attack. 

The  Defensive  holds  it  to  be  easier  to  break  the  power  of 
attack  than  that  of  resistance,  and  therefore  begins  by  only 
warding  off  the  enemy's  blows ;  but  if  it  desires  to  smash  its 
adversary,  it  is  obliged  at  length  to  make  use  of  its  own 
powers  of  offence,  in  place  of  those  of  defence  which  have 
hitherto  been  called  into  play. 

The  Offensive  attempts  to  perform  both  tasks  by  means 
of  the  same  form  of  action. 

The  main  difficulty  of  the  Defensive-Offensive  lies  in  this 
change  from  one  form  of  fighting  to  the  other,  and  it  was 
this  very  difficulty  which  caused  us  from  the  first  to  reject 
the  general  adoption  of  the  principle  of  the  Defensive.- 


84  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

Offensive  notwithstanding  its  advantages  as  they  appear  in 
theory. 

This  transposition  is,  with  the  result  at  which  it  aims, 
namely  victory,  dependent  upon  the  fulfillment  of  two  con- 
ditions ;  first,  that  the  assailant  against  whom  the  decisive 
counter-attack  is  to  be  directed  must  have  previously  been 
shaken  both  as  to  his  power  of  attack  and  of  resistance  by 
the  defence;  the  latter  result  being  by  no  means  necessarily 
identical  with  the  former.  Even  if  the  attacking  powers  of 
the  assailant  are  so  broken  that  he  has  to  retire,  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  his  powers  of  resistance  are  so  much 
impaired  as  to  make  the  success  of  a  counter-attack  certain  ; 
for,  as  above  remarked,  a  repulse  does  not  necessarily  put 
the  attacking  infantry  "hors  combat,"  and  they  will  not 
always  be  reduced  to  the  fragments  of  which  we  before 
spoke.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  powers  of  resistance  of  a 
body  of  troops  are  broken,  their  powers  of  attack  are  at 
the  same  time  destroyed.  The  converse  is  not  always  ap- 
plicable. 

Should,  however,  the  first  condition  be  fulfilled,  still  the 
second  remains  equally  indispensable :  the  counter-attack 
must  catch  the  assailants  at  the  right  moment,  that  is,  just 
after  they  have  been  thrown  into  disorder — a  state  to  which, 
in  any  case,  they  must  previously  have  been  reduced. 

We  may  safely  assert  that  to  do  this  at  the  right  moment 
is  one  of  the  most  difficult  tasks  which  falls  to  the  lot  either 
of  commander  or  of  troops.  We  shall  return  to  this  subject 
later,  when  treating  of  the.  second  stage  of  the  Defensive- 
Offensive. 

Let  us  first  glance  at  the  other  condition,  which  is,  accord- 
ing to  theory,  arrived  at  more  easily  by  the  first  stage  of  the 
Defensive,  namely,  resistance,  than  by  the  attack.  This  con- 
dition is,  your  enemy's  demoralisation. 

Now,  the  arguments  adduced  in  support  of  this  theory  are 
founded  on  two  advantages  which  the  Defensive  is  said  to 
have  over  the  Offensive  with  regard  to  the  action  of  firearms 


The  Defensive-Offensive. 


(and  this  it  is  which  can  alone  demoralise  the  enemy) :  first, 
that  the  defender  stands  still  to  fire  upon  his  opponent, 
who  is  in  motion,  and  thus  can  make  more  of  his  arms,  being 
able  to  choose  his  time,  to  fire  more  shots,  and  to  take  bet- 
ter aim  ;  secondly,  that  being  halted,  he  can  more  easily  take 
advantage  of  the  ground  which,  now-a-days,  is  a  matter  of 
vast  importance. 

The  above-named  advantages  next  demand  our  atten- 
tion. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  use  of  firearms  in  battle 
appears  toVequire  the  combatant  to  stand  still,  because 
movement  destroys  all  certainty  of  aim,  and  after  all,  the 
effect  of  fire  consists  only  in  the  hits  made  by  the  shooter. 

We  have  already  pointed  out  in  our  first  chapter  what 
technical  deductions  have  been  drawn  over  and  over  again 
from  this  specialty  of  the  Defensive. 

This  is  our  time  to  reply,  that  even  with  the  best  firearms, 
certainty  of  aim  will  only  produce  a  sure  and  absolute  re- 
sult when  both  shooter  and  object  aimed  at  are  at  rest,  hence 
that,  cceteris  paribus,  the  attacking  skirmisher  gets  the  advan- 
tage of  a  standing  mark  to  aim  at,  which,  at  least,  in  some 
degree,  counterbalances  the  disadvantage  of  being  himself 
on  the  move. 

The  superiority  enjoyed  by  the  Defensive  in  this  respect 
is  therefore  founded  less  on  the  fact  of  being  at  rest  taken 
by  itself  than  on  the  favorable  conditions  under  which  fire 
can  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  assailant. 

Firearms  only  give  the  defender  a  decisive  advantage 
when  he  can  really  make  full  use  of  them  from  beginning 
to  end  of  the  action,  where  peculiar  circumstances,  such  as 
ranges  previously  marked  out,  ensure  his  aim,  or  where  the 
favorable  nature  of  the  ground,  such  as  being  placed  behind 
a  defile,  or  being  able  to  bring  his  firearms  into  play,  tier 
above  tier,  enables  him  to  take  full  advantage  of  his  numer- 
ical superiority. 


86  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

Wherever  these  conditions  do  not  exist,  the  assailant's 
firearm,  now-a-days,  by  reason  of  its  great  mobility,  quite 
equals  that  of  the  defender  in  efficiency. 

All  these  conditions  of  fundamental  importance  depend 
upon  the  ground.  We  no  longer  now-a-days  reckon  upon  the 
arm  of  itself  making  up  for  any  deficiency  in  this  respect,  as 
we  might,  for  instance,  if  the  breech-loader  were  opposed  to 
the  crossbow. 

The  former,  then,  of  the  two  above-named  advantages  of 
the  Defence  is  simply  supplemented  by  the  second ;  the 
superiority  of  position  over  that  of  the  assailant  assumed  as 
at  first  existing,  and  which  is,  or  ought  to  be,  doubled,  in 
consequence  of  subsequent  measures.  In  fact,  it  is  the 
position  which  alone  can  give  to  the  Defence  the  superiority 
contended  for,  the  position  so  far  as  it  favors  fire-action 
directly  and  supports  it  indirectly  by  giving  cover  to  the  sol- 
dier. 

The  old  teachers  also  recognised  this  truth,  and  the  right 
choice  of  a  position  was  the  chief  subject  of  their  discourses 
on  the  Defensive,  discourses  which  we  need  only  so  far  re- 
capitulate as  will  be  requisite  for  the  purpose  of  inquiring 
whether  any,  and,  if  so,  what  modifications  therein  have 
been  called  forth  by  the  new  arms  ? 

A  clear  field  for  fire  in  front ;  good  appui  for  the  flank: 
strong  defensive   points  within,   space   for  free   movement 
both  in  the  interior  and  in  rear,  an  obstacle  in  front ;  the* 
are  in  general  terms  the  qualities  of  a  good  position  insisted 
upon  in  all  books  of  instruction  on  Tactics. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  as  far  as  a  passive  resistance  i< 
concerned,  the  conditions  remain  still  the  same,  even  witl 
the  best  arms. 

But  we  aim  at  something  beyond  this  for  the  Defensivt 
Offensive,  and  then  two  elements  of  superiority  are  admitted 
by  which  the  rapid,  grazing  and  certain  fire  of  the  new  arms 
combines  with  local  advantages  to  favor  the  counter-attacl 


The  Defensive- Offensive.  87 

which  was  indeed  contemplated  in  the  olden  time,  but  was 
a  work  of  greater  difficulty. 

The  assailant  must  now,  just  as  formerly,  pass  over  a  cer- 
tain intervening  space,  and  get  up  to  the  position  if  he 
means  to  carry  it.  Whilst  doing  so,  he  is  now,  on  account 
of  the  greater  range  of  firearms,  much  longer  exposed  to 
their  effect  than  he  was  formerly,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
intensity  of  the  fire  is  much  augmented  by  its  rapidity ;  if 
even  his  own  improved  armament  to  some  extent  counter- 
balances this  drawback,  there  still  remains  a  certain  surplus 
of  gain  to  the  Defence,  which  has  profited,  if  not  to  an  over- 
powering extent  as  some  would  make  us  believe,  at  least 
considerably,  by  this  addition  to  its  strength.  But  this  im- 
plies nothing  more  than  that  the  Defensive  can  now  arrive  at 
the  same  result  as  that  always  aimed  at  with  a  smaller  ex- 
penditure of  force ;  it  can  in  fact  economise  strength. 

If  in  the  present  day  a  skirmisher  can  fire  three  times  as 
far,  as  fast,  and  as  correctly  as  he  could  formerly,  it  is  clear 
that  he  can  produce  at  least  as  much  effect  with  his  rifle  as 
three  men  could  formerly  with  their  muskets ;  now,  what- 
ever number  of  men  can  in  consequence  be  spared  in  occu- 
pying the  position  (of  course  not  losing  sight  of  the  inten- 
tion of  retaining  it  if  possible),  is  so  much  in  favor  of  the 
defender's  counter-stroke,  and  the  latter,  like  an  attack 
which  it  virtually  becomes,  never  can  be  too  strong. 

To  this  direct  advantage  which,  as  we  have  shown  in  treat- 
ing of  the  attack,  is  really  not  illusory,  although  it  may  not, 
as  theorists  maintain,  increase  in  like  proportion  with  the 
improvements  in  firearms,  because  these  improvements  also 
benefit  in  some  measure  the  Offensive,  an  indirect,  and  per- 
haps, still  more  important,  advantage  is  added. 

We  have  already  mentioned  that  according  to  our  old 
theories,  in  the  time  of  the  old  arm,  the  indirect  aid  of  an 
obstacle  in  front  of  a  position  was  indispensable.  The  delay 
thus  caused  to  the  assailant,  and  the  power  thus  afforded  of 
concentrating  fire  upon  a  few  narrow  passages,  replaced  to 
some  extent  those  qualities  of  range,  accuracy,  and  rapidity 


0«_»lli\_     V^ 


88  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

of  fire  which  were  wanting  in  the  firearms  of  the  past.  But 
this  very  obstacle  became  a  hindrance  to  the  Defender  him- 
self when,  in  seeking  a  decisive  result,  he  attempted  a  coun- 
ter-attack ;  and  this  truth  has  been  recognised  by  the  old 
authorities. 

The  power  of  the  modern  breech-loader  has  freed  the  De- 
fensive-Offensive from  this  incumbrance,  and  the  theory  of 
obstacles  in  front  of  a  position  may  now  be  looked  upon  as 
exploded. 

We  arrive  then  at  the  following  conclusion  to  this  general 
inquiry;  the  Defensive- Offensive  is  dependent  on  the  nature 
of  the  ground. 

The  breech-loader  has  produced  some  favorable  modifica- 
tions in  the  conditions  to  be  sought  after  in  choosing  a  po- 
sition, enabling,  as  it  does,  the  defender  both  to  occupy  it 
with  a  smaller  force,  and  to  dispense  with  an  obstacle  in 
front,  thus  both  directly  and  indirectly  facilitating  the  nec- 
essary counter-attack. 

But  the  necessity  of  really  having  such  a  position,  an  ad- 
vantage not  always  to  be  gained,  still  remains  the  first  and 
foremost  condition  for  the  employment  of  this  form  of  action. 

The  one  principle  derivable  from  the  foregoing,  whereon 
to  found  instructions  for  battle,  will  only  supplement  those 
already  given  in  the  first  chapter,  and  is  as  follows :  the  De- 
fensive-Offensive is  only  justified  when  a  commander  finds  a 
position  so  favorable  to  a  passive  defence  that  he  may  safely 
calculate  upon  shattering  the  enemy's  power  both  of  deal- 
ing blows  and  of  withstanding  them,  although  occupying 
the  ground  with  a  comparatively  small  force;*  and  at  the 

*  We  shall  only  speak  throughout  this  chapter  of  the  relative  proportions  of  tl 
troops  destined  for  the  passive  defence,  (as  few  as  possible)  and  of  those  intended 
make  the  counter-attack,  (as  many  as  possible).  Definite  numbers  can  only  be  given 
if  we  have  particular  ground  in  view.  It  is,  however,  as  well  here  to  remark  that  a 
position  requiring  more  than  at  the  outside  the  larger  half  of  the  disposable  force  for 
the  passive  defence  is,  in  our  opinion,  a  bad  one,  and  that  to  be  called  advantageous 
it  should  be  of  such  a  nature  that  a  commander  occupying  it  with  Defensive-Offensive 
views  should  be  able  to  devote  about  one  third  of  his  force  to  purposes  of  resistance, 
and  about  two -thirds  to  those  of  counter-attack. 


The  Stage  of  Resistance.  89 

same  time  one  which  enables  him  to  make  his  offensive  re- 
turns at  the  right  moment,  to  make  full  use  of  his  forces  for 
the  purpose,  and  to  have  the  power  of  pushing  the  move- 
ment beyond  his  own  lines. 

We  will  now  proceed  to  examine  more  closely  both  stages 
of  the  Defensive- Offensive.  As  we  assumed  in  treating  of  the 
Offensive  that  the  decisive  point  of  attack  was  rightly 
chosen,  so  we  now  shall  take  it  for  granted  that  a  good 
position  for  defence  has  been  selected ;  we  have  only  to  do 
with  the  modern  conditions  upon  which  a  successful  result 
depends. 


I.     THE    STAGE    OF    RESISTANCE. 


he  stage  of  passive  resistance  is,  in  the  first  place,  to  the 
Defensive- Offensive,  what  the  Preparatory  stage  is  to  the  Offen- 
sive ;  it  serves  to  shake  the  enemy's  morale.  But,  in  the 
next  place,  it  must  be  continued  for  a  certain  time,  long 
enough,  indeed,  to  prepare  the  change  from  one  form  of 
action  to  another,  i.e.,  to  make  the  counter-attack  possible, 
so  that  meanwhile  the  defender  must  at  least  be  able  to 
hold  in  check  the  enemy's  power  of  attack  by  his  own  power 
of  resistance. 

The  task  of  Defence  thus  divides  itself  like  that  of  attack, 
into  a  preparatory  and  a  principal  period  of  action. 

If  the  defender  has  to  perform  this  double  task  along  the 
whole  front  of  the  position  chosen,  it  is  very  evident  that 
such  a  display  of  force  would  be  required  as  to  exceed  what 
will  be  presumably  available,  all  the  more  because  that  on 
principle  a  minimum  only  can  be  employed  for  defensive 
purposes  without  compromising  the  success  of  the  offensive 
return.  We  are  not  called  upon  to  consider  here  the  case 
of  a  Defensive,  persevered  in  in  spite  of  the  defenders  being 
actually  numerically  superior  to  the  assailants. 

The  stage  of  resistance  would  in  this  case  be  so  short,  un- 
certain, and  purposely  designed  to  deceive  (unless  all  tacti- 


go  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

cal  principles  were  set  at  defiance),  that  we  need  here  lay 
down  no  rules  for  such  a  course. 

We  have  only  to  deal  with  cases  in  which  numbers  are 
about  eqally  balanced,  or  where,  if  there  is  a  difference,  the 
scale  is  inclined  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  defender.. 

Under  such  conditions  in  respect  of  numbers,  it  is  evident 
that  the  defender  cannot  think  of  distributing  his  forces 
which  are  presumed  to  be  scanty  equally  along  the  whole 
front,  so  as  to  be  prepared  everywhere  for  any  possible 
emergency.  He  must,  therefore,  seek  out  other  means  of 
gaining  his  object,  which  means  will  really  only  be  afforded 
by  the  position,  if  wisely  chosen  as  it  must  always  be  with 
due  regard  to  the  force,  though  the  choice  must,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  be  independent  of  this  consideration.  The  mode 
of  occupying  the  position,  which  it  will  be  for  the  defender 
to  settle,  will  always  exert  a  certain  influence  upon  the 
means  referred  to. 

It  is  a  well-known  advantage  of  the  offensive  which  indeed 
contributes  to  making  it  the  stronger  form  of  action,  that 
the  initiative  both  of  time  and  place  falls  to  its  lot,  giving  it 
the  power  of  surprising  the  enemy.  To  compensate  for  this 
special  advantage,  the  Defender  possessed,  and  still  possesses 
a  certain  general  initiative,  by  means  of  which  (if  only  his 
position  be  strategically  good,  of  which  we  have  nothing 
here  to  say),  he  can,  from  the  nature  of  the  position  taken 
up,  attract  his  opponent,  and  force  him  to  advance  in  one  or 
more  directions  determined  by  and  known  to  him  before- 
hand. 

Passive  defence  must  then  be  restricted  to  these  principal 
lines  of  attack,  which  are  entirely  dependent  on  the  more 
or  less  fortunate  choice  of  position,  and  the  defender  must, 
at  those  points,  endeavor  to  perform  his  double  task  thor- 
oughly, whilst  at  other  parts  of  the  position  he  only  main- 
tains an  attitude  of  observation. 

Wherever  these  main  lines  of  attack  may  be,  the  strong 
points  of  the  defence,  i.e.,  of  the  position,  must  be,  and  be- 


! 


The  Stage  of  Resistance.  91 

ing  strongly  occupied,  they  must  and  will  infallibly  attract 
the  assailant  to  them. 

If  even  there  should  be  neither  local  circumstances  nor 
troops  arrayed  for  defence  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  pene- 
rating  between  the  separate  strong  points  of  a  position, 
hese,  if  well  chosen,  will  exercise  an  irresistible  power  of 
attraction  upon  him,  both  because  they  threaten  him  directly 
by  their  fire,  and  also  indirectly  by  the  attacks  aimed  from 
them  at  his  flank  and  rear,  from  which  he  is  not  safe  till  he 
has  mastered  them. 

The  first  necessity  of  the  Defence  then,  if  it  means  to  per- 
form its  task  with  its  relatively  weak  forces,  is  concentration 
on  decisive  points. 

To  put  the  matter  in  a  negative  form,  we  may  say  that 
the  Defence  should  never  accumulate  forces  where  it  will  not 
presumably  be  exposed  to  decisive  or  would-be  decisive 
attack,  where  in  fact  the  assailant  will  probably  only  make 
demonstrations. 

It  being  now  established  that  the  general  principle  of 
occupation  of  ground  for  passive  defence  is  to  concentrate 
on  decisive  points,  and  only  to  remain  in  observation  else- 
where, we  now  come  to  the  arrangement  of  details  at  these 
centers  of  concentration. 

The  nature  of  the  case  demands  that  every  such  center 
should  form  an  independent  whole  under  one  command, 
whose  entire  task  amounts  to  this:  to  maintain  himself  with 
the  force  under  his  orders  at  the  point  assigned  to  him. 
Just  as  we  said  before,  an  attack  to  be  successful  and  decisive 
should  be  conducted  under  the  persuasion  that  "the  sword 
severs  or  snaps  asunder,"  so  we  may  here  require  the  de- 
fence to  be  maintained  with  the  conviction  that  the  "shield 
wards  off  the  blow  or  splits."  It  has  been  remarked  of  the 
assailant  that  he  never  can  tell  what  force  he  may  chance 
upon,  so  now  we  may  assert  of  the  defender  that  he  never 
knows  but  what  he  may  yet  be  relieved. 

The   most   determined   and   stubborn   tenacity   is   alone 


in 


92  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

capable  of  enabling  the  Defence  to  encounter  the  resolute 
energy  of  an  attack,  pushed  to  the  utmost.  The  possibility 
of  evacuating  the  post  confided  to  him  must  be  as  far  from 
the  defender's  mind  as  the  idea  of  retreat  from  that  of  the 
assailant. 

This  appears  to  be  a  fit  place  to  warn  the  student  against 
conduct  on  the  part  of  the  defender  corresponding  to  those 
premature  and  useless  engagements  which  we  denounced  in 
treating  of  the  attack ;  we  mean  the  practice,  for  which  the 
higher  authorities  are  sometimes  accountable,  of  maintain- 
ing and  battling  for  points  in  advance  of  the  actual  posi- 
tion, which  practice  leads  to  repeated  and  long-protracted 
affairs  of  outposts  (advanced  and  rear  guard  skirmishes, 
and  such  like).  Here,  as  with  the  attack,  we  must  insist 
upon  complete  clearness  of  judgment  and  will ;  the  com- 
mander who  wishes  to  fight  a  defensive  battle,  and  has  the 
opportunity  of  doing  so  in  an  advantageous  position,  must 
not,  under  any  pretence  whatsoever,  expose  a  weak  detach- 
ment in  front  of  his  position  to  the  risk  of  being  overpow- 
ered separately  by  a  superior  enemy,  by  this  means  lower- 
ing the  morale  of  his  army. 

In  the  chapter  on  the  "Temporising  Combat,"  we  shall 
speak  of  what  must  be  done  in  this  way  as  an  introduction 
to  the  reconnaissance. 

All  this  is  a  digression.     Let  us  return  to  the  one  leade 
who  has  to  hold  one  of  the  keys  of  the  position. 

The  theory  of  our  forefathers,  which  is  after  all  the  parent 
of  our  present  wisdom,  was  in  favor  of  the  line  formation 
for  defensive  purposes,  just  as  it  favored  columns  for  the 
attacking  force.  Modern  views  confirm  these  impressions. 
The  whole  power  of  resistance  lies  in  the  complete  devel- 
opment of  the  effect  of  firearms,  and  substantially  in  this 
alone.  But  this  maxim  implies  the  necessity  of  bringing  as 
many  rifles  as  possible  into  front  line,  i.e.,  the  principle 
of  the  line  formation.  The  defender  must  strive  to  ensure 
to  his  firearms  by  all  possible  means  the  superiority  over 
any  fire  which  the  enemy  may  be  able  to  bring  against  him. 


The  Stage  of  Resistance.  93 

We  have  already  touched  upon  the  manner  in  which  a 
numerical  superiority  can  be  ensured  in  a  confined  position 
(such  as  by  concentration  behind  defiles,  by  several  tiers  of 
fire,  &c.),  and  it  may  be  dismissed  for  the  present  as  be- 
longing to  the  general  question  of  the  choice  of  a  position. 

The  other  measure,  that  of  ensuring  superior  accuracy  of 
fire  by  marking  the  ranges  beforehand,  is  mentioned  here  to 
be  strongly  recommended,  although  it  can  only  be  carried 
out  if  there  is  plenty  of  time. 

The  third  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  defender  for  pre- 
serving his  advantage,  depends  on  time  and  place ;  we  speak 
of  cover,  that  is  to  say,  reduction  of  loss  to  the  utmost,  by 
taking  advantage  of  the  ground.  Up  to  a  certain  point, 
however,  this  advantage  will  always  be  on  the  side  of  the 
Defence,  because  all  ground  affords  more  or  less  cover  to  a 
man  standing  still  or  lying  down.  The  defender  should 
never  neglect  to  add  to  this  cover  as  much  as  he  can  by 
artificial  means,  and  with  this  view  the  rifle-pit  is  to  him 
almost  a  necessary  of  life. 

All  these  things,  however,  though  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance, depend  upon  the  conditions  of  the  moment,  as  they 
may  chance  to  be,  upon  the  locality,  the  time  and  means 
available.  We  have  here  more  to  do  with  the  general  prin 
ciples  which  govern  the  employment  of  troops  under  all 
conditions. 

In  the  defence  of  an  assigned  position,  as  in  attack,  this 
task  divides  itself  into  two  branches,  that  of  preparation, 
and  that  of  execution.  Hence,  the  same  as  with  the  attack, 
as  strong  a  force  as  the  ground  will  allow  must  be  devoted 
to  the  first  task  (being  concentrated  at  the  different  strong 
points),  at  the  same  time,  no  larger  force  than  can  be  em- 
ployed with  advantage ;  that  is  to  say,  at  a  given  part  of  the 
position,  the  first  line  should  be  from  the  very  commence- 
ment as  thickly  occupied  with  skirmishers  as  there  is  room 
for,  and,  above  all,  as  there  is  the  power  of  bringing  into 
effective  action.  As  these  skirmishers  are  not  required  to 


94  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

move  about,  and  as,  further,  they  will  as  usual  be  posted 
under  cover,  they  may  be  more  closely  packed  than  in  the 
attack,  without  taking  off  from  their  efficiency,  or  exposing 
them  to  extraordinary  loss  ;  and  the  following  principle  may 
be  accepted,  that  troops  employed  in  a  passive  defence  will 
do  well,  whenever  it  can  be  done,  to  assign  one  skirmisher 
in  first  line  to  every  pace  of  front.  The  fire  of  this  line 
should,  as  with  the  attack,  be  as  much  as  possible  uninter- 
rupted, and  here  also  we  require  a  supporting  line  to  make 
good  losses. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  more  favorable  conditions 
with  regard  to  cover,  it  will  be  sufficient  if  the  supports  be 
equal  to  half  the  strength  of  the  skirmishers  (first  line).  It 
is  hardly  necessary  to  remark  that  they  should  not  actually 
join  it  till  the  attack  has  been  clearly  developed.  The  third 
part  of  the  task  committed  to  the  passive  Defence  remains 
to  be  mentioned,  and  that  is,  to  oppose  its  own  powers  of 
resistance  to  the  whole  striking  power  of  the  attack,  at  least 
until  its  own  counter-stroke  can  be  made  effectually.  We 
must  describe  the  moment  when  this  action  will  be  re- 
quired from  the  course  pursued  by  the.  assailant  as  we  have 
traced  it. 

The  advanced  troops  of  the  attack  have,  thanks  to  supe- 
rior numbers  and  greater  extent  of  front,  spread  round  the 
flanks  and  brought  a  concentric  fire  to  bear  upon  this  first 
line  of  the  Defence,  reducing  it  to  silence ;  they  then  break 
in  with  their  masses  in  one  place  or  other,  all  their  rearward 
troops  being  directed  to  converge  upon  it. 

With  comparatively  narrow  front,  but  hence  more  consid- 
erable depth,  the  stream  of  warriors  pours  into  the  breach. 

To  stem  this  torrent,  the  passive  Defence  requires  a  reserve 
or  main  body.  We  use  the  expression  as  we  used  it  for  the 
attack,  but  without  reference  to  numerical  strength. 

Whenever  it  can  be  done,  the  reserve  will  use  for  its  pur- 
pose independent  reduits  in  this  position,  i.e.,  strong  points 
not  yet  affected  by  the  preparatory  operations  of  the  attack- 


The  Stage  of  Resistance.  95 

ing  force,  and  to  carry  which  further  preparation  and  another 
assault  will  be  required.  The  possibility  of  doing  this  will, 
however,  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  by  the  range,  precision, 
and  destructiveness  of  modern  artillery.  Even  in  village- 
fights  the  inner  reduit,  unless  exceptionally  sheltered,  will 
not  be  less  cannonaded  than  the  border,  even  before  the 
tual  assault. 

Much  less  often  than  formerly  will  it  now  be  possible  to 
ollow  up  the  first  period  of  passive   defence  by  a  second 
interior"  period.     The  fate  of  inner  reserves  will  more  than 
ever  be  bound  up  with  that  of  the  foremost  line. 

Much  more  frequently,  therefore,  than  heretofore,  will  the 
reserve  of  the  passive  defence  be  forced  to  exchange  its  passive 
part  of  resistance  for  the  active  part  of  making  partial  use 
of  its  power  of  attack  ;  that  is  to  say,  far  more  than  in  former 
days  will  even  the  passive  Defence  depend  for  success  on 
assistance  from  the  offensive  element,  which,  in  truth,  was 
never  strange  to  it. 

We  have  already  seen  that  an  Attack  well  met  by  a  passive 
Defence  is  not  in  the  best  condition  to  make  its  own  power 
of  resistance  operative,  and  that  even  slight  counter-attacks 
made  at  this  moment,  particularly  if  directed  on  a  flank, 
will  check  the  assailant,  and  will  in  any  case  prevent  him 
from  attaining  his  decisive  objective,  the  "further  border" 
of  the  position. 

The  passive  Defence  does  not  require  an  absolute  prepon- 
derance of  force  to  gain  this  end,  because  the  assailant  can- 
not at  once  develop  his  numerical  superiority,  nor  immedi- 
ately bring  it  into  play. 

The  defender's  best  chances  lie  in  surprising  the  enemy, 
in  acting  on  the  flanks,  in  displaying  all  his  energy. 

Be  it  as  it  will,  however,  whether  the  Defence  remain  en- 
tirely passive  or  whether  it  pass  into  the  active  stage,  the 
struggle  for  localities,  that  real  prototype  of  the  defensive 
battle,  will  be  decided  in  these  days  much  more  quickly 


g6  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

than  heretofore ;  the  obstinate  stubbornness  of  former  con- 
flicts of  this  kind  will,  with  few  exceptions,  hardly  be  re- 
peated in  the  same  degree  in  face  of  the  all-devouring 
breech-loader. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  the  passive  Defence  also  depends 
less  for  the  performance  of  the  second  part  of  its  allotted 
task  upon  the  numerical  strength  of  its  forces  than  upon 
their  sudden  action  calculated  to  take  the  enemy  by  sur- 
prise, and  therefore,  in  spite  of  the  expression,  "main  body!' 
being  applied  to  the  troops  in  second  line  the  defender 
must  always  put  his  main  numerical  strength,  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable, into  the  first  line  for  holding  the  border  of  the  posi- 
tion. 

The  relative  strength  of  the  advanced  troops  (skirmishers 
and  supports),  and  of  the  main  body  (reserve),  of  the  De- 
fence will  vary  materially  according  to  the  position  occu- 
pied. 

In  any  case,  however,  the  strength  of  the  reserve  during 
the  stage  of  passive  Defence  should  never  more  than  equal 
that  of  the  advanced  body. 

If,  then,  the  defence  be  concentrated,  as  it  should  be,  on 
decisive  points,  according  to  our  reckoning  three  men  per 
pace  of  the  given  front  will  be  sufficient.  This  total  again 
will  be  divided,  according  to  circumstances,  between  first 
line  and  reserve,  up  to  the  extreme  limit  of  3  :  I. 

We  must  further  inquire  what  distance  should  be  kept  be- 
tween the  different  subdivisions  of  the  force  which  we  have 
up  to  this  time  recognised  as  necessary. 

As  all  movement  under  effective  fire  is  undesirable,  and 
as  the  moment  when  the  defensive  line  of  skirmishers  will 
in  all  probability  most  need  the  aid  of  its  supports,  coincides 
with  the  period  of  most  intense  fire  from  the  enemy  (that 
of  the  rapid  independent  fire  of  his  advanced  troops),  the 
general  rule  will  hold  good,  that  the  support  should  be 
placed  as  near  the  skirmishers  as  possible,  so  as  to  be  at 
hand  when  required.  The  disadvantage  of  such  an  arrange- 


tage  of  Resistance. 


97 


ment  is  that  it  is  apt  to  expose  the  supports  to  the  same  fire 
from  which  the  skirmishers  are  suffering,  particularly  if  op- 
posed to  the  enemy's  artillery  (a  disadvantage  not  always  to 
be  remedied  by  natural  cover).  The  best  way  of  meeting 
this  difficulty  will  be,  perhaps,  by  dividing  the  supports 
from  the  very  first  into  small  parties.  The  objection  to  this 
course,  which  was  necessarily  entertained  when  it  was  pro- 
posed for  the  offensive,  that  it  leads  to  a  too  early  inter- 
mixture of  the  lines,  does  not  here  apply,  in  consequence 
of  the  fact  that  both  skirmishers  and  supports  are  lying 
still. 


On  the  other  hand,  the  first  consideration  for  the  Reserve 
is  to  keep  as  much  as  possible  sheltered  from  the  enemy's 
fire  during  the  preparatory  stage.  A  distance  of  from  300 
to  400  paces  from  the  skirmishers,  varying,  indeed,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  ground,  will  generally  suffice  to 
save  the  reserve  from  being  exposed  to  the  risk  of  sharing 
the  effects  of  the  artillery  fire  directed  on  the  first  line. 
Again,  as  this  body,  even  if  acting  straight  to  its  front, 
should  only  come  into  play  shortly  before  or  contempora- 
neously with  the  enemy's  assault,  so  that  it  may  take  the 
assailant  all  the  more  by  surprise,  the  distance  named  does 
not  appear  too  great ;  as  an  extreme  limit  the  rule  may  be 
that  the  reserve  should  stand  a  little  nearer  to  its  skirmish- 
ers than  they  are  to  those  of  the  enemy. 

Naturally,  however,  these  conditions  depend  entirely  on 
the  locality,  and  must  needs  be  often  considerably  modified  ; 
for  instance,  in  the  defence  of  villages.  The  general  princi- 
ples which  govern  the  distribution,  strength,  and  distances 
between  the  several  parts  of  a  defensive  force  being  fixed, 
we  come  now  to  the  question  of  command. 

It  has  already  been  established  as  a  principle  in  our  chap- 
ter on  the  Offensive,  that  unity  of  command  is  in  direct  pro- 
portion to  the  unity  of  the  end  to  be  attained,  and  to  the 
possibility  of  the  leader  exercising  personal  influence  over 
his  troops. 


r " 


98  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

Looking  at  the  matter  from  this  point  of  view,  it  would 
appear  necessary  that  in  a  defensive  force  unity  of  com- 
mand should  reign  in  the  direction  of  depth,  as  the  arrange- 
ment most  completely  answering  the  requirements  of  a 
stubborn  resistance ;  and  we  shall,  therefore,  here  bespeak 
this  unity  of  command  unconditionally  for  skirmishers  and 
supports,  and  for  the  main  force  in  rear  (reserve)  also,  if  it 
can  be  posted  within  such  a  distance  of  the  first  line  as  to 
be  visible  to  the  commander  of  the  latter  (which,  indeed, 
will  not  always  depend  entirely  on  the  distance). 

As,  further,  it  is  in  the  nature  of  the  Defence,  which  can- 
not take  the  initiative  at  any  special  point,  that  it  may  be- 
come the  object  of  the  enemy's  attack  at  any  part  of  the 
position  which  he  may  choose  to  select,  we  should  recom- 
mend dividing  the  reserve  laterally  into  detachments  inde- 
pendent of  one  another,  and  distributed  in  our  general  line 
at  no  great  intervals.  The  company  column  would  appear 
to  be  a  peculiarly  suitable  formation  for  this  purpose,  and 
should,  therefore,  be  the  tactical  unit  of  the  Defence. 

All  this  depends,  as  with  everything  connected  with  the 
Defence,  very  much  on  local  conditions,  which  in  the  direc- 
tion of  width  may  easily  be  so  similar  throughout,  that  unity 
of  command  may  be  desirable,  and,  at  least  in  the  case  of  a 
battalion,  may  exist. 

Without  any  intention  of  fixing  upon  a  normal  fighting 
formation  for  a  battalion  on  the  defensive,  which  would  be 
unpractical,  in  consequence  of  the  great  variety  of  possible 
situations,  but  rather  to  illustrate  the  ideas  which  we  have 
just  expressed,  we  shall,  therefore,  say,  that  a  battalion,  of 
course  supposed  to  be  in  connection  with  others,  and  in- 
tended to  fight  defensively  in  open  ground,  occupying,  let 
us  suppose,  the  ridge  of  a  hill,  should  spread  out  its  four 
companies  with  intervals  of  from  80  to  100  paces  ;  each  com- 
pany (200  rifles)  will  extend  one  division  as  skirmishers 
with  a  front  of  80  paces,  posting  about  50  or  100  paces  be- 
hind these  a  half-division  (eventually  broken  up  into  sec- 
tions) as  supports,  and  establishing  the  remaining  one-and- 


Stage  of  Resistance.  99 

a-half  divisions,  either  deployed  or  in  half-division  column, 
in  open  line  from  300  to  400  paces  in  rear  of  the  skirmishers : 
or  else,  a  battalion  to  which  the  defence  of  the  border  of  a 
wood,  village,  or  such  like  is  entrusted,  and  which  need  only 
provide  for  the  enemy's  reception  at  certain  fixed  points  of 
entry,  will,  according  to  the  estimated  number  of  such 
points,  place  its  companies  across  them  (an  arrangement 
always  far  preferable  for  the  defence  of  a  barricade  to  that 
of  occupying  sections  of  the  front  from  street  to  street), 
and  will  keep  back  one  or  two  of  them  (according  to  cir- 
cumstances) as  reserve  in  close  order,  whilst  the  two  or 
three  companies  fighting  in  first  line  are  extended  as  skir- 
mishers and  supports. 

The  circumstance  that  the  force  of  resistance,  for  entirely 
mechanical  reasons,  increases  in  the  ratio  of  the  depth  of 
formation  opposed  by  the  defender  to  the  attack  directed 
against  him  (a  circumstance  which  influenced  us  when  we 
advocated  unity  of  command  in  the  direction  of  depth), 
brings  us  by  an  entirely  different  route  from  that  pursued 
when  discussing  the  attack  to  the  question  of  lines  of  battle ; 
and  notwithstanding  this  difference,  the  ruling  idea  remains 
the  same  here  as  there,  that  of  the  lines  of  battle  assisting 
the  combatant  to  tide  over  the  moment  when  we  may  pre- 
sume that  his  powers  of  resistance  will  be  put  to  the  test. 

In  our  foregoing  treatise  on  passive  Defence  we  have  de- 
signedly, and  on  principle,  made  use  of  the  expressions 
"first  line"  and  "reserve,"  instead  of  "advanced"  and 
"main"  "body,"  which  we  employed  in  treating  of  the 
attack,  in  spite  of  the  many  points  of  resemblance  indicated. 
In  fact,  when  the  passive  Defence  has  reached  the  point  of 
bringing  into  action  that  part  of  its  force  designated  the 
"reserve,"  it  has  done  its  utmost,  it  has  acted  its  part,  that 
of  holding  its  ground  with  all  its  might  to  the  end.  This 
element  of  endurance  appeared  to  us  to  be  best  rendered 
by  the  expression  "reserve,"  and  just  because  this  term  im- 
plies an  extreme  degree  of  passive  tenacity,  we  avoided  it 
when  dealing  with  the  Attack.  The  well-known  phraseology 


ioo  Stittlies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

of  all  our  text-books  agrees  with  this  our  method,  as  they 
all  have  long  ago  applied  the  term  "inner  reserve"  to  the 
portion  of  the  defending  force  of  which  we  are  speaking,  at 
any  rate,  -when  they  treat  of  local  defence. 

Inversely,  we  shall  again,  for  the  same  reason,  when 
speaking  of  the  body  of  troops  which  delivers  the  counter- 
stroke  of  the  Defensive-Offensive,  not  call  it  a  "reserve."* 

But  now  it  is  evident  that  if,  as  may  happen  in  spite  of 
original  economy  of  strength,  the  numerical  proportions  of 
the  troops  employed  in  this  passive  Defence  have  assumed 
greater  dimensions  at  the  different  points  of  concentration 
than  we  have  presupposed  in  our  general  remarks,  the  sub- 
division hitherto  imagined  into  skirmishers,  supports,  and 
reserves  will  be  insufficient. 

When,  as  has  frequently  happened,  and  as  will  often 
happen,  in  decisive  battles  between  the  great  masses  of  the 
present  day,  the  part  of  passive  Defence  devolves  upon  whole 
brigades,  divisions,  even  corps,  until  other  forces  undertake 
the  counter-attack,  the  question  of  distribution  into  lines  of 
battle  must  needs  crop  up  even  from  the  point  of  view  of 
space,  when  dealing  with  such  large  bodies. 

In  contrast  to  what  was  said  in  the  chapter  on  the  Offen- 
sive, the  expediency  and  necessity  of  forming  a  second  line 
of  battle  will  have  much  greater  weight  in  the  case  of  the 
Defence.  In  the  former  case, we  saw  it  intended  only  as  a 
stop-gap  to  be  used  in  the  improbable  event  of  the  first  line 
being  broken  through  by  the  enemy,  or  in  the  accidental 
event  of  a  gap  otherwise  arising.  But  with  troops  engaged 
in  a  passive  Defence  this  condition  presents  itself  differently 
to  the  view. 

Accidental  gaps  will  certainly  rarely  arise,  as  every  one 
is  standing  fast ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  right 

*  It  may,  perhaps,  strike  the  reader  that  too  much  importance  has  often  been 
assigned  in  this  study  to  particular  forms  of  expression  which  may  be  in  fact 
synonymous.  We  are  not  of  this  opinion,  as  we  have  before  mentioned,  but  think 
that  the  want  of  clearness  in  forms  very  frequently  engenders  a  vagueness  of  ideas. 


The  Stage  of  Resistance. 


101 


1U£ 


earnestly  intends,  and  strives  with  all  his  might,  to  make 
breaches  in  the  line,  bringing  all  the  weight  of  his  powers 
of  offence  to  bear  upon  the  points  assailed.  The  event 
which  on  the  side  of  the  Attack  we  have  seen  was  an  im- 
probable exception,  only  to  be  provoked  by  the  assailant's 
own  faults,  will,  on  the  side  of  the  Defence  be  the  rule,  and 
the  object  contended  for  by  the  enemy  with  all  his  means. 

This  circumstance  at  once  renders  a  second  line  of  battle 
uncommonly  important  to  the  Defence,  even  when  the  front 
is  comparatively  short,  and  in  proportion  as  the  line  be- 
comes longer,  and,  as  thanks  to  the  enemy  having  the 
initiative,  the  uncertainty  as  to  his  intended  point  of  assault 
increases  in  like  measure,  so  the  value  of  a  second  line  of 
battle  is  largely  augmented. 

The  more  total  the  defeat  which  would  be  entailed  upon 
the  defender  by  the  loss  of  his  position,  the  more  speedily 
must  reinforcements  be  brought  up  at  need.  It  does  not 
much  matter  to  the  assailant  when  met  by  a  counter-attack 
of  the  enemy,  at  what  particular  point  the  same  is  made,  as 
his  resistance  does  not  depend  on  the  position  in  which  he 
happens  to  be  at  the  moment.  Very  different  is  the  case  of 
the  Defence,  whose  position  is  the  base  of  its  strength. 

If  the  second  line  of  battle  on  the  Defensive-Offensive  side 
is  called  upon  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  first,  we  may  look 
upon  the  game,  taken  as  a  whole,  as  lost,  and  probably 
definitively  so. 

Such  are  the  principal  reasons  for  the  necessity  of  a  sec- 
ond line  of  battle  in  a  defensive  position  of  some  extent. 

Like  everything  else  on  the  side  of  the  defender,  the 
questions  of  strength,  distance,  and  command  of  such  a 
second  line,  depend  entirely  on  the  nature  of  the  ground. 
The  more  this  is  favorable  to  the  first  line  of  battle,  the 
weaker  naturally  may  the  second  be ;  we  may,  however, 
assume,  that  even  in  a  position  occupied  by  only  one  regi- 
ment, a  second  line  of  battle  will  be  requisite,  whether  fight- 
ing on  open  ground  or  in  woods  or  villages. 


io2  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

This  second  line  of  battle  may,  according  to  circumstances, 
be  fused  with  the  main  body  of  the  first  line  into  one  "inner 
reserve,"  or  by  relieving  it  make  it  free  to  act  in  front,  or 
else  itself  operate  independently  as  an  "outer  reserve." 

It  will  not  be  necessary,  after  what  we  have  already  said 
in  our  chapter  on  the  Attack,  about  lines  of  battle,  and  after 
what  has  elsewhere  been  remarked  about  the  employment 
of  reserves,  to  enter  specially  into  the  mode  of  action  of  the 
second  line  of  battle,  or  to  describe  its  conduct,  according  to 
circumstances,  offensive  or  defensive. 

What  more  remains  to  be  noted  under  this  head  will  be 
referred  to  when  we  come  to  the  second  stage  of  the  Defen- 
sive-Offensive. 

True  to  the  principle,  that  even  the  most  passive  resist- 
ance must  not  remain  without  some  infusion  of  the  offensive 
element,  the  greater  the  force  employed  in  the  passive  De- 
fence, the  more  must  the  action  of  its  second,  eventually  of 
its  third  line  of  battle  (even  if  merely  local,  and  therefore  in- 
decisive) be  that  of  a  force  executing  a  decisive  counter- 
attack ;  in  fact,  to  do  this  should  be  its  aim. 

Having  thus  thrown  some  light  on  the  question  of  the 
distribution  of  strength  during  the  stage  of  passive  Defence, 
it  only  remains  to  notice  briefly  the  course  which  the  strug- 
gle of  the  contending  forces  must  take  with  the  formations 
adopted  by  Attack  and  Defence. 

We  must  at  this  stage  of  our  inquiry  first  of  all  speak  of 
the  defensive  artillery,  which  has  not  been  hitherto  men- 
tioned, for  without  its  assistance  we  cannot  hope  now-a-days 
to  maintain  a  defensive  fight  on  a  large  scale. 

We  shall  start  by  assuming  that  the  defensive  batteries 
are  placed  in  the  most  favorable  positions  possible,  that 
they  are,  as  far  as  can  be,  behind  natural  cover,  and  so  forth  ; 
and  that  they  are  in  the  general  line  of  the  reserve,  i.e., 
about  400  paces  in  rear  of  the  foremost  line  of  skirmishers. 

As  certainly  as  it  is  inconvenient  for  the  attacking  force  to 


Stage  of  Resistance. 


103 


be  compelled  to  deploy  at  a  long  distance  from  the  enemy, 
so  it  is  clearly  incumbent  on  the  defender  to  force  the  as- 
sailant to  this  deployment,  but  it  remains  a  question  whether 
this  task  should,  as  a  rule,  be  allotted  to  the  defensive  bat- 
teries. It  is,  after  all,  more  important  that  they  should 
catch  the  assailant  at  a  really  effective  range,  to  ensure 
which  they  should  not  unmask  themselves  too  soon.  It 
would  appear  preferable  to  hand  over  this  duty  to  an  ad- 
vanced party*  of  the  Defensive- Offensive  force  supported  by 
cavalry  and  some  light  batteries ;  in  like  manner,  on  the 
other  side,  the  advanced  guard  of  the  assailant  will  endeavor 
to  save  the  troops  coming  up  from  the  rear  from  being 
forced  into  an  unnecessarily  early  or  inconvenient  deploy- 
ment. 

The  batteries  in  position  should  only  open  fire  when  the 
enemy  is  within  easy  range  and  there  is  promise  of  good 
effect  (the  assailant's  want  of  skill  may,  of  course,  expose 
him  to  serious  loss  at  an  unusual  distance),  and  should 
aim,  as  a  general  rule,  at  the  attacking  infantry,  although 
they  cannot  be  expected  to  resist  taking  advantage  of  the 
favorable  moment  for  firing  at  the  enemy's  guns  as  they 
come  into  action. 

But  from  the  instant  when  the  attacking  infantry  itself 
opens  fire  up  to  the  very  last  moment,  the  defender's  guns 
should  never  leave  it  alone. 

The  assailant's  artillery  will,  in  consequence  of  this  pro- 
ceeding, be  obliged  to  come  nearer,  and  the  defender's  in- 
fantry must  be  left  to  encounter  it,  and  to  keep  it  at  as  great 
a  distance  as  possible. 

We  have  already  mentioned  as  one  of  the  qualities  of  a 
good  position,  that  it  should  offer  a  clear  field  for  fire  up  to 
the  furthest  effective  range.  We  do  not  mean,  however, 
that  this  should  be  taken  advantage  of  from  the  first  by  the 
mass  of  the  defender's  forces. 


Einleitungstruppe,"  literally  introductory  force. 


IO4  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

Nevertheless,  just  as  in  speaking  of  the  attack  we  dwelt 
upon  the  expediency  and  utility  of  even  unaimed  fire  at  the 
last  moment,  we  feel  ourselves  obliged  here  to  advocate 
chance  shots  on  the  part  of  the  defence.  The  advantage  of 
a  range  exceeding  the  length  of  vision  of  most  skirmishers 
which  the  new  arms  possess  ought  no  longer  to  be  neglected 
for  the  purposes  of  passive  Defence,  in  spite  of  all  the  value 
which  we  most  decidedly  attach  to  the  fire  of  the  masses  at 
the  most  effective  ranges,  and  only  at  such. 

The  moral  effect  produced  upon  the  assailant  by  the 
whistling  of  hostile  bullets,  coming  from  positions  of  which 
he  can  as  yet  see  nothing,  is  not  to  be  undervalued  (we  have 
already  referred  to  it  when  speaking  of  the  attack),  and 
every,  even  the  smallest  deduction  from  the  moral  force  of 
the  assailant  contributed  to  by  the  defender,  is  of  great  value 
to  the  latter. 

But  certainly  the  remedy  would  become  dangerous,  and 
would  produce  the  reverse  of  what  is  intended  if  adminis- 
tered in  too  large  doses.  Such  unaimed  fire  can  only,  of 
course,  produce  mere  chance  hits,  which  must  be  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  number  of  cartridges  expended.  Now  if 
the  men  of  the  attacking  force  remark  that  out  of  the  crowd 
of  whistling  bullets  not  only  some,  but  by  far  the  greater 
number  hit  no  one,  this  sort  of  fire  will  encourage  more  than 
it  will  depress.  All  the  same,  experience  has  led  us  to  take 
count  of  these  chance  shots  in  considering  the  formation  for 
attack,  hence  we  shall  do  well  not  to  neglect  this  means  of 
annoyance.  If  some  quite  small  detachments  are  pushed 
forward  from  the  flanks  of  a  position  or  in  front  of  it,  and 
keep  up  a  steady  continuous  fire,  well-regulated  by  the 
officers  at  ranges  of  from  1800  to  1500  paces,  for  in- 
stance, in  the  ascertained  direction  of  the  enemy's  general 
advance,  it  must  at  least  somewhat  influence  the  formations 
of  the  attacking  force.  And  as  we  have  before  remarked, 
the  passive  Defence  cannot  afford  to  neglect  even  the  small- 
est means  of  offence.  The  way  in  which  afterwards  the  real 
fire  of  the  masses,  and  lastly  their  rapid  independent  fire  is 


The  Stage  of  Resistance. 


105 


regulated,  stands  out  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  foregoing  pro- 
ceedings. Fire  should  only  be  opened  by  the  defender's 
actual  line  of  skirmishers  at  the  range  most  effective  accord- 
ing to  the  mark  aimed  at,  and  should  be  maintained  with  a 
certain  degree  of  spirit  without  at  first  taking  the  form  of 
rapid  independent  firing,  which  should,  however,  be  practised 
when  the  object  is  to  keep  the  enemj^'s  advanced  line  as  far 
as  possible  from  the  position,  when  preparing  to  open  its 
own  rapid  independent  fire.  Success  on  the  part  of  the  De- 
fence at  this  moment  causes  most  frequently  the  failure  of 
the  attack,  as  is  well  known. 

But  the  defender  develops  the  full  force  of  his  fire,  bring- 
ing it  to  its  highest  pitch  by  employing  supports,  often  also 
reserves,  even  his  second  line  of  battle  at  the  moment  when, 
as  above  described,  the  enemy  advances  to  storm  the  posi- 
tion ;  for  the  Defence  truly  the  most  trying  time,  but  also 
the  moment  when  all  the  commander's  resources  (arising 
both  from  previous  training  and  momentary  impulse)  must 
be  called  into  play,  to  awaken  the  firm  conviction  in  his 
troops  that  to  retreat  now  would  be  certain  ruin,  and  that,  as 
a  last  resource,  they  must  take  to  the  bayonet. 

We  may  then  resume  what  we  said  upon  passive  Defence  as 
follows: — 

1.  The  passive  Defence  must,  in  order  to   reserve  as  much 
force  as  possible  for  the  decisive  offensive  return,  endeavor 
to  perform  with  a  minimum  of  strength  the   double  task  of 
shattering  the  enemy  and  of  holding  the  position. 

2.  Whilst  the  choice  of  position  has  much  to  do  with  the 
successful  performance  of  this  task,  the  mode  of  occupying 
it  will  also  materially  affect  the  result. 

The  troops  employed  in  the  passive  Defence  should  be  con- 
centrated at  points  previously  recognised  and  indicated  as 
keys  of  the  position,  unity  of  command  being  preserved  at 
each  of  these  points,  whilst  the  intervening  space  should 
only  be  observed. 


io6  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

3.  The  principle  of  the  line-formation  will  govern  the  dis- 
position of  the  troops  at  each  point  occupied,  i.e.,  as  many 
rifles  as  possible  will  be  brought  into  action  in  first  line. 

One  man  to  a  pace  in  this  line  of  skirmishers  will  best 
meet  this  demand,  and  a  line  of  supports  half  as  strong  as 
the  first  line,  and  approaching  as  close  as  practicable  to  it 
will  be  sufficient,  as  it  is  assumed  that  both  lines  are  well 
under  cover. 

Upon  these  two  bodies,  forming  together  the  first  line  of 
the  Defence,  and  which  should  also  invariably  be  under  one 
commander,  devolves  the  task  of  shattering  the  assailants' 
power  of  attack. 

4.  So  as  under  all  circumstances  to  be  able  to  hold  a  po- 
sition once  occupied,  this  first  line  needs  a  reserve  (main- 
body),  varying  in  strength  according  to  circumstances,  from 
equal  to  down  to  one-third  or  one-fourth   of  its   own   num- 
bers ;  this  reserve  serving  passively  to  garrison  a  reduit  or  to 
furnish  active  support,  under  one  and  the  same,  or  under 
separate  command,  according  to  which   part   it   plays,   but 
never  more  than  from  300  to  400  paces  in  rear. 

5.  Unity  of  command  in  the  direction  of  depth  is  desira- 
ble as  long  as  the  reserve  is  visible  from  the  position  of  the 
first  line,  whilst  in  the  direction  of  width  its  extent  depends 
upon  the  unity  of  the  work  in  hand,  which  again  chiefly  de- 
pends upon  the  nature  of  the  ground. 

It  is  always  better  to  occupy  the  approaches  to  a  position 
by  independent  bodies,  and  not  to  make  such  approaches 
boundaries  between  sections  of  the  position. 

The  best  formation  for  a  battalion  on  the  defensive,  is 
generally  that  of  separate  company  columns,  whether,  as  a 
whole,  it  be  formed  in  one  or  more  lines. 

6.  The  value  and  necessity  of  a  second  line  of  battle  are 
much  more  evident  for  a  defensive  than   for  an   attacking 
force ;  but  its  strength,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  drawn 
up  and  handled,  depend  entirely  on  the  nature  of  the  ground, 


ie  Stage  of  Resistance. 


107 


according  to  which  it  will  come  into  action  either  as  an 
"inner"  or  "outer"  reserve,  for  the  latter  of  which  offices  a 
third  line  of  battle  will  often  become  necessary  when  the 
numbers  are  large ;  and  its  operations  will  be  conducted  al- 
most entirely  on  the  principles  of  the  offensive  return  (the 
more  so,  the  larger  the  dimensions  of  the  forces  engaged), 
even  when  it  does  not  of  itself  attempt  to  produce  a  decisive 
result. 

Above  all,  an  infusion  of  the  offensive  element  should 
never  be  wanting  to  the  passive  Defence  even  in  the  smallest 
particulars. 

7.  It  should  be  a  principle  of  the  passive  Defence  to  open 
fire  upon  the  enemy  only  when  he  comes  within  the   most 
effective  range. 

All  the  same  it  will  be  necessary  to  take  advantage  of  the 
extreme  range  of  the  arm  by  detaching  small  parties  to  fire, 
under  the  control  of  their  officers,  on  the  enemy's  general 
line  of  approach,  as  far  as  it  is  known. 

The  first  line  will  by  a  lively  fire,  and  eventually  by  rapid 
independent  firing,  keep  the  enemy's  skirmishers  at  as  great 
a  distance  as  possible  when  they  are  taking  up  their  ground 
previous  to  the  assault,  for  the  defence  will  be  best  served 
by  their  being  hindered  from  establishing  themselves  firmly 
at  this  moment.  Every  fire-arm  should  be  brought  into  play 
to  the  fullest  extent  against  the  actual  assault  at  from  400 
to  300  paces. 

The  defenders  must  be  convinced  that  it  may  be  neces- 
sary, after  all,  to  have  recourse  to  the  bayonet,  and  that  this 
would  be  less  dangerous  to  them  than  to  give  way. 

8.  From  the  very  nature  of  the  work,  a  defensive   action 
can  only  be  carried  through  in  extended  order,  to  adopt  which, 
from  the  very  first,  both  supports  and  reserve  may  easily  be 
forced. 

Still,  even  with  troops  thus  extended,  the  power  of  con- 
centrating fire  must  be  preserved,  although  it  will  rarely  now 
be  able  to  take  the  form  of  a  volley. 


io8  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

The  intermixture  of  skirmishers  with  supports  will,  for 
the  Defence  as  for  the  Attack,  be  generally  the  only  form  of 
reinforcement  possible,  although  exceptions  to  this  rule  may 
occur  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  fight,  exceptions  always  to 
be  made  use  of. 


II.     THE    STAGE    OF    COUNTER-ATTACK. 

The  counter-attack  of  the  Defensive-Offensive  is  its  deci- 
sive act  of  offence.  Hence  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  speak 
of  numbers,  formations,  or  principles  of  execution,  all  which 
matters  have  been  settled  when  treating  of  the  Offensive.  It 
remains  to  us  only  in  this  place  to  clear  up  one  point,  but 
certainly  the  most  material  one  for  the  counter-attack, 
namely,  at  what  moment  it  should  be  made. 

We  have  already  pointed  out  as  a  fundamental  condition 
of  success  in  attack  that  the  shock  of  the  masses  should  fol- 
low immediately  upon  the  preparatory  operations.  The 
same  condition  holds  good  in  the  case  of  the  counter-attack 
of  the  Defensive- Offensive  force,  if  the  defensive  stage  is 
really  to  be  a  preparation  for  it. 

Success,  on  the  whole,  depends  upon  choosing  the  right 
moment  for  action.  This  moment  is  self-evident  in  the  case 
of  the  attack,  which  adheres  simply  to  the  same  mode  of 
fighting  throughout,  but  for  the  Defensive-Offensive  force 
which  will  deal  its  blow  with  other  troops  hitherto  far  away 
from  the  front,  and  therefore  more  fresh,  the  question  of 
when?  and  where?  so  decisive  for  the  attack,  must  be  solved, 
and  the  answer  acted  upon  as  speedily  as  possible  and  under 
the  most  trying  conditions. 

The  first  thing,  then,  to  be  done  is  to  fix  upon  the  most 
favorable  moment,  and  thereupon  to  settle  upon  the  best 
position  for  the  troops  destined  to  make  the  movement. 

The  worst  time  for  the  assailant  to  exert  his  power  of  re- 
sistance is,  doubtless,  that  at  which  he  puts  all  his  strength 
into  offensive  action. 


kThe  Stage  of  Counter- Attack.  109 

nee  it  follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  the  most 
able  moment  for  the  counter-attack  is  that  in  which 
the  assailant  is  advancing  to  the  assault.  If  the  Defence  has 
done  its  duty,  the  attacking  force  is  just  then,  whilst  ad- 
vancing without  shelter  and  in  a  mass,  as  much  shaken  in 
respect  of  its  power  of  resistance  as  it  could  ever  expect  the 
opposing  force  to  be.  Doubtless,  its  offensive  power  is,  at 
such  a  moment,  raised  to  its  highest  pitch,  and  this  is  more 

I"  e  consequence  of  human  nature  than  of  tactical  rules ;  but 
is  force  and  energy  are  only  of  avail  in  one  direction,  and 
at  is  forwards. 
A  counter-attack  make  at  this  moment  on  the  flank  has 
•eat,  very  great  chance  of  success.  All  that  has  been  re- 
arkcd  about  the  attack  and  its  formation  in  lines  of  battle 
in  its  favor. 

To  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the  assailant  at  the  very  moment 
that  he  makes  his  assault,  must  be  the  special  aim  of  the 

I  Defender,  as  in  this  manner  the  counter-attack  of  the  Defen- 
sive-Offensive is  likely  to  be  most  telling.  But  when  we  con- 
sider the  questions  of  time  and  space,  and  that,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  assailant  is  to  some  extent  prepared  for  the  at- 
tempt, no  one  will  deny  that  it  is  not  quite  an  easy  matter. 

Before  we  proceed  to  inquire  into  the  ways  and  means  by 
which  the  Defensive-Offensive  can  arrive  at  this  end,  it  will 
be  advisable  to  determine  whether  there  are  not  other  mo- 
ments favorable  for  the  counter-stroke. 

Let  us  examine,  in  the  first  place,  the  preceding  stages  of 
he  combat. 


• 


? 

in 


A  well-led  attacking  force  advancing  in  a  close,  compact 
line,  followed  at  a  suitable  distance  by  second  and  third 
lines  of  battle,  will  seldom  or  ever  give  the  Defender  the 
chance  of  making  a  successful  counter-attack  until  the  fire 
f  the  troops  in  position  at  the  most  telling  range  has  shaken 
The  only  circumstances  which  will  justify  the  Defender 
assuming  the  offensive  before  he  has  made  the  most  of 
his  fire  to  give  the  enemy  a  warm  reception,  are  faults  in 


. 

HO  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

the  dispositions  made  by  the  latter,  or  a  gap  in  the  advanc- 
ing line  occasioned  by  want  of  instruction  on  the  part  of  his 
troops ;  in  short,  mere  accidents.  Even  if  in  the  course  of 
the  action  it  should  appear  likely  that  the  effect  produced 
by  the  fire  would  not  be  as  great  as  was  perhaps  expected 
beforehand,  as  the  defender  promised  to  himself  from  his 
position  (which  in  such  a  case  must  have  been  ill-chosen), 
it  still  remains  more  than  doubtful  whether  a  change  of  pur- 
pose, a  relinquishment  of  the  defensive  for  the  offensive, 
would  offer  a  better  prospect  than  a  consistent  execution  of 
the  original  plan,  even  if  that  were  not  absolutely  the  best 
which  might  have  been  adopted.  It  generally  answers  bet- 
ter in  war  to  go  through  steadily  with  what  you  have  deter- 
mined on  doing,  than  to  fly  off  suddenly  to  some  other 
scheme,  even  if  you  think  that  the  latter  might  have 
answered  better  from  the  beginning.  If,  then,  we  have  once 
accepted  battle  on  the  Defensive-Offensive,  let  us  carry  it  out, 
until  a  counter-attack  has,  at  least  comparatively,  the  best 
chance  of  success. 

But  the  case  is  different  when  it  is  a  question  of  taking 
advantage  of  manifest  errors  on  the  part  of  the  assailant. 
An  active  Defender  should  not  neglect  such  opportunities, 
but  the  counter  stroke  will  then  assume  the  character  of  a 
sortie,  not  that  of  a  real  change  to  decisively  offensive 
action.  Unless  disorder,  want  of  energy,  and  other  faults 
have  shown  themselves  unmistakably  on  the  part  of  the 
attacking  force,  it  will  never  be  advisable  for  the  Defensive- 
Offensive  force  to  sally  forth  directly  from  its  position  with 
the  troops  which  had  been  told  off  for  passive  Defence. 

And  even  for  the  partial  sorties  it  will  be  advisable  not  to 
employ  the  troops  actually  holding  the  position,  but  only 
their  "outer"  reserves,  particularly  cavalry,  and  to  recall 
them  as  soon  as  the  short  sally  has  had  its  effect. 

The  counter-attack,  if  made  immediately  after  the  assail- 
ant's final  rush,  does  not  at  least  suffer  from  not  having 
waited  for  the  effects  of  effective  preparatory  defensive-fire, 
as  do  premature  sallies,  such  as  above  alluded  to. 


I  The  Stage  of  Counter- Attack.  1 1 1 

We  pointed  out  in  the  previous  chapter  that  an  attacking 
>rce,  even  if  successful,  is  not  in  a  very  favorable  condition 
for  withstanding  an   attack,   which   consideration   leads  to 
making  dispositions  calculated  to  help  the  assailant  through 
his  period  of  weakness,  but  as  in  any  case  there  is  some 
ifficulty  in  bringing  the  reinforcements  (the  third  line  of 
attle)  into  action  at  the  right  time,  this  moment  will  always 
decidedly  the  most  favorable  for  the  defender's  counter- 
roke. 

Whenever  then  it  is  not  possible  to  fall  with  fresh  troops 
pon  the  flank  of  the  enemy  just  as  he  is  advancing  to  the 
auit,  this  second  opportunity  will  be  used  for  the  pur- 
se. 

According  to  old  tactical  rules,   the  flank  attack  was  of 
universal  application,  because  obstacles  in  front  of  the  posi- 
ion  generally  hindered  any  movement  in  that  direction. 

From  measures  of  this  description  arise  those  long-pro- 
tracted struggles  for  localities  which  distinguished  the  Na- 
poleonic wars,  and  which  now,  partly  indeed  for  other 
reasons  beside  that  above  given,  have  become  so  much  less 
frequent.  The  rule  that  the  defender  should  charge  the 
assailant  when  he  gets  within  30  paces  on  open  ground  is 
also  based  upon  the  same  theory. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  front  attack  offers  less 
chance  of  decisive  success  than  the  flank  attack,  because 
the  latter  has  the  unmistakable  advantages  first,  of  being 
executed  on  troops  which  have  been  more  cut  up  before- 
hand ;  secondly,  as  the  passive  Defence  co-operates  to  the 
last  moment,  of  being  able  to  bring  larger  forces  into  play; 
and  lastly,  of  drawing  at  once  the  assailant's  supporting 
troops,  themselves  the  object  of  attack,  into  a  partnership 
of  loss  with  their  advanced  line,  thus  depriving  the  com- 
mander of  the  attack  of  the  advantage  of  having  his  reserves 
at  his  disposal. 

Having  thus  indicated  the  opportunities,  or  the  opportu- 
nity for  action,  it  now  remains  to  make  the  best  of  them. 


; 


H2  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

This  problem,  which  to  us  appears  the  most  difficult  in 
the  difficult  art  of  command,  resolves  itself  into  the  follow- 
ing question;  In  what  part  of  the  position  should  the  troops 
intended  to  make  the  counter-attack  be  drawn  up  ? 

Unfortunately,  the  answer  which  we  find  so  commonly 
given  in  manuals  and  essays  as  a  complete  solution,  although 
it  be  undoubtedly  accurate,  is  by  no  means  exhaustive ;  this 
answer  being  that  you  should  place  the  troops  referred  to 
under  cover,  where  they  will,  as  far  as  can  be  foreseen,  be 
required,  and  near  enough  to  come  to  the  scratch  at  the 
right  moment. 

There  are,  doubtless,  in  all  military  operations,  great  and 
small,  a  vast  number  of  questions  which  must  be  left  to  the 
judgment,  acuteness,  and  genius  of  the  commander  to  de- 
cide;  but  it  is  difficult  to  name  a  point  upon  which  theory 
can  give  so  little  guidance  as  upon  this  particular  one.  We 
do  not  claim  the  merit  of  supplying  this  want.  What  we 
have  above  said  about  the  most  favorable  moment  for  the 
counter-attack  will  show  that  we  consider  the  most  desira- 
ble post  for  the  troops  which  are  to  make  it,  to  be  in  rear  of 
a  flank  of  the  position,  thus  at  the  same  time  any  turning 
movement  or  flank  attack  being  best  provided  against.  But 
under  certain  conditions  the  counter-stroke  may  also  be 
dealt  upon  the  enemy's  flank  from  a  position  between  two 
of  the  main  points  of  occupation,  and  this  is  the  object 
which  we  must  try  our  utmost  to  attain.  But  having  said 
this,  almost  everything  is  exhausted  which  we  can  contribute 
to  the  subject,  and  we  conclude  with  no  other  answer  but 
that  it  depends  upon  circumstances  whether  we  place  the 
troops  in  question  behind  one  or  both  wings,  whether  we 
place  them  in  the  center  eventually  or  at  first, — how  near  to 
the  front  line,  &c.,  &c.* 

But  because  this  was  so,  and  is  so,  and  because  it  must 
surely  be  granted  that  the  officer  who,  acting  "according  to 

*  These  "circumstances"  themselves  usually  depend  upon  the  choice  of  a  position, 
and  upon  its  offensive  capabilities,  subjects  which  do  not  now  concern  us. 


The  Stage  of  Counter-  Attack.  113 

circumstances,"  hits  upon  the  very  best  course,  is  a  some- 
what rare  creature,  therefore  we  said  above  :  the  change  ..of 
form  of  action  necessary  for  the  counter-stroke,  makes  the 
Defensive-  Offensive  so  remarkably  difficult,  and  everj/thing 
connected  with  it  is  so  dependent  on  "circumstances,"  that 
we  must  reject  it  as  a  form  of  action  to  be  recommended  on 
principle.  We  will  not  deny  or  fail  to  recognise  that  in 
theory  the  attractions  of  the  Defensive-  Offensive  as  a  tactical 
principle  in  many  ways  surpass  those  of  the  pure  Offensive  ; 
but  when  you  come  to  practice,  so  many  "it's"  and  "but's" 
into  play,  that  but  little  of  the  fascination  remains. 


K 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  only  a  general  with  the  most 
rfect   eye,   and  troops  the   most  thoroughly  capable   of 
manoeuvering  appear  fit  to  undergo  this  ordeal. 

Only  once  did  even  a  Napoleon  carry  out  this  change  of 
form  in  the  middle  of  a  battle,  and  that  was  at  Austerlitz  ; 
the  number  of  instances,  however,  in  which  even  a  so-called 

Bctorious  Defensive  army  has  been  stopped  by  the  difficul- 
:s  of  the  second  part  of  its  task,  so  that  the  battle  in  con- 
quence  remained  undecided,  almost  equals  the  number  of 
the  defensive  battles  themselves.* 

All  that  we  have  said  remains  unaltered  by  the  fact  that 
our  battles  and  combats  of  the  present  day  fought  with  arms 
and  masses  of  men  unheard  of  since  the  invention  of  gun- 
powder, will  lead  more  often  than  formerly  to  a  compara- 
tively indecisive  measuring  of  strength,  more  seldom  than 
formerly  to  a  victory  which  really  annihilates  the  enemy, 
because  both  daylight  and  strength  must  fail  before  the  way 
can  be  properly  prepared  for  the  decisive  onslaught,  and 
because  both  sides  remain  too  much  exhausted  to  begin 
again  next  day.  And  the  cases  which  will  be  of  more  fre- 
quent occurrence  now  than  formerly,  of  masses  being  com- 
pelled to  fight  entirely  on  the  Defensive,  without  any  hope 

*  Some  of  Wellington's  battles  may  be  quoted  as  successful  instances  of  the  Defen- 
sive-Offensive; notably  Salamanca,  where  the  "second  part  of  the  task"  was  well  per- 
formed.— (Tr.) 


114  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

of  gaining  a  real  victory,  but  simply  with  the  intention  of 
maintaining  themselves  in  the  position  which  they  have 
taken  up,  will  make  no  alteration  in  these  principles. 

(Such  combats  may  be  called  covering  actions,  for  instance 
against  sorties  or  attempts  at  relief.) 

We  must,  however,  always  strive  for  a  decisive  result,  and 
the  only  unalterable  task  of  theory  is  to  point  out  the  way 
to  arrive  at  such. 

But  if,  as  a  deduction  from  this,  it  should  be  asserted  that 
in  future  all  combats  will  assume  the  form  of  action  in  which 
both  parties  take  the  Offensive,  this  must  to  a  certain  extent 
be  allowed.*  Battles  in  which  both  sides  take  the  Offensive 
( Rencontreschlacht ),  and  the  attack  and  defence  of  fortresses 
and  entrenched  camps  were  the  only  forms  of  warfare  be- 
fore powder  came  as  an  agent  so  completely  in  favor  of  the 
Defence,  which  character  it  no  longer  continues  to  retain. 

But  if,  speaking  generally,  victory  should  be  the  object  of 
every  battle,  it  is  evident  how  extremely  important  it  must 
be  to  deprive  the  enemy  of  his  initiative  for  attack. 

Thus,  the  study  of  the  Defensive-Offensive  brings  us  back 
at  last  to  the  purest  Offensive. 

The  principles  which  present  themselves  to  us  as  a  conse- 
quence of  this  study  of  the  second  stage  of  the  Defensive- 
Offensive  are  pretty  much  as  follows: 

1.  The   Defensive- Offensive   must    carefully    separate   the 
troops  intended  for  the  two  purposes  of  Defence  and  Coun- 
ter-attack ;  allotting  to  the  former  as  far  as  possible  a  mini- 
mum of  force,  if  the  position  be  favorable. 

2.  The.  strong  main-body  is  intended  to  deal  the  coiwiter- 
stroke  best  of  all  on  the  enemy's  flank  just  as  he  is  advanc- 
ing to  storm  the  position ;  otherwise,  at  least  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible after  the  assailant  has  actually  forced  his  way  in ;  only 

*  Reasons  for  assuming  the  Defensive  are  given  above,  and  what  has  been  said  of 
Its  consequences  is  not  without  a  weakening  tendency. 


Some  Remarks  on  Drill.  115 

as  an  exceptional  case,  when  the  assailant  makes  gross  mis- 
takes or  shows  timidity,  should  the  counter-attack  be  made 
before  the  fire  of  the  Defence  has  had  its  full  effect. 

3.  The  counter-attack  as  an  act  of  offence  is  governed  en- 
tirely, both  as  to  form  and  execution,  by  the  same  princi- 
ples which  regulate  the  attack,  that  is  to  say,  it  should  be 

[uick,  concentrated,  and  energetic. 

4.  The  position  chosen  for  the  body  of  troops  intended  to 
ake  the  counter-attack,  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  as  well 

s  one  of  the  most  important  problems  which  a  commander 
as  to  solve.  Being  entirely  dependent  on  circumstances 
or  time  and  place,  the  offensive  return  can  only  produce  a 
ecisive  result  if  made  at  the  right  moment.  This  consid- 
ration  must  guide  the  commander  in  selecting  a  position, 
nd  also  in  deciding  upon  the  further  dispositions  and  orders 
hich  are  certain  to  be  required.  The  only  principle  which 
an  be  laid  down  is  to  keep  the  troops  concealed  under 
over,  if  possible  behind  a  flank. 

5.  The  combination  of  defence  and  counter-attack,   and 
he  necessary  transition  from  one  to  the  other  are  of  such 
irect  and  decisive  consequence  to  the  Defensive- Offensive, 
hat  this  form  of  action  is  only  to   be   recommended   if  the 

commander  be  thoroughly  competent  and  the  troops  ex- 
tremely fit  to  manoeuvre. 


III.     SOME    REMARKS    ON    DRILL. 


All  that  we  have  since  said  on  the  Defence  has  not  in  the 
least  affected  the  assertion  made  in  our  chapter  on  the 
Offensive,  that  extended  order  had  become  practically  the 
only  fighting  formation  for  infantry.  We  find  the  line  of 
skirmishers,  the  swarm  of  skirmishers  as  much  in  the  Defence 
as  in  the  Attack,  nay,  even  more  generally  and  imperatively 
required  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter;  and  in  the  former 
also  more  than  in  the  latter,  the  company  column  comes 
into  the  foreground  as  the  actual  foundation  of  skirmishing 


into 


n6  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

order.  It  must  be  admitted  that  in  the  Defence  the  company 
is,  almost  without  exception,  to  be  regarded  as  the  tactical 
unit,  whilst  in  the  Attack  this  cannot  everywhere  be  allowed. 
All  the  deductions,  then,  in  respect  of  drill  formations  which 
were  drawn  from  these  premises  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
second  chapter  would  here  have  simply  to  be  repeated ;  but 
we  may  mention  that  the  requirements  of  the  Defence  furnish 
further  arguments  in  favor  of  the  three-deep  formation,  and 
of  the  subdivision  of  the  company  into  four  parts  resulting 
from  it. 

It  would  be  hardly  necessary  to  revert  again  to  the  drill 
regulations,  were  we  not  bound  to  say  a  few  words  upon  a 
subject  so  intimately  connected  with  the  Defence  which  is 
based  upon  the  action  of  firearms,  as  the  volley,  a  form  of 
fire  which  has  been  warmly  recommended  for  defensive  pur- 
poses. 

The  extraordinary  effect,  particularly  on  the  morale 
which  the  sudden  discharge  of  a  great  shower  of  bullets  at 
the  same  moment  is  apt  to  produce  upon  an  enemy  under 
certain  conditions,  is  assuredly  not  undervalued  by  us,  lay- 
ing stress,  as  we  often  have  done,  upon  the  effects  of  even 
unaimed  fire. 

On  the  contrary,  and  just  because  we  so  much  value  this 
powerful  agent,  we  desire  for  the  troops  which  have  to  make 
use  of  it,  the  adoption  of  a  formation  which  will  expose 
them  less  than  that  of  compact  close  order,  the  only  one 
hitherto  imagined  for  this  purpose,  to  the  especially  severe 
losses  which  may  be  expected  at  those  particular  moments. 
It  will,  in  future,  be  almost  impossible  to  bring  up  to  the 
front,  or  to  direct  lines  in  close  order  at  such  moments  as 
demand  the  volley,  and  indeed  this  has  already  been  proved, 
except  in  the  case  of  quite  small  detachments  under  pecu- 
liarly favorable  conditions.  As  a  means  of  training  we  may, 
and  indeed  we  should  continue  to  practice  this  old-estab- 
lished form,  but  we  can  only  employ  the  volley  in  action, 
when  feasible,  from  extended  order  by  signal.  A  shrill 


Some  Remarks  on  Drill.  117 

whistle  of  the  leader  of  the  line  or  swarm  of  skirmishers,  of 
the  clump  or  group,  gives,  as  far  as  it  can  be  heard,  the  signal 
to  make  "ready,"  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  to  "cease  firing," 
even  when  rapid  independent  firing  is  going  on  ;  the  whistle 
repeated  after  that  for  the  "ready"  is  the  signal  to  "com- 
mence firing,"  which  every  soldier  must  at  once  obey,  at 
least  every  one  who  can  fire  without  hurting  his  neighbor. 
This  requires  drill. 

There  is  nothing  new  in  this  at  bottom,  but  it  is  well  that 
it  should  become  matter  of  regulation. 

Lastly,  the  question  of  the  square  belongs  also  to  the  do- 
main of  Defence.  From  all  we  have  been  saying  about  the 
fighting  formation  for  infantry,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  we 
consider  the  square  an  impossibility  as  long  as  the  enemy's 
guns  and  rifles  are  within  effective  range.  The  smaller  de- 
tachments will  sometimes  have  to  form  "clumps,"  but  the 
battalion  square  can  only  now  be  used  when  hostile  cavalry 
masses  come  on  without  the  support  of  the  other  arms ;  cer- 
tainly a  rare,  if  not  an  impossible  case. 

One  more  remark  may  be  here  permitted,  although  it  does 
not  actually  concern  infantry  field-exercise.  In  treating 
both  of  Offensive  and  of  Defensive-Offensive,  we  have  dwelt 
much  less  than  was  thought  formerly  necessary,  particularly 
in  the  early  days  of  the  breech-loader,  upon  the  importance 
of  avoiding  the  so-called  "waste  of  ammunition." 

In  fact,  it  is  one  of  the  most  important  advantages  of  the 
breech-loader,  that  it  can  fire  away  a  great  quantity  of  am- 
munition, and  war  experience  has  taught  us  that,  far  differ- 
ently to  what  was  in  other  days  the  case,  we  must  now  take 
count  of  chance  hits  and  unaimed  shots. 

The  arm  is  equal  to  the  task,  the  frequently  momentous 
results  of  its  fire  are  well-established ;  it  remains  to  supply 
the  ammunition. 

Constant  and  plentiful  relays  of  ammunition  are  a  neces- 
sity of  life  for  infantry  now-a-days,  which  necessity  must  be 


H8 


Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 


supplied.  We  must  not  omit  all  notice  of  this  point  in  these 
remarks  on  drill,  although  it  does  not  strictly  belong  to  our 
subject.  Besides  the  circumstance  that  the  relation  between 
gun  and  ammunition  wagon  is  a  subject  of  artillery-regula- 
tion, may  also  serve  to  show  that  the  above  observation  is 
not  out  of  place. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE    TEMPORISING    COMBAT    (THE    DEMONSTRATIVE). 

IN  the  first  chapter  of  this  study,  we  pointed  out  the  dif- 
ference between  fighting  which  aims  at  a  decisive  result  and 
that  which  does  not  do  so,  whilst  in  the  two  succeeding 
chapters  we  gave  a  sufficient  illustration  of  the  decisive 
forms  of  action,  as  far  as  general  principles  are  concerned, 
so  that  we  think  we  may  here  dispense  with  further  argu- 
ment. 

It  is  indeed  difficult  to  imagine  a  more  striking  contrast 
than  exists  between  those  endeavors  to  annihilate  the  enemy 
based  upon  the  most  extreme  energy  in  offence,  or  upon 
the  most  stubborn  tenacity  in  defence,  and  the  objects 
aimed  at  in  the  action  with  which  we  now  have  to  deal, 
namely,  to  gain  time,  or  to  occupy,  perhaps  to  hold  a  cer- 
tain point,  if  possible  without  fighting. 

In  our  chapters  on  the  Offensive  and  on  the  Defensive- 
Offensive,  we  alluded  to  the  necessity  of  an  "introductory" 
phase  of  action,  as  enabling  the  commander  to  come  to  a 
right  decision  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued ;  in  the  period 
preceding  this  "introductory"  stage,  reconnoissances  will 
be  required  which  will  usually  bring  those  making  them 
into  collision  with  the  enemy's  outposts.  The  commander 
who  wishes  to  avoid  a  decisive  operation,  or  to  escape  if 
possible  the  consequences  of  one  which  has  turned  out 
badly,  can  only  do  so  by  means  of  a  rear-guard ;  and  so  on. 

All  detachments  intended  for  these  "introductory,"  "re- 
connoitring," "outpost,"  or  "rear-guard,"  purposes,  in  fact, 


120  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

all  troops  meant  to  carry  on  "la  petite  guerre,"  act  so  far  in 
the  same  manner  that  they  neither  desire  to,  can,  or  ought 
to  bring  things  to  the  crisis  of  destroying  or  being  destroyed 
(at  any  rate  this  may  always  be  said  of  one  side). 

Nevertheless,  as  in  war,  the  fact  of  our  opponent  not 
wishing  a  thing  to  happen  is  sufficient  reason  for  the  other 
to  desire  it,  these  tasks  will  very  rarely  be  performed  except 
by  force  of  arms.  And  after  all,  a  decisive  result  lies  at  the 
root  of  all  military  action. 

To  escape  from  this  dilemma,  requires,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed, a  different  mode  of  handling  troops  than  does  the 
clear  and  precise  aiming  at  an  actual  result.  If  we  search 
for  the  characteristics  common  to  all  action  of  this  kind, 
for  the  means  by  which  according  to  both  practice  and 
theory,  this  difficult  task  of  avoiding  battle,  at  least  by  one 
side,  is  to  be  accomplished,  we  shall  find  that  all  bodies  of 
troops  thus  employed  will  always  make  a  show  of  adopting 
either  the  Offensive  or  the  Defensive  form  of  action,  so  as,  by 
threatening  the  enemy  with  it,  to  deceive,  mislead,  and  in- 
duce him  to  take  false  steps. 

The  advanced-guard  of  an  attacking  force,  which  is  lead- 
ing the  way  with  the  view  of  making  out  the  details  of  the 
hostile  position,  will  be  compelled,  in  order  to  settle  upon 
the  principal  line  of  attack,  to  make  at  once  a  show  of 
being  really  the  attacking  force,  for  the  purpose  of  mislead- 
ing the  enemy,  and  of  tempting  him  to  unmask  his  strength 
early. 

So  also  the  outposts,  or  the  rear-guard  of  the  Defensive 
force,  in  retiring  upon  the  main  position  must  here  and 
there  make  a  show  of  intending  to  offer  decided  resistance, 
so  as  to  induce  the  assailant,  if  possible,  to  make  a  prema- 
ture deployment,  and  to  draw  him  after  them  in  the  desired 
direction.  Reconnoissances  will  often  by  false  attacks,  dis- 
tract the  enemy's  attention  from  the  point  which  is  really 
of  importance.  Rear-guards  are  very  difficult  to  handle, 
because  they  cannot  always  maintain  the  imposing  attitude 


The  Temporising  Combat  (The  Demonstrative).         121 

required  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  forcing  the  enemy  to 
make  turning  movements,  or  of  delaying  him  in  some  other 
way. 

We  may  describe,  in  a  few  words,  this  sort  of  fight  to  be 
something  which  appears  different  to  what  it  is,  and  which 
tries  to  be  thought  something  different. 

Feint,  deceit,  allurement,  demonstration,  are  the  life-ele- 
icnts  of  this  style  of  conflict,  for  which  perhaps  the  Demon- 
Dative,  will  be  a  more  suitable  comprehensive   expression, 
in  the  temporising  Combat. 

But  as  now  the  power  of  Striking  and  that  of  Resisting 
•e  the  only  two  strings  of  the  instrument  (the  armed  force), 
id  as  the  Offensive  and  Defensive  are  the  only  two  notes  of 
:s  music   (Tactics)   which  are  produced  by  these  strings, 
>thing  remains  to  the  Demonstrative  but  to  use  these  notes 
happy  alternation. 

Having  seen  that  the  Offensive  cannot  exist  without  an 
[fusion  of  the  Defensive,  nor  the  Defensive  without  some  in- 
irmixture  of  the  Offensive,  it  will  now  be  recognised  as  the 

>k  of  the  Demonstrative  to  act  sometimes  offensively,  at 
thers  defensively,  so  as  to  make  the  most  of  both  the  pri- 
lary  forms  of  action  by  the  most  judicious  combination 

>ssible ;  in  other  words,  to  manoeuvre  skilfully. 

In  order  to  be  equal  to  this  task,  the  fighting  formation 
lust  needs  be  of  a  very  flexible,  mobile  character, — a  for- 
lation  which  will  accommodate  itself  easily,  and  without 
•iction  to  all  circumstances,  taking  advantage  of  these  if 
ivorable,  and  if  not  so  evading  the  danger. 

The  Feint,  with  pliability  soft  as  wax,  requires  very  dif- 
ferent combinations  to  the  struggle  for  life  and  death,   with 
ethod  hard  and  unyielding  as  iron. 


On  the  part  of  the  soldier  mobility,  on  the  part  of  the 
officer,  from  highest  to  lowest,  readiness  to  act  on  his  own 
responsibility  and  decision,  are  qualities  indispensable  to 
uccess  in  these  operations.  Although  we  only  wish  here 


success  ir 


122  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

to  speak  particularly  of  Infantry,  and  the  other  arms  do  not 
concern  us,  this  seems  the  place  to  mention  that  all  these 
tasks  are  specially  suited  to  well-armed  Cavalry  and  Horse 
Artillery,  which  have  again,  in  the  last  wars,  played  so 
prominent  a  part  as  advanced-  and  rear-guard.  May  they 
then  no  longer  stick  at  the  word;  the  thing  itself  is  of  the 
very  greatest  importance,  and  its  performance  affords  the 
most  brilliant  opportunities  to  genius,  aptitude  for  war,  and 
fitness  for  command.* 

But  let  us  return  to  the  Infantry.  The  two  fundamental 
requirements  noticed  as  affecting  the  question  of  formation, 
leave  no  room  for  doubt  that  Infantry  can  only  meet  them 
by  using  the  company  column. 

This  formation  is  the  basis  of  skirmishing,  and  only  the 
action  of  skirmishers  carried  to  its  fullest  extent  can  per- 
form for  Infantry  what  the  Demonstrative  requires.  Any 
order  more  or  less  close,  of  itself  leads  to  decisive  action, 
which  extended  order  alone  gives  the  power  to  avoid,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  threaten. 

We  here  contrast  close  and  extended  order  with  reference 
to  the  employment  of  individual  portions  of  the  battle 
array,  not  as  above,  when  in  contrasting  mass  and  individual 
formations  we  referred  to  the  employment  of  the  individual 
man. 

In  this  sense,  we  say,  extended  order  alone  can  be  employed 
successfully  in  the  Demonstrative,  viewing  it  as  the  exact 
opposite  to  close  order  as  required,  speaking  generally,  in  the 
Offensive  and  Defensive-Offensive;  extended  order  alone 
enables  us  to  evacuate  a  defensive  position  without  incur- 
ring a  defeat ;  it  alone  admits  of  an  attacking  movement 
without  being  exposed  to  the  evils  of  a  repulse. 

This  first  main  requirement  of  the  Demonstrative  will  have 
the  further  consequence,  that  in  all  such  combats  troops 
must  be  spread  out  over  a  broader  front  than  with  the  two 

*  In  this  Infantry -study  there  can  be  no  question  of  the  employment  of  Cavalry  in 
battle. 


The  Temporising  Combat  {The  Demonstrative).        123 

main  forms  of  action,  each  of  which  in  its  way,  sets  so  high 
a  value  upon  concentration. 

The  object  of  all  these  engagements  is,  according  to  cir- 
cumstances, to  gain  a  sight  of  the  enemy  or  to  hinder  him 
from  seeing  you.  Both  objects,  however,  always  require  a 
certain  extension  of  front,  but  may  almost  and  entirely  dis- 
pense with  depth  of  formation,  because  the  Demonstrative 
force  nowhere  wishes  to  be  a  prime  agent,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  main  body,  the  great  mass  of  the  host  of  which  it 
is  only  a  fraction,  is  coming  up  behind  it. 

Still,  the  greater  the  numbers  the  less  will  it  be  able  to 
dispense  entirely  with  some  sort  of  reserve.  But  when 
compared  with  the  decisive  forms  of  action,  the  Demonstrative 
will  only  present  the  mere  image  of  a  first  line,  and  of  a 
reserve  held  back  to  meet  a  case  of  extremity. 

The  more  this  tendency  to  extension  of  front  makes  itself 
felt,  the  more  difficult  unity  of  command  will  of  course  be- 
come, the  more  capable  of  independent  action  must  be  the 
fractions  which  stand  side  by  side.  The  Commanding 
Officer's  task  can  therefore  only  be  specified  in  a  very  gen- 
eral manner ;  it  cannot,  as  in  the'cases  of  Attack  and  Defence, 
be  distinctly  determined  by  having  a  special  point  assigned 
to  take  or  to  hold ;  again,  subordinate  officers  will  not  have, 
as  in  those  cases,  their  allotted  parts  to  play,  but  only  gen- 
eral directions,  and  this  rule  will  probably  hold  good  down 
to  the  lowest  grades,  each  individual  perhaps  getting  the 
chance  of  solving  the  whole  problem  by  himself. 

A  patrol  which  reaches  the  favorable  point  from  whence 
the  hostile  position  can  be  surveyed,  a  picket  which  hinders 
a  mischievous  reconnoissance,  a  weak  detachment  in  ad- 
vance of  a  defensive  position,  or  in  a  rear-guard  action 
which  compels  the  opponent's  force  to  deploy,  has  done  all 
that  could  be  expected  of  it,  and  it  will  be  able  to  do  this 
under  certain  circumstances,  for  the  object  to  be  attained  is 
not  so  much  to  win  the  fight  itself,  as  to  gain  time  or  some 
local  advantage. 


1 24  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

Even  if  the  one  detachment  which  accomplishes  this  be 
destroyed,  all  the  other  troops  at  hand  merely  demonstra- 
ting, the  task  will  yet  have  been  executed. 

Would  this  be  possible  except  by  using  totally  different 
formations  and  dispositions  to  those  applicable  to  the  great 
decisive  battles  of  the  masses  ? 

Having  established  as  the  most  judicious  form  of  action 
that  of  a  line  of  independent  company  columns  with  greater 
or  smaller  intervals,  each  company  furthering  the  common 
object  to  the  best  of  its  ability,  the  indirect  manner  in  which 
they  will  co-operate  will  explain  itself.  These  small  bodies 
righting  side  by  side  will  each  be  too  weak  either  of  itself  to 
make  directly  a  real  attack  or  a  serious  resistance,  but  they 
will  play  into  one  another's  hands  by  mutual  action  on  the 
flanks.  Each  will  send  forth  its  skirmishers,  opening  a  very 
heavy  fire  wherever  the  enemy  shows  himself  in  force,  but 
quickly  avoiding  his  attack,  to  try  the  same  game  anew  at 
another  place  if  he  assumes  the  offensive,  or  tries  to  hold 
his  opponent  fast  by  an  obstinate  resistance. 

These  partial  engagements  take  the  place  of  that  unity  of 
action  which  is  only  found  in  carrying  out  the  general  plan 
of  operations ;  hence,  however,  the  risk  of  partial  defeats. 

However  damaging  such  a  check  may  be  to  the  particular 
enterprise  in  hand,  it  is  but  of  secondary  importance  in 
itself,  and  only  becomes  dangerous  when  the  commander  in 
rear  gives  way  to  the  temptation  of  trying  to  extricate  a 
detachment  thus  compromised,  and  in  this  manner  is  very 
likely  to  become  involved  in  a  serious  engagement  against 
his  own  will,  and  contrary  to  the  general  object  of  his  opera- 
tions, which  should  always  be  kept  clearly  in  view.* 

It  may  seem  a  hard  thing  to  say,  but  still  it  should  be 

*  At  Spicheren,  Worth,  and  Borny,  the  German  commanders  became  involved  in 
serious  engagements  against  their  own  will,  in  consequence  of  the  initiative  taken 
by  the  leaders  of  their  advanced  guards.  In  each  case  they  supported  the  detach- 
ment compromised,  and  the  result  was  most  satisfactory,  because  the  action  of  the 
advanced  guards,  though  in  two  cases,  at  least,  premature,  was  on  the  whole  con- 
sistent with  the  general  object  of  the  operations. — (TR.) 


The  Temporising  Combat  (The  Demonstrative.}         125 

established  as  a  principle,  that  the  captains  to  whom  be- 
longs the  honor  of  these  fights,  must  undertake  them  at 
their  own  risk  and  on  their  own  responsibility. 

They  will  get  support  from  the  neighboring  companies 
in  line  with  them,  but  must  not  reckon  upon  any  from  the 
rear. 

It  stands  to  reason  that  we  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  it 
should  be  an  absolute  and  imperative  rule  that  on  no  ac- 
count is  one  company  to  be  kept  back  behind  another,  that 
all  must  be  scattered  into  one  long  line  of  skirmishers,  and 
so  forth.  We  have  only  meant  to  treat  the  question  in  the 
abstract,  and  all  that  should  be  deduced  from  what  we  have 
said  amounts  simply  to  this :  the  Demonstrative  neither 
knows  nor  ought  to  know  either  the  recklessness  of  the 
Attack  a  outrance,  which  is  ready  to  venture  all,  or  the 
tenacity  of  the  obstinate  Defence  which  is  prepared  to  sacri- 
fice all. 

The  Demonstrative  will  have  to  vary  and  modify  its  action 
in  a  hundred  different  ways  according  to  its  special  task,  to 
its  absolute  and  relative  strength,  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  and  to  the  enemy's  measures,  for  which  reason  we 
name  a  flexible  formation  as  that  best  suited  to  it.  And  so 
we  sum  up  as  follows: — 

1.  Every  body  of  troops  engaged  in   decisive   operations 
requires  to  have  a  number  of  secondary  tasks  executed  be- 
yond their  scope,  and   both  before   and   after  them.     Such 
tasks  are  rarely  to  be  performed  except  by   force   of  arms, 
yet  have  but  little  to  do  with  the  final  object  of  every  real 
battle,  namely,  decisive  victory. 

All  these  reconnoitring,  outpost,  advanced,  and  rear-guard 
actions  may  be  comprehended  in  the  term  Demonstrative 
combats. 

2.  It  is  to  the  interest  of  every  force  intended  for  decisive 
action  to  employ  only  as  few  troops   as  possible,   and   only 
the  infantry  absolutely  necessary  to  gain  the  object  in  view. 


.  1 26  Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 

3.  These  troops  will  sometimes  act   offensively,    at   other 
times  defensively,  but  as  they  never  aim  at  a  decisive  result, 
and  as  their  task  is  always   rather  to   gain  time  and   room, 
they  never  make  a  real  attack  or  a  real  defence. 

4.  To  perform  the  work  required  of  them  their  formation 
should  be  very  flexible,   and   with   more   front   than   depth, 
only  consisting  of  one  line,  with  maybe  a  reserve  held  back. 
The  line  of  company  columns  with  skirmishers  will  be  the 
best  formation  for  the  purpose. 

5.  With  this  looseness  of  formation  the  chief  Commander 
can  only  give  general  directions  to  the  different  independent 
fractions,  and  eventually  come   up  to  their   support.      The 
result  will  depend  more  than   in  any   other  situation   upon 
the  subordinate  officers  ;  indeed,  at  times,  it  may  be  brought 
about  by  any  one  of  them. 

6.  The  operation  will  always,  on  the  whole,   be  only  an 
indirect  one,  for  all  direct  action  involves  the  danger,  against 
which  there  is  and  can  be  no  remedy  of  leading  to  the  un- 
desired  crisis.     Success  will  depend  solely  on  the  skill  with 
which  detachments  acting  side  by  side  play  into  each  other's 
hands. 

So  much  for  principles;  one  word  more  to  conclude: — 

When  we  first  in  this  study  explained  the  difference  be- 
tween combats  aiming  at  a  decisive  result  and  those  not 
doing  so,  we  pointed  out  the  great  importance  of  drawing 
the  same  distinction  in  the  general  principles  of  instruction 
for  our  infantry,  and  we  think  that  a  nearer  consideration 
of  the  various  formations  has  served  to  prove  the  correct- 
ness of  our  views. 

The  Demonstrative  requires  nothing  in  the  way  of  drill  in 
addition  to  what  was  noted  for  the  two  main  forms  of  action, 
it  simply  ratifies  their  wants  in  this  respect.  But  if  we  only 
picture  to  ourselves  superficially  (and  our  treatment  of  the 
subject  in  this  place  can  only  be  superficial,  as  we  cannot 
here  enlarge  upon  the  training  of  our  troops),  the  demands 


The  Temporising  Combat  (The  Demonstrative).         127 

which  each  of  these  modes  of  fighting  makes  upon  our  in- 
fantry, we  must  confess  that  they  necessarily  vary  accord- 
ing to  the  object  in  view. 

But  we  are  inclined  to  think  that  the  smaller  objects  are 
more  attended  to  in  our  peace-instruction  than  are  the 
greater. 

Must  that  not,  or  at  least  may  that  not  easily  lead  to  seek- 
ing great  results  where  only  small  ones  are  to  be  found  ? 

In  other  words,  may  not  our  Field-exercise  spoil  our  Fight- 
ing? 

The  bold  and  vigorous  features  of  the  Offensive  and  De- 
fensive-Offensive present  a  strong  contrast  to  the  delicately 
shaded  outline  of  the  Demonstrative. 

From  the  private  to  the  captain,  careful  instruction  in 
details  is  the  chief  thing  for  all  ranks ;  that  is  to  say,  they 
should  be  made  good  shots,  be  educated  to  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  how  to  take  advantage  of  the  ground,  and  to 
a  complete  mastery  of  every  tactical  formation,  also  to  quick 
perception ;  this  training  will  culminate  in  the  battalion- 
commander's  capacity  for  handling  his  companies,  and  all 
this  preliminary  instruction  will  have  its  good  effect  further 
on  ;  after  this  comes  the  training  of  masses  from  the  battalion 
up  to  the  division. 

Now,  in  our  army,  there  is  no  want  of  guidance,  zeal,  or 
in  general  of  intelligence  in  carrying  out  the  first  part  of 
this  course,  and  far  be  it  from  us  to  detract  in  any  way  from 
the  merit  of  our  soldiers ;  but  for  the  last  part  of  the  course, 
what  we  urgently  want  above  all  is  more  time. 

The  battalions  of  a  regiment  are  assembled  yearly  for  a 
few  days  on  the  drill-ground,  which  may  do,  and  the  regi- 
ments of  a  brigade  are  scrambled  together  somehow  (yet 
they,  too,  should  learn  how  to  manoeuvre). 

But  the  division,  the  battle-unit,  is  assembled  barely  once 
or  twice  a  year.  The  manoeuvres  as  a  rule  represent  only 


or  t 


128 


Studies  on  the  New  Tactics  of  Infantry. 


fighting  in  extended  order,  not  the  action  of  the   masses  at 
the  critical  moment. 

And  yet  is  it  not  wonderfully  difficult  to  know  how  to 
bring  the  masses  into  play  at  the  right  time :  to  deploy 
masses  here  and  there  when  needed ;  to  combine  the  move- 
ments of  the  masses ;  in  one  word,  to  direct  the  masses  ? 

May  we  be  able  to  find  time  and  opportunity  for  these 
lessons,  lest  war  should  have  to  teach  us  what  we  ought  al- 
ready to  have  learnt  in  peace,  what  like  is  Battle  !  !  ! 


PART   II. 

THE  PEACE  SCHOOL 


(PREPARATION    FOR   WAR 
IN  PEACE). 


INTRODUCTION. 


WHEN  we  endeavored  in  the  first  part  of  these  studies  to 
nd  an  answer  to  the  question,  what  alterations  in  the  Tac- 
tics of  Infantry  have  been  forced  upon  us  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  improved  arms  now  in  use,  our  attention  was 
repeatedly  drawn  to  the  degree  of  tactical  success  which 
may  be  attained  in  war  by  having  previously,  during  peace, 
made  ourselves  familiar  with  the  necessary  formations. 

"The  school  of  peace  (war-training  in  time  of  peace)  can 
alone  enable  us  to  overcome  the  enormous  friction  of  the 
battle-field;"  this  is  what  we  then  at  once  recognised  as  a 
fact;  hence  the  following  question  would  only  appear  to 
be  the  natural  sequel  to  the  enquiry  then  commenced,— 
what  effect  will  its  results,  with  reference  to  formations 
suitable  to  war,  be  calculated  to  produce  in  matter  and 
manner,  upon  the  training  of  our  infantry  during  peace  ?  It 
must  at  once  be  admitted  that  the  new  order  of  things  has 
raised  to  no  inconsiderable  extent  the  demands  which  must 
be  made  as  well  upon  the  soldier  individually  as  upon  a 
body  of  troops  collectively  and  upon  its  leaders  up  to  the 
very  highest  grade. 


132  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

Extended  order,  which  is  acknowledged  to  be  now  the 
only  possible  fighting  formation,  requires  higher  qualities 
than  were  ever  before  expected  in  the  private  soldier ;  the 
extension  of  the  sphere  of  danger  renders  it  necessary  for  a 
body  of  troops  to  be  more  capable  of  manoeuvring  than 
ever;  the  increased  complication  of  command  in  battle, 
together  with  the  more  than  heretofore  irrevocable  nature 
of  its  results,  require  on  the  part  of  the  leaders  a  well- 
trained  tactical  judgment,  all  the  more  that  they  have  both 
to  deal  much  oftener  with  elements  strange  to  them,  and 
always  to  operate  with  much  greater  masses,  than  in  other 
days. 

Now  although  there  is  nothing  positively  new  either  in 
the  formations  alluded  to  or  in  the  educational  require- 
ments based  upon  them,  nevertheless  the  influence,  the 
value,  the  importance  of  such  training  compared  to  what 
was  given  in  former  days,  are  as  much  raised  on  the  whole 
as  they  are  modified  in  matters  of  detail.  And  doubtless, 
if  our  army  wishes  to  maintain  the  pre-eminence  now  at- 
tained in  face  of  future  foes,  it  must  necessarily  devote  its 
constant  attention  to  this  continual  process  of  change,  for 
which  reason  a  more  complete  enquiry  into  the  question  is 
justified. 

The  most  complete  self-reliance  on  the  part  of  the  indi- 
vidual soldier,  the  greatest  power  of  manoeuvring  on  that  of 
the  troops,  combined  with  a  good  military  eye  on  the  part 
of  subordinate  officers,  and  with  thorough  capacity  for 
directing  the  masses  on  the  part  of  those  in  higher  com- 
mand ;  these  are  the  qualities  which  in  the  main  form  the 
groundwork  for  that  successful  unity  of  action  which  leads 
to  victory. 

To  prepare  beforehand  all  these  elements  of  success  is 
the  task,  and  by  no  means  a  light  one,  of  our  peace-training, 
a  task,  however  difficult,  which  must  be  accomplished  if  an 
army  is  to  be  fitted  to  its  work.  Now  the  instruction  of  the 
individual  soldier  in  detail  has  been  already  for  many  years 
a  fundamental  principle  of  our  method  of  training  during 


Introduction.  133 

peace ;  the  practical  field-manceuvres  of  our  army  enjoy  an 
European  renown ;  the  theoretical  preparatory  teaching  of 
our  officers  is  avowedly  of  a  high  standard ;  upon  all  which 
the  results  of  three  campaigns  have  impressed  the  stamp  of 
actual  proof. 

With  such  facts  before  us  we  may  be  justified  in  main- 
taining that  the  fundamental  principles  of  our  peace-training 
should  continue  stedfast  and  immovable,  whilst  only  such 
modifications  should  be  made  as  experience  has  shown  to 
be  necessary.  Above  all  let  us  be  careful  not  to  meddle 
with  any  part  of  what  our  peace  school  has  so  pre-eminently 
contributed  towards  the  creation  of  discipline,  of  patriotism, 
of  the  love  of  honor,  in  short  to  the  moral  phase  of  military 
education. 

We,  who  have  here  only  to  do  with  tactical  training,  are 
simply  called  upon  to  enquire  how  far  what  has  hitherto 
been  aimed  at,  and  accomplished,  in  this  way  during  peace, 
has  approved  itself  in  war,  and  consequently  what  improve- 
ments may  be  made  therein.  For,  however  great  may  be 
the  pleasure  with  which  we  look  back  to  the  success  ob- 
tained, a  careful  examination  of  our  tactics  will  reveal  much 
to  the  impartial  eye  of  the  critic  which  might  well  have 
been  different.  And  we  cannot  be  surprised  that  such  was 
and  is  the  case  when  we  consider  that  the  collossal  technical 
alterations  which  the  present  age  has  brought  forth  were 
tried  for  the  first  time  practically  against  one  another  in  the 
war  of  1870-71,  and  that  it  would  have  been  more  than  rash 
to  throw  over  a  well-tried  system  of  peace-training  on  ac- 
count of  mere  theoretical  speculations. 

Now,  however,  we  are  in  a  position  to  estimate  by  means 
of  the  scale  of  experience  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 
edifice  which  it  is  necessary  to  erect.  But  measuring  by 
this  scale  what  has  been  already  accomplished  and  what  re- 
mains to  be  done,  we  cannot  but  admit  that,  however  com- 
plete and  sufficient  the  training  of  our  soldiers,  non-com- 
missioned officers,  and  subalterns  has  proved  itself  to  be,  as 


134 


Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 


far  as  the  sphere  of  operations  of  each  individual  extends, 
they  have  often,  very  often  been  wanting  in  a  clear  and 
comprehensive  intelligence  of  how  to  co-operate  for  a  com- 
mon end ;  moreover,  however  well  acquainted  our  captains, 
field  officers,  and  generals  have  shown  themselves  with  the 
requirements  of  war  generally  and  with  the  conduct  of 
troops  in  action  particularly,  they  have  met  with  great,  often 
insurmountable  difficulties  in  making  their  respective  com- 
mands fit  into  the  great  battle-frame  as  parts  of  one  and  the 
same  picture. 

Making  therefore  all  due  acknowledgment  of  what  was 
accomplished  in  detail,  we  cannot  avoid  confessing  that  the 
tactical  errors  of  our  infantry  were  numerous,  very  numer- 
ous, and  more  especially  so  where  things  were  on  a  larger 
scale,  which  errors  may  entirely  be  laid  to  the  charge  of  a 
system  of  instruction  in  peace  which  fails  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  modern  battle,  requirements  which,  to  be  sure, 
have  only  quite  lately  made  themselves  felt. 

To  what  other  cause  but  to  insufficient  familiarity  with 
and  practice  in  such  matters,  for  theories  have  never  been 
wanting,  can  the  following  effects  be  attributed ;  that  we  so 
often  saw  our  Infantry  rush  headlong  to  the  charge  without 
giving  our  Artillery  sufficient  time  or  opportunity  to  pre- 
pare the  way ;  that  great  bodies  of  troops  trickled  away  into 
action  before  completing  their  march  into  line  of  battle; 
that  detachments  standing  or  fighting  side  by  side  made 
their  attacks  independently  of  one  another  instead  of  in 
combination;  that  comparatively  weak  bodies  (advanced 
guards,  for  instance)  assumed  an  extension  of  front  far  more 
than  commensurate  with  their  strength,  and  that  separate 
battalions,  companies,  even  at  last  divisions,  breaking  away 
here  and  there  from  their  "stem,"  and  seeking  each  its  own 
way,  doubled  in,  attacked,  made  turning  movements,  pur- 
sued, each  "on  its  own  hook,"  until  utterly  breathless,  and 
with  ammunition  expended,  they  found  themselves  at  the 
opposite  end  of  the  battle-field.  And  how  many  more  such 
examples  might  be  given  ! 


Introduction.  135 

We  must  freely  admit  that  faults  of  this  sort  became  less 
frequent  as  the  war  went  on,  that  our  Infantry  acquired  on 
the  battle-fields  the  routine  in  which  it  had  been  at  first  in 
this  respect  deficient ;  but  it  appears  to  us  that  this  very 
fact  should  all  the  more  induce  us  to  regulate  our  work  in 
peace  in  such  a  manner  that  such-like  improvements  should 
no  longer  remain  to  be  made  in  war,  and  that  the  "peace- 
school"  of  the  future  may  steer  clear  of  error  as  it  may  do, 
if  it  takes  for  its  guide  the  well-considered  lessons  of  the 
late  war,  fruitful  as  they  are  of  instruction,  and  conclusive, 
at  any  rate,  for  the  immediate  future. 

But  let  us  not  flatter  ourselves  with  the  hope  that  the  war- 
experience  just  gained  will  alone  be  sufficient  to  fulfill  this 
object.  Even  if  it  were  kept  longer  in  view  than  is  avow- 
edly the  case  during  the  "piping  times  of  peace,"  the  value 
of  its  lessons  is  often  very  problematical  unless  sifted  and 
regulated  by  criticism. 

Final  deductions  from  "personal  experiences"  often  take 
a  wonderfully  false  twist.  For  instance,  we  saw  how  after 
1866  a  man,  with  an  otherwise  clear  and  observing  mind, 
and  one  which  extracted  much  that  was  true,  went  so  far  in 
his  "Retrospect"  as  to  assert,  with  many  believers,  that  the 
right  course  for  infantry  to  follow  was  to  fight  in  future 
"  like  a  horde  of  savages  !  " 

If  just  now  at  least,  when  recent  events  are  still  fresh  in 
our  memory,  such  a  doctrine  will  no  longer  find  many  dis- 
ciples, and  the  elimination,  on  principle,  of  all  superior 
direction  will  hardly  at  this  moment  be  a  maxim  of  even 
the  most  fanatical  theorist,  it  is  advisable  nevertheless  to 
oppose  to  it  a  firmer  barrier  than  that  of  mere  "individual 
war-experience."  There  is  only  one  sure  way  of  preserving 
ourselves  in  future  from  a  relapse  into  such  erroneous  doc- 
trine, the  facile  offspring  of  "personal  experiences,"  and 
that  way  is  to  have  fixed  precepts  founded  upon  the  wants  of 
war. 

Let  us  then  sum  up  the  objects  we  are  aiming  at : — 


136  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

The  foundation  of  our  peace-school  has  approved  itself 
throughout,  but  the  building  which  we  have  at  once  to  erect 
upon  this  base  must  be  calculated  to  render  the  same  ser- 
vice to  the  altered  tactics  of  the  present  day  as  was  ren- 
dered by  the  old  edifice  to  those  of  an  earlier  period. 

In  other  words,  battle  as  it  is  now  must  again  be  the  prin- 
cipal object  of  our  peace-training,  just  as  battle,  as  it  was 
then,  used  to  be  the  principal  object  of  our  training  in  former 
days.  Again,  to  be  in  keeping  with  the  phraseology  of  the 
first  part  of  these  studies,  we  will  say  :— 

Our  peace-instruction  should  make  a  more  radical  distinc- 
tion than  has  been  done  hitherto  between  the  Decisive  and 
the  Demonstrative*  forms  of  action. 

We  do  not  conceal  from  ourselves  that  great,  but  we  think 
not  insurmountable,  difficulties  stand  in  the  way  of  this 
modern  "labor  of  peace."  If  we  shall  always  find  much 
which  bears  upon  such  work  to  be  totally  unrepresentable 
in  peace;  if  first  and  foremost  the  necessity  of  more  costly 
and  more  frequent  gatherings  of  great  masses  of  troops 
must  be  accepted,  there  will  yet  be  much,  very  much  to  be 
done  in  the  way  of  preparation  in  the  earlier  and  even  in 
the  earliest  stages  of  our  instruction  in  addition  to  those 
"great  reviews"  of  the  great  Frederick  which  seem  to  have 
been  revived. 

And  to  that  army  which  gained  such  great  successes  on 
the  bettle-fields  of  the  late  war  by  its  invincible  spirit,  and 
by  pouring  forth  its  best  heart's  blood,  the  faculty  will  hardly 
be  denied  of  raising  in  peace-time  its  new  tactics  to  the 
level  of  its  well-proved  strategy,  and  of  assigning  to  the  art 
of  fighting  battles  the  place  which  it  ought  to  hold  amongst 
the  other  qualities  which  that  army  so  eminently  possesses. 
If  we  keep  the  object  aimed  at  in  view,  to  make  progress 
with  the  training  of  the  soldier  both  individually  and  col- 


*  The  skirmishing-tactics  which  originated  in  1870-71  differ  as  much  from  the  col- 
umn tactics  of  Napoleon,  as  these  differed  from  the  line-tactics  of  Frederick ;  it  remains 
for  us  to  develop  the  new  system  as  far  as  the  strength  of  man  will  admit. 


Introduction.  137 

lectively,  and  then  with  the  higher  instruction  of  the  officers, 
we  shall  perhaps  succeed,  by  making  desirable  modifications 
and  improvements  in  these  respects,  in  working  up  before- 
hand for  the  great  field-manoeuvres  a  material  by  means  of 
which  these  representations  of  war  will  make  as  near  an  ap- 
proach to  reality  as  can  possibly  be  attained  in  peace. 


CHAPTER  I. 

/ 

THE    TRAINING    OF    SOLDIERS    INDIVIDUALLY    AND 
COLLECTIVELY. 

IN  face  of  modern  requirements  it  is  no  longer  allowable 
to  follow  the  old  custom  of  fixing  upon  a  certain  proportion 
of  matter  the  infusion  of  which  would  convert  a  man  into  a 
perfect  soldier. 

Mechanical  proficiency  in  externals,  formerly  of  such 
primary  importance,  has  lost  its  value  in  the  same  propor- 
tion as  the  soldier  has  ceased  to  be  merely  a  wheel  in  the 
great  military  machine,  and  even  where,  as  for  instance  in 
the  use  of  the  rifle,  greater  mechanical  proficiency  than  ever 
is  required  of  him,  yet  after  all  it  is  the  independent  and 
judicious  use  of  the  art  of  shooting  by  each  individual  which 
is  the  pith  of  the  whole  thing.  The  amount  of  actual  matter 
which  is  drilled  into  a  soldier  no  longer  forms  the  only, 
hardly  indeed  even  the  main  criterion  of  efficiency,  which 
has  come  to  depend  much  more  upon  his  moral  and  intel- 
lectual qualities. 

It  will  be  hard  to  find  anyone  now  who  will  be  inclined  to 
assign  positive  limits  to  the  amount  of  what  a  soldier  should 
know  and  be  able  to  do,  after  which  his  military  education 
may  be  considered  complete,  for  the  flexibility  of  modern 
tactics  makes  such  an  estimate  of  proficiency  simply  im- 
possible. Hence  it  is  evident,  and  was  indeed  evident  be- 
fore our  last  experiences,  that  with  a  system  of  short  ser- 
vice during  peace,  and  viewing  the  question  of  training  sim 
ply  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  soldier,  we  are  dealing,  and 


The  Training  of  Soldiers.  1 39 

can  only  deal  with  a  relative  minimum  of  instruction  with 
which  we  must  needs  be  satisfied ;  on  the  other  hand,  also, 
that  with  the  existing  terms  of  service  the  instructor  must 
endeavor  to  attain  as  far  as  possible  at  each  moment  of  pro- 
gressive development  a  certain  relatively  serviceable  degree 
of  efficiency  which  would  render  his  men  at  any  time  imme- 
diately fit  for  use. 

In  order  to  gain  a  clearer  view  of  this  point  without  at 
present  going  into  the  question  of  the  means  to  be  em- 
ployed in  military  training — its  substance  and  the  final  result 
—let  us  place  before  ourselves  an  ideal  to  be  attained  by  it 
in  working  up  a  certain  specified  material. 

To  bring  the  man  as  individual  combatant,  and  the  indi- 
viduals as  joint  combatants,  to  the  highest  possible  pitch  of 
warlike  efficiency  (fighting-capacity),  to  make  soldiers  of 
them,  and  of  these  soldiers  to  form  organized  bodies,  such 
are  the  material  objects  of  military  training;  to  raise  both 
the  individual  and  the  body  of  men  at  the  same  time  to  the 
moral  level  of  their  task,  is  the  aim  of  military  education — an 
aim  to  be  pursued  from  the  very  first,  and  to  be  regarded  as 
on  a  par  with  the  objects  above  mentioned. 

So  much  for  our  aim ;  now  as  regards  the  material  out  of 
which  so  much  that  is  great  and  difficult  has  to  be  fashioned. 
This  presents  itself  to  us,  as  seen  and  judged  from  the  tech- 
nical standpoint,  in  the  shape  of  a  raw,  i.e.,  totally  unpre- 
pared mass. 

Without  its  being  here  necessary  for  us  to  enter  into  his- 
torical dissertation  and  argument,  it  will  doubtless  be  ad- 
mitted that  modern  armies  have,  and  must  have,  for  their 
foundation  the  "mass-levy"  of  the  nation,  of  which  the 
great  majority  have  up  to  the  time  of  enrollment  been  en- 
tirely strange  to  the  use  of  arms.  Whilst  in  former  days 
one  was  required  only  to  form  a  limited  number  of  profes- 
sional soldiers,  we  are  now  called  upon,  under  present  con- 
ditions, both  directly  and  indirectly  more  difficult,  to  train 


140  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

the  mass  of  the  people  during  a  short  period  of  service,  to 
a  higher  standard  of  efficiency  for  war. 

In  face  of  such  circumstances,  the  above-mentioned 
necessity  of  being  "satisfied  with  a  minimum"  has  already 
been  long  forced  upon  us ;  but  it  becomes  still  more  im- 
perative when  we  compare  actual  circumstances  with  those 
of  the  time  just  passed.  The  demands  upon  us,  as  we  have 
already  pointed  out  in  our  introduction,  have  once  more 
been  increased ;  the  time  allotted  for  meeting  them  remains 
the  same.  In  deciding  upon  our  future  system  of  peace- 
training,  we  cannot  help  recognising  the  greatest  possible 
reduction  in  the  quantity  of  things  taught,  if  we  do  not  wish 
to  expose  ourselves  to  a  reduction  of  quality  still  more 
prejudicial.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  enquire  how  far 
such  reduction  in  amount  of  matter  in  favor  of  the  mainte- 
nance and,  wherever  possible,  of  the  elevation  of  the  stan- 
dard of  quality,  may  and  ought  to  go  ;  also  whether,  and  if 
so,  how  this  end  may  be  promoted  by  the  system  of  train- 
ing. The  further  consideration  of  this  important  question 
will  lead  us  soon  to  a  distinction  hitherto  perhaps  not  fully 
appreciated  between  the  warlike  efficiency  of  soldiers  as  in- 
dividuals and  as  a  body. 

For  instance,  it  is  not  necessary,  and,  as  one  may  sup- 
pose, has  never  been  necessary,  because  never  obtainable, 
that,  for  a  body  of  troops  to  possess  a  general  fitness  for 
war,  each  member  should  be  equally  prepared  to  perform 
each  one  of  the  warlike  tasks  which  that  body  may  be 
called  upon  to  accomplish. 

If  even  it  must  be  admitted  in  theory  that  a  force  com- 
posed only  of  perfectly-trained  soldiers  will  produce  the 
most  perfect  results,  yet  this  commonplace  is  entirely 
worthless  in  practice,  because  based  upon  a  mere  Utopia  of 
the  present  day.  With  things  as  they  actually  are,  the 
question  presents  itself  to  us  substantially  in  this  wise ; 
which  body  of  troops  is  most  fit  for  war,  one  composed  of 
soldiers  who  have  undergone  a  certain  equal  average  degree 


The  Training  of  Soldiers.  141 

of  preparatory  training  for  all  the  possible  requirements  of 
war,  or  one  the  majority  of  whose  members  are  prepared  to 
perform  with  sufficient  sureness  the  principal  and  constantly- 
recurring  tasks  which  devolve  upon  soldiers  in  the  field, 
whilst  only  a  smaller  number  are  initiated  in  the  more  diffi- 
cult and  rarer  operations  of  an  indecisive  character  required 
on  actual  service  ? 

That  nowadays  we  have  only  these  two  alternatives  before 
us,  that  it  is  practically  impossible  in  the  two  or  three  years 
at  our  disposal  for  training  our  men  to  impart  to  every  in- 
fantry soldier  a  sufficient  degree  of  efficiency  in  every  pos- 
sible situation  of  war,  will,  we  think,  be  admitted  without 
further  proof. 

That  man  who  only  knows  the  outward  forms  and  manip- 
ulations of  which  he  is  to  make  use  "under  certain  circum- 

ances,"  is  not  a  proficient  in  his  calling  or  handicraft,  but 
only  he  who  thoroughly  understands  their  employment,  and 
therefore  knows  for  certain  and  without  doubt  what  he  has 
to  do  in  each  individual  case. 

But  if  a  "peace-school,"  limited  as  to  time,  endeavors  on 
principle  to  train  every  soldier  in  every  way  as  far  as  time 
and  circumstances  allow,  it  is  evident  that  such  a  course 
must  interfere  with  the  higher  instruction  of  those  who  are 
gifted  with  more  aptitude  or  taste  for  the  business  than  the 
less  favorably  endowed  majority,  and  that  in  consequence 
thereof  only  a  certain  average  efficiency  can  naturally  be 
obtained  as  the  general  result.  If  then,  as  is  always  the 
case,  certain  individuals  stand  above  the  common  level,  they 
will  hardly  surpass  by  their  achievements  the  many  who 
remain  below  the  level,  so  far  that  on  the  whole  there  should 
be  a  balance  of  gain.  But  the  state  of  things  will  be  very 
different,  and  certainly  more  favorable,  if,  taking  count  of 
individual  aptitude  in  our  peace  training,  we  aim  at  attain- 
ing for  the  body  of  troops  collectively  only  what  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  in  war,  and  proceed  to  the  more  difficult 
tasks  exclusively  with  those  who  have  manifested  real  mili- 


142  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

tary  aptitude,  and  these  latter  who  shall  have  the  power  of 
educating  to  a  much  higher  standard  than  heretofore,  or 
without  this  classification ;  whilst  we  shall  gain  time  and 
opportunity  to  prepare  the  remainder,  constituting  the  great 
majority,  all  the  more  thoroughly  for  their  necessary  labors. 
If  then  at  any  time  any  unusual  task  devolves  upon  a  corps, 
the  influence  and  example  of  the  men  who  have  been  more 
thoroughly  instructed  with'  a  view  to  the  particular  emer- 
gency, will  act  upon  the  rest ;  so  that  the  general  efficiency 
aimed  at  will  rather  be  increased  than  diminished.  Our 
argument,  then,  may  be  summed  up  as  follows:  Whilst 
hitherto  the  edifice  of  our  "peace-school"  has  been  based 
upon  the  idea  of  aiming  at  imparting  to  each  infantry  sol- 
dier complete  instruction,  or  at  any  rate  instruction  as 
varied  as  possible,  so  that  the  general  standard  should  be 
raised  by  the  sum  of  individual  acquirements,  we  must  now 
endeavor  to  erect  a  system  of  classification  upon  the  undis- 
turbed foundation  of  our  old  traditions. 

And  to  do  this  nothing  fundamentally  new  is  required ; 
this  system  of  voluntary  restriction  to  a  certain  field  of  in- 
struction has  long  been  embodied  with  the  best  results  in 
our  well-proved  course  of  musketry  instruction ;  the  evident 
practical  utility  of  forming  an  "upper  class"*  has  already 
long  since  accustomed  the  masses  to  this  distinction  in  all 
the  different  branches ;  but  nevertheless  it  will  neither  be 
unadvisable  or  of  little  importance  to  proclaim  this  doctrine 
clearly  as  the  leading  principle  of  our  method  of  instruction, 
so  that  there  should  be  perfect  certainty  as  to  our  object. 
Only  by  doing  this  will  it  be  possible  to  knock  the  too 
idealistic  principle  of  universal  perfection  on  the  head,  a 
principle  which  endangers  our  success  by  its  experimental 
tours  de  force.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  course  we 
have  pursued  hitherto  has  been  governed  by  a  longing  for 
this  "all-sidedness,"  as  every  possible  formation  imaginable, 
every  phase  of  combat  has  been  shown  to  the  young  soldier 
on  the  drill  ground  and  at  field  exercise  from  his  very  first 

*  "Ausbildend,"  i.e.,  improving,  receiving  cultivation.— (TK.) 


The  Training  of  Soldiers.  143 

year  of  service,  the  practice  of  the  following  years  being 
devoted  to  perfecting  him  in  these  lessons  by  repetition. 
But  if,  in  face  of  the  constantly  increasing  claims  upon  us, 
we  must  once  for  all  give  up  the  hope  of  attaining  this  end 
with  all  our  men,  an  intentional  and  well-considered  system 
of  restriction  must  incontestably  be  preferred  to  trying  how 
far  we  can  possibly  get.  That  such  an  endeavor,  if  it  does, 
not  really  reach  the  acme,  must  rather  operate  prejudicially 
than  otherwise,  manifests  itself  perhaps  most  clearly  by  the 
example  of  the  course  of  development  given  to  our  peace- 
practice  in  fighting  in  extended  order. 

All  our  instructions,  directions,  and  rules  for  guidance  in 
this  branch  of  our  duties  date  from  a  time  when  the  first 
commencement  of  a  better  armament,  especially  for  our 
own  troops,  imparted  an  increased  importance  to  the  action 
of  skirmishers  in  battle,  although  it  still  remained  very  far 
indeed  from  being  estimated  on  a  par  with  the  action  of  the 
masses  in  close  order.  The  situations  of  combat  to  which 
we  have  applied  the  common  term  "demonstrative,"  were 
naturally  the  only  ones  which  could  then  be  kept  in  view  as 
objects  of  all  our  instruction  in  skirmishing.  The  highest 
possible  development  of  the  sharpshooter  in  this  way  passed 
as  over  and  above  sufficient  for  the  secondary  part  which  he 
had  to  play  in  the  decisive  engagements  of  columns.  The 
drill-ground,  with  its  double  columns  on  the  center  and  skir- 
mishers in  the  intervals,  was  our  preparatory  school  for  the 
conflict  of  masses,  in  other  words  for  battle :  our  field-exer- 
cise* served  to  train  light  infantry  for  their  secondary  tasks. 

The  short  campaign  of  1866  against  the  muzzle-loader  had 
only  immaterially  disturbed  these  customary  conditions  of 
peace  when  the  next  war  came  with  totally  different  de- 
mands on  the  army. 

It  cannot  create  surprise  that,  when  the  destructive  effects 
of  the  latest  inventions  placed  before  the  eyes  of  every  in- 

*  "Felddienstiibung,"  literally  "  Fieldservice-practice,"  which  means  a  great  deal 
more  in  Germany  than  what  we  in  England  understand  by  "Field-exercise,"  and  for 
which  we  have  hitherto  had  no  fair  equivalent  either  in  word  or  deed.— (Tn.) 


144  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

dividual  the  imperative  necessity  of  breaking  with  all  our 
old  battle-traditions,  our  leaders  of  high  and  low  degree, 
realising  with  quick  determination  the  only  possible  change, 
substituted  "field-exercise"  for  the  evolutions  of  the  drill- 
ground. 

But  battle  in  its  present  form  is  by  no  means  field-exercise 
magnified. 

The  use  of  masses  in  extended  order  for  decisive  action 
has  nothing  in  common  with  the  employment  of  skirmishers 
in  extended  order  for  demonstrative  purposes. 

All  the  above-mentioned  tactical  errors  of  our  Infantry 
are  to  be  attributed  to  the  fact  of  this  distinction  not  hav- 
ing been  sufficiently  recognised  in  the  press  and  hurry  of 
the  first  moment,  a  distinction  which  has  still  been  treated 
as  of  little  consequence  in  the  peace-training  subsequent  to 
the  war,  and  which  has  now  unexpectedly  assumed  decisive 
importance.  This  complete  distinction  however  lies,  in  our 
opinion,  in  the  radical  difference*  between  demonstrative  and 
decisive  action  in  battle  with  reference  to  the  use  of  ground. 

Whilst  for  instance  in  demonstrative  combats  a  force  is  not 
only  justified  in  suiting  and  subordinating  its  action  to  the 
ground,  but  also  bound  to  do  so,  in  a  decisive  battle  it  can 
only  seek  to  avail  itself  of  the  ground  as  far  as  possible  and 
to  make  the  best  use  of  it  in  the  one  decisive  direction. 

Our  Infantry  only  acquired  the  former  art  at  "field-exer- 
cise"; whilst  in  the  "field-manoeuvres"  which  generally  rep- 
resented only  small  affairs,  we  were  usually  of  necessity 
forced  to  recognise  the  ground  as  the  ruling  element,  on 
account  of  the  weakness  of  the  forces  engaged,  and  in  spite 
of  the  "decisive  ideas"  which  were,  in  truth,  rather  kept  in 
the  background.  Moreover  the  training  preparatory  to 
battle  continued  to  be  restricted  to  the  drill-ground,  or,  at 
any  rate,  in  the  few  days  allotted  to  "division-exercises'* 
there  had  not  been  sufficient  opportunity  or  motive  to  get 
out  of  the  old  rut. 


The  Training  of  Soldiers.  145 

Thus  at  the  decisive  moment  the  really  needful  was  want- 
ing in  spite  of  all  individual  perfection.  Hence  arose  the 
practice  on  the  part  of  our  troops  of  splitting  up  for  the 
purpose  of  seeking  more  favorable  ground,  hence  the  exag- 
gerated extension  of  front,  the  confused  interminglement ; 
all  intimately  connected  with  an  idea  to  which  our  field- 
exercise  gave  birth,  that  to  take  advantage  of  the  ground  is 
synonymous  with  plenty  of  space,  freedom,  and  independ- 
ence of  higher  direction. 

So  it  came  to  this  that  the  distinction  made  on  principle 
between  field-exercise  and  drill  elevated  to  the  utmost,  so  as 
to  give  the  best  possible  returns  in  both  domains,  ended  by 
producing  difficulties  in  the  battle-field  which  were  only 
successfully  overcome  by  the  high  intelligence  of  our  lead- 
ers and  the  noble-self-sacrifice  of  our  men. 

All  honor  to  the  energy  and  skill  with  which  these  battles 
were  fought  out,  but  we  must  not  cite  them  as  examples  of 
correct  tactics,  and  we  may  depend  upon  it  that  our  proba- 
ble adversaries  of  the  future  have  already  reflected  upon 
this.  A  remedy  is  required,  as  we  have  already  experienced, 
and  which  we  have  sought  after  in  war ;  but  now  is  specially 
the  time  to  find  it  during  the  leisure  of  peace,  and  the  whole 
army  is  anxiously  searching  for  it. 

Let  us  return  to  the  question  whether,  by  the  tendency 
hitherto  in  force  towards  "all-sidedness"  (making  our  men 
all  equally  good  at  everything),  we  shall  attain  our  object. 
We  think  not — not  at  least  until  a  length  of  time  for  train- 
ing our  men,  which  we  can  never  indeed  hope  to  command, 
is  placed  at  our  disposal. 

A  method  of  instruction  which,  with  short  service,  aims 
at  giving  each  recruit  perfect,  or  at  least  sufficient,  training 
in  every  branch,  which  is  calculated  to  seek  for  results  only 
in  the  sum  of  individual  efforts  instead  of  relying  upon  an 
organised  division  of  labor,  must  and  will  very  soon  sink  so 
far  below  the  level  of  the  requirements  of  war,  which  have 
in  the  present  day  so  prodigiously  risen,  that  it  will  produce 


146  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

no  longer  any  satisfactory  result  whatever.  It  therefore  be- 
hooves us  to  say,  with  concise  decision,  we  require  for  the 
new  tactics  more  practice  in  manoeuvring  than  we  have 
hitherto  had ;  and  we  must  contrive  to  spare  the  time  for  it, 
as  we  can  no  longer  expect  the  mass  of  individual  soldiers 
to  be  equal  to  all  the  emergencies  of  war. 

The  value  of  individual  instruction  on  its  own  account 
has  increased,  but  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  arrive  at  this 
intrinsic  accession  of  value  by  cramming  the  individual  sol- 
dier with  more  material  details ;  we  must,  on  the  contrary, 
rather  do  less  in  this  way,  so  that,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
may  be  able  to  get  more  out  of  the  body  collectively.  The 
well-tested  principles  of  training  remain  unaltered,  only  its 
material  tasks  and  aims  require  to  be  changed.  A  satis- 
factory proficiency  for  all  in  the  necessary,  the  greatest  pos- 
sible attainments  for  the  more  gifted  ones  in  the  desirable, 
branches  of  a  soldier's  trade ;  such  must  be  the  watch-word 
for  a  system  of  short  service. 

What  things  should  come  under  the  head  of  the  necessary 
will  hardly  be  a  matter  of  doubt  for  anyone  who  has  ac- 
companied us  through  the  first  part  of  these  studies. 

The  only  possible  decisive  forms  of  combat,  and  of  these 
two,  of  course  most  specially  the  Offensive  will  be  of  con- 
stant and  unfailing  occurrence,  will  come  in  the  way  of 
every  soldier-as  long  as  war  remains  what  it  is ;  in  contrast 
to  these  forms  are  the  indecisive,  proficiency  in  which  is  only 
desirable,  although  you  will  perhaps  meet  in  them  greater 
technical  difficulties. 

When  now  we  go  further  into  detail  as  to  the  knowledge 
and  acquirements  requisite  for  these  forms  of  various  de- 
grees of  importance,  we  must  always  distinguish  between 
what  is  required  of  the  individual  and  what  of  the  body  of 
which  he  is  a  member. 

These  questions,  however,  lead  us  to  that  of  what  should 
be  the  practice  of  our  future  "peace-school,"  whence  it  will 
appear  that,  as  regards  the  daily  routine  of  the  service,  it 


The  Training  of  Soldiers.  147 

will  not  differ  as  much  as,  after  all  that  has  been  said,  one 
might  suppose  and  fear,  from  our  practice  hitherto.  Let  us 
first  inquire  what  is  necessary ;  and  in  doing  so  we  shall  treat 
of  the  individual  combatant. 

The  first  thing  we  must  demand  of  the  soldier  in  every 
decisive  combat  is  discipline,  born  of  high  personal  energy. 
Although  this  as  a  moral  quality  belongs  to  the  domain  of 
military  education — a  domain  with  which,  as  before  remarked, 
we  who  treat  only  of  the  formal  side  of  the  question  have 
nothing  to  do,  still  this  fundamental  condition  of  all  great 
results  must  not  here  be  passed  over  in  silence,  because  we 
must  allude  to  the  outward  means  of  developing  it  afforded 
by  a  rationally-conducted  course  of  gymnastics,  which, 
whilst  giving  a  man  complete  control  over  his  own  limbs, 
accustoms  him  to  the  strictest  regularity  and  steadiness  in 
the  ranks,  to  intelligent  subordination. 

A  perfect  familiarity  with  the  use  of  arms  is  the  second 
requirement  for  decisive  combat.  The  certain  shot  makes 
the  good  foot-soldier ;  but  the  distances  at  which  this  sure 
aim  comes  into  play  in  decisive  action  do  not  now-a-days,  as 
a  rule,  exceed  400  paces.  In  engagements  where  they  are 
really  in  earnest,  the  real  zone  of  activity  for  firearms  lies  in 
by  far  the  greatest  majority  of  cases  between  450  and  150 
paces.  The  ranges,  therefore,  from  200  up  to  400  paces 
constitute  the  field  in  which  the  most  thorough  training  in 
the  use  of  the  rifle  is  necessary.  It  is  of  the  greatest  conse- 
quence that  we  should  make  our  men  as  good  shots  as  pos- 
sible at  these  distances,  and  at  the  same  time  to  take  count 
of  rapidity  of  fire,  which  plays  so  great  a  part  in  decisive 
combats,  as  also  of  the  various  nature  of  the  marks  to  be 
aimed  at  (those  under  cover  or  those  moving  on  the  skir- 
misher). But  the  bullet  is  not  yet  the  final  argument.  The 
soldier  should  be  accustomed  from  the  very  first  to  the  use 
of  the  bayonet,  and  this  should  be  promoted  by  a  sensible 
ind  really  serviceable  system  of  bayonet  exercise,  progress- 
ig  by  degrees  to  fencing,  if  for  nothing  else,  for  its  moral 
Affect. 


148  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

Skill  in  taking  advantage  of  the  ground  is  the  third  quality 
which  we  should  seek  to  develop  for  decisive  action  by 
means  of  individual  training.  The  power  of  making  use  of 
or  preparing  for  defence  at  pleasure  every  accident  of 
ground,  whether  for  cover,  however  momentary,  or  to  facili- 
tate the  action  of  our  firearms,  is,  both  for  decisively  offen- 
sive situations  as  well  as  during  the  stage  of  resistance  of 
the  Defensive-Offensive,  an  important  resource,  and  therefore 
one  to  be  generally  understood.  But  in  training  our  people 
to  make  use  of  it  we  should  be  careful  not  to  allow  local 
considerations  to  interfere  arbitrarily  with  the  assigned 
direction  of  personal  action  in  battle.  To  take  advantage  of 
accidents  of  ground  which  happen  to  occur  in  the  given 
direction  of  attack,  to  know  how  to  make  the  most  of  means 
of  defence  which  may  chance  to  exist  in  the  defensive  posi- 
tion assigned  to  occupy,  this  and  this  alone  should  be 
taught  and  learnt.  Just  in  this  consists  the  material  differ- 
ence between  our  field  training  of  the  present  day  and  that 
of  former  times.  Extended  order  applied  to  the  masses 
can  and  should  no  longer  allow  that  liberty  of  action  which, 
admitted* as  it  was  in  our  "field-exercise,"  was  so  calculated 
to  promote  dispersion. 

We  now  turn  to  the  formal  requirements  of  decisive  action 
on  a  body  of  troops.  The  power  of  moving  surely  and  with 
cohesion  in  close  order  stands  first  and  foremost  as  point  of 
departure,  and  also  as  keystone  of  all  action  in  battle.  The 
ability  to  pass  quickly  from  one  form  of  close  order  to  another 
(to  perform  evolutions)  and  again  to  change  from  close  to 
extended  order  and  vice  versa  (to  extend,  to  close)  come 
next. 

Individual  action  having  become  the  rule  of  battle,  and 
tempting,  as  it  does,  to  carelessness  and  disorder,  by  way  of 
counteraction,  the  greatest  steadiness,  the  most  perfect 
order  and  precision  amongst  the  masses  must  be  all  the 
more  insisted  upon  and  enjoined. 

But  as  the  disciplining  value  of  these  exercises  does  not 
consist  in  the  quantity  and  complication  of  the  evolutions, 


The  Training  of  Soldiers.  149 

but  in  the  manner  in  which  each  is  performed,  the  forma- 
tions actually  necessary  in  war  will  be  amply  sufficient  for 
our  purpose,  a  subject  to  which  we  must  return  further  on. 

Mobility,  attention  to  orders,  "fire-discipline"  constitute  (last  not 
least*)  the  third  requirement  to  be  considered  in  training 
troops  for  decisive  action.  The  one  and  only  actual  method 
of  fighting,  with  its  requirements,  many  of  which  still  so 
new  or  at  least  unfamiliar  to  us,  even  those  of  a  purely 
formal  character  (different  movements,  modes  of  firing, 
etc.)  must  be  made  a  second  nature  to  our  Infantry.  Who 
will  fail  to  comprehend  that  here  is  the  field  in  which  we 
can  and  must  spend  a  great  part  of  the  time  which  may  be 
spared  from  other  work,  and  this  can  be  done  with  advan- 
tage even  on  the  drill-ground,  but  especially  on  ground  of 
the  most  varied  character. 

Lastly,  a  general  acquaintance  with  the  forms  and  requirements 
of  outpost  duty,  imparted  by  practical  instruction  limited  to 
what  is  absolutely  necessary  and  simplified  to  the  utmost, 
will  make  our  Infantry  equal  to  every  emergency  of  the 
greater  operations  of  war.f  All  requirements  which  go  be- 
yond those  just  specially  mentioned  as  necessary,  however 
desirable  they  may  otherwise  be  considered,  cannot  in  our 
opinion  be  now-a-days  any  longer  met  by  the  mass  of 
the  Infantry,  and  they  maybe  relinquished  for  them  without 
prejudice  to  the  general  result,  if  on  the  other  hand  we  make 
up  for  it  by  giving  all  the  more  thorough  training  to  the 
chosen  few. 

We  will  now  turn  to  what  is  required  in  this  direction.  If, 
adhering  with  set  purpose  to  the  principle  of  classification, 
we  select  those  young  soldiers,  and  only  those,  who  after 
their  first  year's  service,  i.e.,  when  the  autumn  manoeuvres 
have  given  them  an  idea  of  the  daily  life  of  war,  have  hith- 

*  Sic,  in  the  original.— (Tn.) 

t  "Des  grossen  krieges,"  "la  grande  guerre,"  for  which  we  have  no  equivalent  ex- 
pression. Of  course  every  military  reader  understands  the  distinction  made  by 
French  and  Germans  between  "great"  and  "little"  war.— (TK.) 


i  50  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

erto  distinguished  themselves  from  the  mass,  by  greater 
power  of  comprehension,  natural  gifts,  a  lively  interest  in 
their  profession,  etc.,  and  having  thus  selected  them,  push 
them  on  a  step  in  advance  of  their  comrades,  such  a  course, 
as  we  before  remarked,  can  only  be  advantageous.  The 
range  of  study  for  the  body  of  picked  men  to  be  formed 
thus  to  a  certain  extent  in  every  company  would  comprise 
all  that  we  have  hitherto  understood  by  the  term  "Field 
service"  in  its  more  limited  sense.  Above  all,  these  men 
should  be  trained  to  taking  advantage  of  the  ground  with 
greater  nicety,  if  the  expression  is  permissible,  thus  gaining 
an  insight  into  the  art  of  adapting  their  own  action  to  the 
nature  of  the  country,  and  learning  at  the  same  time  to  dis- 
tinguish the  comparatively  rare  cases  in  which  this  may  be 
allowable.  Patrol  duties,  as  far  as  they  can  be  performed 
by  Infantry,  the  minor  operations  of  war,  also  practice  in 
executing  works  and  tasks  which  under  certain  circum- 
stancs  are  required  of  Infantry,  as  for  instance  those  of  an 
engineering  character, — all  these  things  should  be  taught  them 
both  theoretically  and  practically  ;  also,  as  far  as  it  is  feasi- 
ble to  do  so,  they  should  receive  at  least  theoretical  instruc- 
tion as  to  their  conduct  in  various  situations  of  warfare, 
such  as,  for  instance,  investments,  sieges,  attack  and  de- 
fence of  works, — subjects  which,  notwithstanding  their  im- 
portance, have  hitherto  been  almost  entirely  neglected  dur- 
ing peace. 

It  cannot  be  the  aim  or  intention  of  these  pages  to. enter 
into  the  details  of  carrying  out  our  proposals.  The  "how" 
in  these  matters,  in  accordance  with  orders  emanating  from 
the  highest  source,  is  the  special  province  of  those  from 
whom  the  "what"  is  required;  and  our  task  here  only 
amounts  to  specifying  in  what  that  "what"  consists.  But 
we  hope  to  have  given  all  necessary  proof  in  this  disserta- 
tion that  the  demands  which  we  are  making  upon  our  In- 
fantry will  ensure  all  desirable  proficiency,  even  though  on 
principle  we  relinquish  any  attempt  to  arrive  at  universal 
perfection  (allseitige  Ausbildung). 


The  Training  of  Soldiers.  1  5  1 

We  already  show  the  results  of  a  soldier's  musketry  in- 
struction in  his  discharge  documents  ;  we  might  surely  also 
find  place  for  such  an  expression  as  "  qualified  as  leader  of 
skirmishers,"  thus  showing  once  for  all  the  standard  of  in- 
struction which  we  desire  to  attain. 

Let  us  then  resume  our  argument:  considering  how  the 
demands  upon  our  Infantry  have  increased,  we  must  con- 
tent ourselves  under  a  system  of  short  service  with  training 
our  masses  to  the  highest  possible  standard  of  efficiency  in 
the  tactical  forms  requisite  for  decisive  action,  and  we  must 
only  aim  at  imparting  universal  proficiency  to  the  more 
gifted  members  of  a  corps  by  giving  them  all  the  more 
careful  instruction  even  in  the  indecisive  operations  of  war. 
But  even  if  this  principle  be  adopted  everywhere  practically 
as  the  guiding  one  with  reference  to  the  course  of  training, 
we  shall  still  be  compelled,  in  order  to  ensure  real  general 
efficiency,  to  limit  the  quantity  of  matter  taught  to  what  is 
actually  serviceable  in  war.  It  remains  now,  with  reference 
to  the  tactics  of  the  present  day,  to  cast  a  glance  upon  this 
side  of  the  question,  so  as  to  determine  how  narrow  it  may 
be  allowable  to  make  these  limits. 

As  far  as  concerns  what  we  must  necessarily  require  of 
the  individual  soldier,  it  will  be  difficult  to  reduce  the  quan- 
tity of  matter.  At  the  same  time  it  must  be  confessed  that  by 
omitting  the  motion  of  "advance-arms,"  a  motion  which 
can  well  be  spared,  much  time  would  be  economised  in  in- 
dividual instruction.* 

The  reduction  to  be  effected  in  the  formal  training  of  sol- 
diers as  a  body  will  be  of  more  consequence. 

First  it  seems  altogether  allowable  to  abolish  all  battalion 
evolutions  hitherto  executed  at  the  commanding  officer's 
word  of  command,  as  the  battalion  is  no  longer  a  battle- 
unit,  though  it  will  still  continue  to  be  one,  for  the  march 
for  manoeuvre.  It  may  be  considered  sufficient  for  the 


*  Some  of  the  motions  of  our  own  "Manual"  might,  I  think,  be  omitted  with 
advantage.—  (TB.) 


152  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

warfare  of  the  present  day,  if  the  battalion  concentrated  in 
column  can  go  through  its  facings,  interior  movements, 
manual  and  platoon,  at  the  word  of  one  officer.  But  evolu- 
tions, i.e.,  changes  from  one  formation  in  close  order  to 
another,  also  the  extension  and  re-assembling  of  the  battal- 
ion, may  without  prejudice  be  executed  at  the  word  of  com- 
mand of  the  captains  (now  no  longer  required  to  lead  divis 
ions),  commanding  officers  only  giving  the  "cautions."* 

If  this  were  carried  out,  company  drill  in  close-order 
movements  would  gain  additional  importance,  and  would 
require  more  time  to  be  expended  upon  it,  which  will  be  all 
to  the  advantage  of  this  important  battle-unit  (we  purposely 
avoid  the  expression  tactical  unit}. 

All  that  we  require  of  the  battalions  over  and  above  this 
first  groundwork  belongs  to  the  domain  of  "battle-exer- 
cise" of  which  we  shall  speak  more  at  large  when  we  treat 
of  the  instruction  of  officers. 

We  have  further  already  pointed  out  in  the  first  part  of 
these  studies  that,  with  a  view  to  simplifying  our  course  to 
the  utmost  with  regard  to  forms,  we  think  that  the  reten- 
tion of  only  one  system  of  formation  in  rank  and  file  is 
strongly  to  be  recommended.  It  appears  really  quite  unim- 
portant at  present  whether  in  doing  so  our  choice  falls  on 
the  two  or  three  deep  formation. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  fact  that  both  methods 
have  advantages  and  disadvantages  which  about  balance 
one  another,  also  the  so  much  increased  tendency  to  dis- 
persion in  the  fighting  of  the  present  day,  which  reduces 
itself  practically  to  only  single  rank,  we  should  ourselves 
prefer  the  more  compact  three-deep  formation — more  com- 
pact by  a  third. 

But  this  is  only  by  the  way.  We  enter  into  details  of 
regulation  no  further  than  our  "study"  positively  requires; 

*  This,  amongst  other  changes,  was  recommended  by  me  in  a  little  book  with  a 
rather  ambitious  title,  "A  New  System  of  Tactics  for  Infantry,"  published  in 
1867.— (Tn.) 


The  Training  of  Soldiers. 


153 


only,  in  opposition  to  some  all  too  zealous  innovators  in  this 
matter,  we  must  define  precisely  our  standpoint  with  regard 
to  this  subject,  which  it  is  not  our  province  to  discuss,  by 
stating  that  we  hardly  want  any  part  of  the  old  drill  regu- 
lations altered,  first  on  account  of  the  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  reserve  men,  and  again  because  we  really  do  not  think 
alteration  required,  but  do  wish  to  see  a  good  deal  cut  out. 

But  we  believe  that  a  "peace-school,"  which  aims  at  rais- 
ing the  standard  of  results  whilst  limiting  the  amount  of 
things  taught  to  what  is  necessary  in  war,  will  not  fail  to 
supply  our  leaders  again,  as  in  the  past,  with  the  solid  and 
substantial  materials  suitable  for  "crowning  the  edifice"  of 
future  victories. 

So  much  for  the  training  of  the  soldier  individually  and 
)llectively. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE    HIGHER    INSTRUCTION    OF    OFFICERS. 

THE  more  we  are  convinced,  as  expressed  in  the  previous 
chapter,  that  modern  tactical  requirements  force  us  to  con- 
fine the  formal  training  of  the  mass  of  our  infantry  to  a 
minimum  of  quantity,  so  as  to  obtain  to  that  extent  at  least 
the  amount  of  desirable  proficiency,  all  the  more  evident 
becomes  the  importance  of  the  instruction  of  our  officers. 
Their  influence,  which  under  the  present  conditions  of  in- 
creased difficulty  has  become  all  the  more  needful,  can  only 
make  itself  felt  in  a  satisfactory  manner  if  each  one  of  them, 
according  to  his  position,  has  the  absolute  faculty  of  judg- 
ing every  tactical  situation,  in  which  he  may  chance  to  find 
himself,  with  quick,  just  and  clear  intelligence.  To  come 
to  a  right  decision,  always  according  to  his  position  in  the 
military  hierarchy,  as  to  the  object  of  each  engagement 
commenced,  and  thereupon  to  base  his  plans  with  judg- 
ment; this  it  is  which  is  required  in  the  present  day  more 
than  ever  of  every  officer  down  to  the  lowest  grade,  and 
which  can  alone  enable  him  to  maintain  his  proper  influence 
with  his  subordinates.  The  troops  have  only  to  fight  when 
and  where  they  receive  the  order ;  but  the  officer  in  chief 
command,  who  from  his  post  issues  this  order,  bears  the 
full  and  entire  responsibility  thereof.  He  must  make  up 
his  mind  as  to  what  object  he  can  and  wishes  to  attain,  for 
then,  and  only  then,  will  he  be  in  a  position  to  make  the 
best  use  of  the  means  at  his  disposal. 

Except  the  fear  of  responsibility,  an  officer  of  high  or  low 


The  Higher  Instruction  of  Officers.  155 

degree  can  have  no  greater  fault  than  to  forget  his  responsi- 
bility. 

Here  we  come  to  a  dilemma  which  is  in  truth  not  easy  to 
overcome.  The  sharpness,  impetuosity,  and  energy  which 
always  are  found  united  with  quick,  even  hasty  determina- 
tion, must  be  restrained ;  this  sharp  thirst  for  battle  must 
give  way  to  mature  consideration,  to  the  power  of  biding 
your  time  and  of  bearing  delay ;  patience  must  be  practiced 
when  the  raging  desire  to  get  at  the  enemy  has  perhaps 
been  raised  to  boiling  heat  by  the  aggravating  hail  of  hos- 
tile bullets.  And  yet  at  the  same  time  "the  native  hue  of 
resolution"  must  not  be  "sicklied  o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of 
thought" — on  the  contrary,  the  extreme  of  energy  is  re- 
quired. 

Is  this  not  more  than  can  be  expected  of  man  ?  Will  not 
the  attempt  to  obtain  it  lead  to  a  lamentable  fiasco — to  want 
of  decision  and  timidity,  or  at  least  to  half-heartedness  and 
lukewarmness  ? 

And  yet  we  believe  that  the  venture  must  be  made,  as 
long  as  our  officers  are  and  continue  to  be  what  they  now 
are.  We  must  therefore  bring  them  and  the  younger  gen- 
eration up  to  that  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  which  shrinks  from 
nothing,  to  that  heroic  daring  which  from  the  earliest  days 
has  added  such  wondrous  leaves  to  the  national  laurels ;  but 
at  the  same  time  we  wish  to  train  them  to  somewhat  calmer 
judgment.  And  further,  whilst  we  may  excuse  men  for 
going  ahead  themselves,  and  for  allowing  others  to  go 
ahead  in  war — and  the  more  readily  the  lower  their  position 
—at  the  same  time  let  us  repress  it  when  displayed  at  small 
cost  at  peace  manoeuvres.  We  have,  by  the  way,  no  great 
fear  that  our  "pluck  will  go  to  the  devil"  with  such  educa- 
tional maxims. 

One  of  the  latest  war-experiences  also  is  that  blind  "elan" 
will  not  do  much  if  we  do  not  allow  it  to  impose  upon  us. 
Calculated  energy,  the  result  of  sound  instruction,  will 
amply  replace  qualities  founded  perhaps  on  the  fool-hardi- 
ness generated  by  too  hot  blood. 


1 56  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

Now  the  main  requirement  for  such  a  method  of  instruc- 
tion by  which  a  commanding  officer  (we  choose  purposely 
this  comprehensive  expression)  may  develop  his  own  judg- 
ment, is  an  entire  breach  with  that  system  of  pre-arranged 
drill-ground  combats,  where  even  the  second  senior  officer 
learns  for  the  first  time  when  receiving  from  his  chief  the 
order  to  attack,  where  he  is  to  suppose  the  enemy  to  be ; 
again  the  definite  abolition  of  the  distinction  between 
manoeuvring  "across  country"  and  on  the  "drill-ground," 
whenever  we  have  to  do  with  any  phase  of  actual  fighting. 

As  far  as  concern's  practice  in  the  mere  formations  of 
combat — for  instance,  the  extension,  movements,  and  firings 
of  a  line  of  skirmishers,  the  barrack-square  and  the  drill- 
shed  will  be  enough  for  the  squad  of  recruits  for  whom 
alone  this  sort  of  thing  can  be  wanted ;  when  we  come  to 
the  company,  however,  we  should  no  longer  allow  attacks 
to  be  made  against  "empty  air."  But  the  instruction  of 
officers  commences  at  once  with  "battle-practice,"  outside 
the  barrack-gate  and  beyond  the  flat  level  of  our  present 
drill-grounds,  always  excepting  the  very  beginners,  who  are 
hardly  bona  fide  officers,  and  whom  the  captain  has  to  in- 
struct in  the  art  of  leading  a  division  in  close  order,  and 
such  like. 

This  is  the  time  to  put  in  a  word  about  the  places  which 
we  from  the  force  of  habit  are  accustomed  to  search  out  for 
our  military  exercises,  and  the  constantly  increasing  diffi- 
culty of  discovering  which  in  the  neighborhood  of  our  gar- 
risons appears  to  many  calamitous,  because  the  spectre  of 
hut  encampments  "a  la  Thiers  appears  in  the  background. 
But  now  really,  considering  the  present  tactical  require- 
ments of  Infantry,  so  far  from  any  advantage  arising  to  us 
from  having  as  open  a  plain  as  possible  for  this  object,  such 
ground  would  rather  be  unfavorable  for  training  purposes. 
In  the  olden  time,  when  the  tactician  sought  out  a  plain  for 
his  battle-field,  there  was  good  sense  and  complete  justifica- 
tion in  selecting  similar  ground  for  battle-practice  also ;  but 
now-a-days,  when  the  strategist  chooses  his  field  of  battle 


The  Higher  Instruction  of  Officers.  157 

without  in  the  least  troubling  himself  about  the  configura- 
tion of  the  ground,  whilst  the  tactician  even  gladly  avoids 
a  perfect  flat,  the  choice  of  places  for  practicing  battle-move- 
ments may  surely  be  less  restricted.  We  have  already  in 
our  first  chapter  pointed  out  how  mere  drill — i.e.,  the  prac- 
tice of  formations — has  made  or  should  be  confined  to  much 
smaller  limits  than  heretofore,  in  consequence  of  the  later 
conditions  of  the  altered  nature  of  battle.  Really,  the  com- 
pany alone  now  requires  a  drill-ground ;  the  space  necessary 
for  the  drill  of  a  battalion — i.e.,  for  its  only  remaining  col- 
umn-movements—may be  very  much  smaller  than  in  former 
days. 

It  will  be  amply  sufficient  for  its  purpose  if  the  length  of 
the  space  slightly  exceeds  the  front  of  the  battalion  in  line, 
and  if  its  breadth  is  a  little  more  than  three  times  the  front 
of  the  battalion  in  column.  These  measurements  are,  how- 
ever, far  below  those  to  which  we  now  pretend,  and  they  are 
such  as  the  yard  of  every  one  of  our  newer  barracks  would 
afford  for  a  battalion  on  its  peace-footing. 

Everything  connected  with  battalion-exercises  which  goes 
beyond  this  point  can  no  longer  be  counted  as  drill,  but  is 
rather  included  under  the  head  of  "battle-practice,"  for 
which  we  no  longer  require  perfectly  level  ground.  But  as 
soon  as  we  give  up  this  requirement,  we  shall  still  find 
undulating  ground  (only  let  it  be  dry)  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  our  large  garrisons — i.e.,  towns,  which  will 
serve  as  fields  for  the  "battle-practice"  of  our  infantry- 
such  ground  being,  moreover,  as  a  rule  not  such  as  is  sought 
after  by  co-operative  agricultural  associations. 

With  such  undulating  country  (and  no  matter  if  here  and 
there  in  cultivation  or  intersected  by  smaller  and  greater 
obstacles)  for  our  "exercise-grounds,"  that  distinction  of 
which  we  complained  in  our  first  chapter  between  field-ser- 
vice and  field-exercise  will  melt  away  with  the  greatest  ease 
in  face  of  an  increased  unity  of  idea;  and  the  more  varied 
the  ground  the  more  will  it  tend  to  develop  the  tactical 


158  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

judgment  and  the  understanding  both  of  the  young  officer 
and  of  the  older  commander. 

But  if  we  wish  our  "battle-exercises"  to  meet  this  end, 
they  must  be  made  subordinate  to  a  clear  and  definite  idea 
from  the  very  first  moment  of  entering  upon  this  field  of 
instruction,  a  condition  with  which  we  cannot  dispense  even 
on  the  most  platform-like  drill-ground,  if  the  battalion  be 
broken  up  or  thrown  into  skirmishing  order  as  for  "battle." 

By  this  we  do  not  mean  that  the  commander  should 
plague  himself  with  extensive  general  and  special  ideas,  but 
we  do  mean  that  when  a  body  of  troops  is  to  engage  an 
imaginary  enemy,  his  supposed  position  should  be  pointed 
out  to  it,  if  an  attack  is  intended ;  the  supposed  direction  of 
his  movements  should  be  indicated,  if  it  is  proposed  to  re- 
main on  the  defensive ;  the  point  which  he  is  assumed 
to  have  reached  should  be  shown,  if  a  counter-attack  is 
planned ;  and,  finally,  his  whereabouts  should  be  made 
known,  if  a  mere  demonstration  is  purposed ;  and  all  this 
should  be  done  clearly  and  definitely. 

If  the  ground  does  not  furnish  us  with  clearly  suitable 
points  of  vantage,  we  may  content  ourselves  with  marking 
the  spots  in  the  simplest  possible  manner  by  using  adjutants 
and  non-commissioned  officers  to  make  the  limits  of  the 
enemy's  position,  the  point  of  attack,  or  the  line  of  the 
enemy's  advance  clear  to  the  eye. 

If  only  the  "exercise  ground"  is  not  absolutely  flat,  the 
battle-pictures  may  in  this  manner  be  much  varied  in 
kaleidoscope  fashion,  and  the  greatest  possible  variety  in 
detail  is  desirable  together  with  complete  simplicity  in  the 
main  features,  particularly  if  the  younger  officers  are  to 
learn  anything.  It  is  only  by  seeing  this  from  every  possi- 
ble point  of  view  and  by  doing  it  in  every  possible  manner 
that  our  sight  is  so  sharpened  as  to  recognise  quickly  the 
right  course  of  action,  and  this  is  just  what  we  have  to  aim 
at  for  actual  warfare. 

There  are  very  few  men  who  judge  things  more  clearly 


The  Higher  Instruction  of  Officers.  159 

when  under  fire,  and  those  are  exceptional  persons  whose 
understanding,  which,  before  seemed  to  slumber,  gathers 
strength  amidst  the  enemy's  bullets.  Habit  is  the  best 
security  for  keeping  the  mind  clear  even  in  press  of  dan- 
ger. 

Just  as  with  the  private  soldier  the  habit  of  discipline 
makes  obedience  into  a  second  nature,  even  in  the  most 
trying  moments,  so  with  the  officer  the  habit  of  observing 
ground  must  make  a  correct  judgment  as  to  making  the 
most  of  it,  become  to  him  a  second  nature. 

This  end,  however,  can  only  be  obtained  if  a  great  num- 
ber of  as  varied  fights  as  possible  are  worked  out  on  the 
practice-ground  and  discussed  concisely  and  instructively. 

As  certain  as  in  actual  warfare  a  pause  of  rest  for  re- 
establishing order  must  follow  every  attack  successfully 
made  or  repulsed,  so  on  the  practice-ground,  after  one 
attack  has  been  made,  one  position  quickly  occupied,  the 
troops  under  inspection  may  surely  without  prejudice  be 
led  on  to  perform  a  second,  a  third,  and  even  more  opera- 
tions of  quite  a  different  character,  without  its  being  neces- 
sary for  these  various  practices,  though  executed  in  one 
day,  to  have  any  connection  with  one  another.  It  must  only 
be  made  clear  to  both  officers  and  men  that  "now  something 
else  is  coming." 

In  this  manner,  for  instance,  a  battalion  will  easily  be  able 
to  represent  in  a  course  of  eight  or  ten  exercises  some  thirty 
battle-pictures  with  ever-varying  shades,  and  this  even  on 
ground  affording  comparatively  little  change.  Every  time 
the  direction  of  attack  is  somewhat  altered,  the  mode  of 
advance  of  the  line  of  skirmishers,  the  manner  of  occupying 
the  ground  and  so  forth  are  modified,  and  the  most  varied 
changes  in  detail  are  developed  on  a  foundation  of  sound 
principles. 

By  these  means  both  field  officers  and  captains  will  be 
educated  to  the  correct  way  of  taking  advantage  of  ground 
in  each  specified  direction,  thus  gaining  that  quickness  of 


160  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

eye  which  will  afterwards  prevent  all  wavering  in  the  actual 
emergency,  and  which  will  result  in  making  them  do  the 
right  thing  instinctively. 

Moreover,  just  as  in  this  manner  we  may  train  our  people 
to  the  exigencies  of  decisive  battle,  so  may  we  train  them 
after  the  same  fashion  to  the  temporising  combat. 

The  same  place  of  exercise  may  be  used,  without  extend- 
ing our  "ideas"  much  further,  for  practising  the  battalion 
in  advanced  and  rear-guard  actions  or  in  reconnoissance  ; 
lastly,  it  may  serve  to  represent  the  "intermediate  stage  be- 
tween two  decisive  situations,"  again  helping  to  form  a  cor- 
rect judgment. 

We  will  now  say  of  the  "what"  just  what  we  before  said 
of  the  "how."*  By  such  a  course  of  training  in  the  battal- 
ion, the  regiment,  even  in  the  brigade ;  and  we  maintain 
only  and  solely  by  such  a  course  shall  we  arrive  at  forming 
the  judgment  of  every  officer  according  to  his  station,  so  as 
to  enable  him  to  come  to  the  important  decision  which  will 
be  constantly  required  of  him  in  war,  as  to  whether  he 
should  keep  his  troops  back  or  commit  them  to  action,  and 
at  once  to  choose  the  right  course. 

By  such  numerous  and  varied  "battle-exercises,"  we  shall 
teach  the  young  officer  to  be  kept  in  hand  and  the  elder 
officer  to  keep  in  hand.  Each  will  learn  to  form  a  right 
estimate  of  the  value  of  the  detachment  under  his  command 
with  reference  to  the  whole  force,  and  to  subordinate  him- 
self to  the  higher  object  in  view.  By  this  means  also  we 
shall  recover  that  tactical  precision  once  the  pride  and 
strength  of  our  army,  but  which  has,  we  cannot  deny,  aban- 
doned us  in  these  latter  years  and  during  the  late  cam- 
paigns. 

That  long-proved  "fire-discipline,"  dating  from  the  time 
of  the  great  Frederick,  which  has  worked  such  wonders  for 
us,  is  still  just  as  necessary  for  us  as  it  was  then  and  at  all 

*  See  p.  150.— (TB.) 


The  Higher  Instruction  of  Officers.  161 

times ;  only  it  no  longer  depends  on  our  men  but  on  our 
lieutenants.  The  independence  of  the  individual  soldier  in 
action  has  since  those  old  times  wonderfully  augmented, 
hence  the  difficulty  of  controlling  him  has  extraordinarily 
increased ;  but  the  necessity  of  control  remains  the  same 
now  as  ever.  And  as  in  this  way  with  the  task  of  the  lieu- 
tenant with  reference  to  his  division,  so  on  account  of  the 
altered  character  of  command  in  action  the  task  of  the  cap- 
tain with  reference  to  his  subalterns,  of  the  battalion-com- 
mander with  reference  to  his  captains  (who  have  gained 
greater  independence),  and  so  upwards,  has  each  individual's 
task  become  very  much  more  onerous,  whilst  the  value,  im- 
portance, and  necessity  of  each  have  not  thereby  been  in 
the  least  diminished. 

Even  so  far  back  as  that,  the  great  king  was  obliged  to 
oppose  with  energetic  reprimands  a  habit  of  dispersion 
"which  leads  to  this,  that  the  common  soldier  decides  the 
battle ;  and  this  is  an  every-day  affair  (journalier)."  Now 
we  shall  not  be  misunderstood  if  we  say  :  it  is  also  "journ- 
alier" for  the  lieutenant  or  captain  to  decide  the  battle; 
such  being  the  favorite  theme  of  our  innovators  of  the  pres- 
ent day,  whose  passionate  ardor  would  lead  them  to  give  no 
chance  in  this  way  to  the  battalion  commander,  not  to  men- 
tion higher  authorities. 

We  learn  from  the  experience  of  war  that  if  peace-habits 
have  not  prepared  us  to  meet  this  difficulty,  incorporating,  as 
it  were,  in  our  flesh  and  blood  the  conviction  of  the  necessity  of 
maintaining  the  influence  of  the  higher  and  highest  authority,  the 
force  of  momentary  circumstances  will  be  stronger  than  all 
theory  and  all  good  will. 

There  is  truly  something  great  in  that  universal  strife  to 
go  forward  which  has  animated  even  the  smallest  detach- 
ment, and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  clear  ourselves  of  the 
suspicion  that  we  wish  to  suppress  this  feeling,  but  if  this 
noble  sentiment  is  to  conduce  to  the  general  result  instead 
of  uselessly  evaporating,  as  it  often  does,  in  isolated  deeds 


1 62  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

of  heroism,  the  conviction  must  be  carefully  fostered  be- 
forehand in  peace,  that  intelligent  obedience  stands  even 
before  dash,  and  that  in  battle  the  commander-in-chief  will 
give  an  opportunity  at  the  right  moment  for  every  man  to 
satisfy  his  thirst  for  action. 

Thus  officers  in  high  command  will  no  longer  have  to  fear 
that  if  they  hold  back  even  in  critical  moments,  their  con- 
duct will  be  misjudged  by  their  subordinates,  and  those  in 
a  lower  position  will  learn  that  by  having  a  little  patience 
they  will  reap  all  the  larger  crop  of  laurels. 

So  we  repeat  that  the  system  of  training  for  our  officers 
centers  itself  in  "battle-exercises"  of  a  practical  nature, 
answering  to  the  requirements  of  modern  tactics,  and  no 
longer  recognising  any  difference  between  "  field-exercise  " 
and  "field-practice."  We  know  well  that  this  is  not  all  that 
can  be  said  upon  the  matter,  and  that  there  are  claims  upon 
officers  both  of  high  and  low  degree  which  they  must  meet 
in  order  to  be  fully  competent  for  their  respective  duties. 
But  the  first  thing  to  be  thought  of  for  them,  as  for  the  rank 
and  file,  is  to  prepare  them  for  the  universal,  the  inevitable, 
the  constantly  recurring  exigencies  of  warfare;  afterwards 
attempting  to  give  them  as  officers  thorough  efficiency  in 
all  the  other  phases  of  military  action. 

So  these  "battle-exercises"  are  the  kernel  round  which 
group  themselves  on  one  side  the  greater  manoeuvres  to 
which  we  shall  devote  a  special  chapter,  on  the  other  side 
the  smaller  manoeuvres  for  training  in  the  minor  tasks  of  war 
(des  grossen  Krieges). 

These  latter  furnish  a  special  field  for  work  to  our  younger 
officers,  who,  whilst  making  their  first  appearance  as  instruc- 
tors upon  it,  have  the  opportunity  of  themselves  learning  so 
much. 

In  these  little  operations  the  judgment  develops  itself, 
the  spirit  of  self-reliance  is  engendered,  which  spirit  they 
have  again  to  school  themselves  to  sacrificing  elsewhere  of 
their  own  free  will  and  from  conviction  to  the  claims  of  a 
larger  unit. 


The  Higher  Instruction  of  Officers.  163 

Here  the  opportunity  for  acting  on  his  own  responsibility 
offers  itself  to  the  young  officer,  here  the  fruits  of  his  own 
work  manifest  themselves,  to  gather  which  fruit  is  the 
natural  desire  of  every  mortal.  The  small  proportions  of 
the  work  which  he  is  here  called  upon  to  direct  will  make 
him  comprehend  all  the  more  fully  and  unmistakably  the 
necessity  for  subordination  and  unity  of  command  in  work 
of  larger  proportions. 

Here,  too,  he  will  learn  on  a  small  scale,  whilst  distin- 
guishing between  more  and  less  favorable  ground,  and  whilst 
teaching  his  select  men  to  do  so,  how  every  sort  of  ground 
may  on  a  larger  scale  be  utilized,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
will  acquire  the  capacity  of  coming  on  every  occasion  to 
the  right  determination. 

If,  as  we  go  on,  we  accustom  the  learner  to  hostile  action 
by  practising  one  party  against  another,  these  little  manoeu- 
vres,  more  or  less  useful  even  for  superior  officers,  accord- 
ing to  the  strength  of  the  forces  engaged,  form  quite  fairly 
part  of  a  system  of  education  for  officers.  As  far  as  gar- 
rison arrangements  will  permit,  we  must  also  endeavor  to 
carry  on  these  exercises,  particularly  such  as  have  reference 
to  field  and  outpost  duties,  with  mixed  detachments  of  cav- 
alry and  infantry,  before  the  corps  proceed  to  take  part  in 
the  great  manoeuvres  which  will  give  the  finishing  touch  to 
its  training. 

We  do  not  propose  to  ourselves  here,  any  more  than  when 
treating  of  the  soldier  individually  and  collectively,  to  enter 
into  details.  Here,  as  there,  we  are  only  called  upon  to 
specify  clearly  and  broadly  the  point  of  view  from  which 
the  object  aimed  at  should  be  regarded,  and  the  ways  and 
means  for  attaining  it ;  the  work  itself  is  the  province  of  the 
workman. 

We  only  wish  to  add  one  thing  more.  The  "education  of 
the  officer"  cannot  be  considered  complete  so  long  as  it  is 
confined  to  the  narrow  limits  of  a  number  of  "exercises," 
however  practically  conducted.  Theoretical  study  must,  of 


164  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

course,  keep  pace  with  them.  We  are  all  the  more  anxious 
not  to  omit  mention  of  this  personal  work  of  every  officer  as 
a  pedestal  to  the  edifice  of  our  performances  of  quite  equal 
value  to  the  other,  because  otherwise  a  misunderstanding 
might  easily  arise,  and  we  might  be  supposed  not  to  assign 
their  full  value  to  theoretical  studies,  thus  undermining  the 
theoretical  study  which  we  have  devoted  to  the  very  study 
now  before  us.  The  "method  of  application,"  to  which  we 
owe  such  great  progress,  will  furnish  rich  and  ample  mate- 
rials for  this  study,  even  to  our  youngest  comrades.  May 
they  continue  to  use  them  as  fairly  as  ever;  then  for  them 
will  the  good  fruit  of  practice  ripen  upon  the  tree  of  sound 
theory. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    GREAT    MANOEUVRES. 

IT  remains  now  to  cast  a  last  glance  on  that  part  of  our 
system  of  peace-instruction  where  officers  and  men,  having 
undergone  the  preparatory  course  advocated,  are  brought 
up  in  company  to  the  highest  stage  of  their  efficiency,  and 
as  the  season  draws  to  a  close,  are  to  prove  in  the  field  of 
\\iegreat  mancenvres  to  the  chiefs  in  high  and  in  highest 
command,  lastly  to  the  Imperial  Commander  himself,  that 
the  army  is  equal  to  its  task. 

There  are  three  objects  which  we  strive  to  attain  by  these 
great  manoeuvres:  Mutual  acquaintance  between  the  different 
corps  and  arms,  and  the  power  of  giving  mutual  support, 
are  to  be  promoted  and  encouraged;  officers  of  all  ranks 
have  to  learn  how  to  make  use  of  what  they  have  already 
practiced  in  face  of  an  adversary  who  on  his  side  is  not  idle. 
Both  the  soldier  and  the  corps  must  get  acquainted  with 
and  accustomed  to  the  daily  routine  of  life  in  the  field. 

In  order  to  meet  this  triple  demand,  our  "divisional 
autumnal  manoeuvres"  have  already  been  divided  into 
"field"  and  "outpost"  practice,  "field  manoeuvres  with  tw^o 
forces  opposed  to  one  another,"  and  "manoeuvres  of  the 
entire  division."  We  must  examine  this  tripartition  some- 
what more  closely  from  the  standpoint  of  war  as  at  present 
carried  on. 

It  must  be  recognised  as  a  rule  hitherto  usually  followed 
that  the  troops  assembled  for  these  annual  exercises  do  not 
exceed  the  strength  of  a  division.  Royal  reviews,  at  which 


1 66  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

the  two  divisions  of  an  army-corps,  or  great  autumnal 
manoeuvres,  at  which  at  the  outside  two  army-corps  were 
concentrated,  are,  as  we  know,  of  rare  occurrence,  occurring 
exceptionally,  often  after  an  interval  of  some  years,  of 
which  the  Guard  corps  has  alone  not  to  complain,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  convenient  arrangement  of  its  quarters.  The 
division  of  all  arms  forming  now  the  battle-unit,  at  any  rate 
by  assembling  it  annually,  as  is  done  on  principle,  the  basis 
at  least  of  a  system  of  instruction  calculated  to  meet  even 
the  highest  demands  is  provided. 

Nevertheless,  we  cannot  fail  to  remark  that  here  also  our 
old  habits  are  affected  by  the  requirements  of  modern  tac- 
tics, which  seem  to  make  a  modification  in  the  division  of 
time  allowed  to  the  different  exercises  urgently  necessary. 
According  to  present  regulations  the  division,  as  such,  has 
only  three  (even  sometimes  two)  days  for  the  so-called 
"divisional-exercises"  ( manoeuvres  of  the  entire  division). 
Of  these  one  is  taken  up  with  the  divisional  parade,  so  that 
the  division  is  only  assembled  under  command  of  its  gen- 
eral for  Tinited  battle-practice  twice,  or  may  be  once  a  year. 
Considering,  however,  the  great  tasks  which  devolve  upon 
an  infantry  division  in  modern  battle  this  scanty  allowance 
of  time  would  appear  much  too  small. 

Twelve  battalions  and  twenty-four  guns,  without  reckon- 
ing the  cavalry  regiment,  represent,  even  in  the  battles  of 
masses  which  take  place  in  the  present  epoch,  such  an  im- 
posing force  that  the  fact  of  its  being  employed,  success- 
fully or  otherwise,  may  well  exert  a  decisive  effect  upon 
the  course  of  the  whole  action.  The  attack  even  of  a  single 
division  properly  led  by  the  commander,  and  well  executed 
by  the  troops,  may  incline  the  scales  in  our  favor  amidst 
the  conflict  of  hundreds  of  thousands  which  has  raged 
doubtfully  for  hours;  the  overthrow  of  one  single  division 
in  a  defensive  position  may  tear  a  gap  in  our  line  which  can 
never  again  be  closed.  That  the  division,  being  the  smallest 
independent  unit  on  which  a  commander  can  reckon  for  the 
decisive  stroke  which  he  meditates,  should  be  in  thoroughly 


The  Great  Manoeuvres.  167 

efficient  working  order,  is  a  necessary  condition,  not  only 
for  the  great  tactical,  but  also  for  the  strategical  result. 
The  "division"  represents  to  the  commander-in-chief  a  con- 
stant mathematical  expression  of  offensive  and  defensive 
force  upon  which  he  may  base  his  higher  and  final  calcula- 
tions with  incontestable  security. 

This  was  the  case  formerly,  and  so  it  must  continue  to  be  ; 
but  it  has  become  more  difficult  to  carry  out ;  yes,  very 
much  more  difficult,  on  account  of  the  loosening  effect  of 
the  battle  of  the  present  day. 

Much  steady  practice  is  required,  unless  we  wish  to  see 
what  may  easily  happen  in  the  heat  of  such  battles  as  we 
have  now,  whole  divisions  melt  away,  like  snow  under  a 
March  sun,  useless  because  not  under  control  of  the  one  comman- 
der. 

We  have  already  often  pointed  out  in  general  terms  the 
dangers  of  dispersion  to  which  the  tactics  of  the  present 
age  may  so  easily  lead ;  the  division  welded  together  into 
unity  by  habits  acquired  during  peace  is  the  rock  upon  which 
that  dreaded  wave  must  break. 

If  in  the  old  times  of  column-tactics,  the  battalion  mass 
was  the  symbol  of  united  force  and  concentrated  energy, 
constantly  reforming,  as  it  did,  its  dense  array,  so  in  these 
times,  when  the  nature  of  battle  occasions  a  greater  disper- 
sion the  smaller  the  body,  this  necessary  conviction  of  strength 
is  only  inherent  in  the  larger  bodies ;  in  none  more  thor- 
oughly than  in  the  division.  It  is  the  smallest  "fighting- 
assemblage"  which  under  modern  conditions  of  war  can  of 
itself  produce  a  decisive  result. 

The  battalion,  the  regiment,  the  brigade,  these  are  all  im- 
portant intermediate  bodies,  each  of  which  will,  as  far  as  it 
can,  endeavor  to  keep  itself  together,  but  each  of  which  will 
possibly  find  itself  compelled  to  fight  without  depth;  the 
division  with  its  framework  of  artillery  is  the  first  to  pre- 
sent the  cohesion  of  an  organic  body.  It  appeared  to  us 
necessary  to  enter  rather  at  length  into  this  pre-eminent 


1 68  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

consequence  of  the  infantry-division  in  modern  battle,  so  as 
to  deduce  from  thence  all  the  more  decisively  the  import- 
ance of  its  training  during  peace. 

Once  allow  the  full  extent  of  its  value,  and  you  cannot 
deny  that  to  attain  to  it  more  than  two  days'  work  per 
annum  are  required. 

Here,  again,  perhaps  what  we  before  said  about  the  rela- 
tion which  the  soldier  bears  to  the  corps  to  which  he  be- 
longs applies,  only  one  step  higher;  the  efficiency  of  the 
division  is  not  entirely  based  upon  the  sum  of  efficiency  of 
all  its  separate  battalions.  Twelve  battalions,  four  regi- 
ments, two  brigades,  may  all  have  been  thoroughly  trained 
beforehand  in  "battle-practice;"  yet  when  united  into  a 
division  they  may  do  little  good  as  such,  they  may  even 
get  it  and  thereby  also  themselves  into  a  scrape,  if  they  are 
not  accustomed  to  subordinate  themselves  completely  to 
the  undivided  command  of  their  divisional  general.  The 
reason  is  this,  that  with  the  present  conditions  of  strength 
even  a  brigade  can  only  exceptionally  find  itself  in  a  posi- 
tion to  represent  by  itself  more  than  one  situation  in  a  com- 
bat (an  attack,  a  defence,  &c.),  and  that  a  division  is  the 
smallest  body  which  has  the  power  of  going  through  the 
whole  fight,  including  "introduction"  and  "victory."  But 
the  division  itself,  being  only  the  first  and  smallest  battle 
unit,  must  therefore  also  learn  to  take  its  share  in  action  in 
a  manner  suited  to  the  circumstances  as  the  part  of  a  whole  ; 
and  for  this  reason  it  also  requires  the  kind  of  "battle-prac- 
tice" in  which,  being  employed  as  a  unit  for  a  limited  pur- 
pose actually  assigned  or  supposed  by  the  commander-in- 
chief,  it  has  to  a  certain  extent  to  represent  only  one  definite 
situation  of  battle.  With  demands  of,  as  it  appears  to  us, 
such  unquestionably  two-fold  character  as  regards  our  train- 
ing, we  must  declare  that  we  consider  it  extremely  desirable 
that  the  annual  period  of  three  days  now  allowed  for  the 
exercises  of  the  united  division  should  be  extended  to  at 
least  six,  and,  if  larger  assemblages  of  troops  take  place, 
wherever  possible  to  nine  real  working  days.  Of  these  it  is 


The  Great  Manoeuvres.  169 

certainly  desirable  that  one  should  be  set  apart  expressly  for 
a  parade  of  the  whole  division,  if  such  cannot  conveniently 
be  tacked  on  to  a  "battle-practice."  Such  military  displays 
on  a  large  scale  impart  both  to  the  corps  and  to  the  indi- 
vidual, to  a  greater  extent  than  is  generally  supposed,  the 
feeling  of  "all  belonging  together-ness,"  the  consciousness 
of  strength,  the  certainty  that  "there  are  a  great  lot  of  us." 
They  also  tell  well  upon  the  great  public,  which  rarely  but 
on  such  occasions  has  an  opportunity  of  raising  its  spirits 
by  a  contemplation  of  the  nation's  power.  At  these  parades, 
and  often  only  by  means  of  these  parades,  do  the  different 
arms  make  each  other's  acquaintance,  outwardly  at  least, 
and  come  to  know  of  one  another,  what  is  the  size  of  a  cav- 
alry regiment,  of  an  infantry  battalion,  and  so  forth;  the 
private  soldier  often  never  seeing  these  bodies  together  ex- 
cept on  such  occasions.  The  other  five  or  eight  days  we 
should  like  to  see  equally  divided  between  the  kind  of 
"battle-exercise"  in  which  the  division  comes  into  play  as 
an  united  whole  to  carry  out  a  definite  portion  of  a  supposed 
action,  and  that  in  which  it  goes  through  the  fight  inde- 
pendently and  isolated. 

For  the  first  object  the  ground  itself  will  usually  supply 
the  necessary  points  to  mark  the  position  or  movements  of 
the  supposed  enemy,  or  such  points  may  easily  be  indicated, 
as  we  before  remarked  when  treating  of  "battle-exercises;" 
for  the  latter  purpose  the  regulations  upon  an  "indicated 
enemy"  in  the  "imperial  orders"  come  into  force.  Here, 
likewise,  again  we  have  only  to  speak  of  "what"  is  desirable, 
leaving  confidently  the  "how"  to  the  decision  of  those  in 
command.  We  only  wish  to  draw  attention  to  the  import- 
ance of  combining  with  the  above-mentioned  exercises,  as 
can  easily  be  done,  the  most  varied  practice  possible  in 
bringing  the  division  into  line  of  battle  from  one  or  from 
more  columns  of  route  at  the  same  time. 

It  will  be  objected  to  the  wish  here  expressed  for  multi 
plying  the  exercises  of  the  united  division,  that  this  can 
only  be  accomplished  at  the  cost  of  the  two  other  above- 


I/O 


Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 


mentioned  exercises,  both  also  doubtless  very  important 
branches  of  instruction,  without  an  increased  expenditure 
of  time  and  particularly  of  money. 

Perhaps,  however,  we  may  succeed  in  meeting  this  objec- 
tion by  the  following  arguments.  The  three  days'  "field" 
and  "out-post"  exercises  have  for  their  object,  as  denoted 
by  their  designation,  actually  merely  the  incidents  of  out- 
post duty,*  and  of  the  minor  operations  of  war  which,  with 
a  few  isolated  exceptions,  are  developed  from  it  alone,  as 
we  have  all  experienced  in  the  last  great  wars.  At  our 
"peace-exercises,"  however,  it  has  hitherto  been  the  cus- 
tom, in  order  to  furnish  a  motive  for  the  intended  out-post 
position,  to  conceive  "ideas"  in  the  three  days,  often  of  the 
most  wonderful  description,  derived  from  times  long  past 
(for  instance,  forced f  foraging  expeditions,  convoy-escorts, 
and  such  like),  which  culminated  at  length  in  scuffles  be- 
tween small  detachments,  which  it  is  only  to  be  hoped  that 
our  army  will  now-a-days  avoid. 

On  this  account  it  appears  to  us  that  we  may,  without 
prejudice,  give  up  these  days  as  an  independent  cycle  of 
exercises,  and  that  it  will  be  a  more  practical  course  to  unite 
the  out-post  exercises  as  far  as  they  cannot  be  practiced  be- 
forehand in  "mixed"  garrisons,  with  the  great  manoeuvres 
of  the  division.  If,  for  instance,  at  the  end  of  each  "battle- 
exercise"  of  the  entire  division,  which  of  itself  would  not 
take  up  more  than,  at  the  outside,  two  or  three  hours'  time, 
a  small  portion  of  the  division  were  told  off  as  rear-guard 
of  the  enemy  supposed  to  be  repulsed,  or  as  his  advanced 
guard,  supposing  him  victorious,  and  were  ordered  to  take 
up  a  line  of  out-posts  consistent  with  the  "idea,"  whilst 
another  fraction  of  the  division  were  directed  to  ensure  its 


*  " Sicherheitsdienst,"  literally  "safety-service,"  i.e.,  the  duty  of  ensuring  an  army 
against  surprise.  There  is  no  expression  in  our  language  actually  equivalent.  That 
used  in  the  text  is  the  nearest  approach. — (Tn.) 

t  The  expression  is,  I  am  aware,  not  good  English,  but  perhaps  it  may  be  pardoned 
for  want  of  a  better  and  as  preferable  to  a  long  paraphrase.  Besides,  a  "forced 
reconnoissance"  is  an  accepted  military  term.  Why  not  then  speak  of  "forced 
foraging"  ' — (TR.) 


The  Great  Manoeuvres.  171 

security  in  accordance  with  the  supposed  situation,  doubt- 
less nothing  but  advantage  could  accrue  from  such  a  course. 

The  out-post  duty  itself  will  appear  more  like  reality,  be- 
cause founded  on  conditions  more  nearly  akin  to  war ;  there 
will  be  the  more  ample  time  for  all  its  incidents  after  the 
short  day's  work,  because  its  main  difficulties  arise  at  night ; 
as  for  the  division  itself,  the  bivouac,  which  has  become  in- 
dispensable, will,  if  only  the  general-staff  officer  shows  a 
little  dexterity,  on  this  occasion,  take  the  place  of  a  long 
march,  instead  of  a  short  march  to  cantonments  or  in  the 
morning  from  cantonments  which  it  would  have  formerly 
had.  When  the  division  assembles  the  next  morning,  the 
"idea"  which  has  previously  directed  the  conduct  of  the 
troops  which  may  happen  to  occupy  the  out-post  position 
of  course  ceases  to  be  in  force,  having  from  the  first  not 
affected  those  which  took  no  part  in  the  practice.  Whilst 
thus  the  "out-post  exercises"  are  suppressed,  as  an  inde- 
pendent feature  in  the  autumn  manoeuvres,  the  time  remains 
intact  for  the  detachment-exercises  which  accustom  officers, 
at  first  on  a  small  scale,  to  the  counter-action  of  the  enemy; 
but  we  should  not  hesitate  to  shorten  this  period  in  favor  of 
the  exercises  of  the  entire  division,  if  the  pretext  for  doing 
so  is  afforded  by  determining  upon  subsequent  greater 
manoeuvres  for  which  the  division  must  thus  be  all  the  more 
carefully  prepared. 

We  shall  come  now  by  a  roundabout  way  which  takes  us 
momentarily  beyond  the  limits  of  infantry-tactics  to  the 
necessity  for  having  these  greater  manoeuvres  or  concentra- 
tions as  frequently  as  possible.  We  have  hitherto  spoken 
of  the  exercises  of  an  Infantry-division,  without  taking  into 
consideration  the  fact  that,  according  to  our  custom  hith- 
erto, a  number  of  batteries  and  a  force  of  cavalry  have  been 
attached  during  the  period  of  exercise  to  the  two  divisions 
of  an  army  corps  on  the  peace  footing  far  in  excess  of  the 
proportion  for  war.  It  has  been  hitherto  allowable  for  us 
to  take  no  notice  of  this  circumstance,  because  it  had  no 
material  effect  upon  the  method  and  design  of  exercise  of 


172 


Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 


the  division  on  a  peace  footing  which  still  remained  in  sub- 
stance an  Infantry -division.  The  number  of  guns  did  not 
differ  greatly  from  that  actually  at  the  disposal  of  a  division 
in  war,*  and  the  general  result  is  not  much  affected  by 
whether  the  available  surplus  is  looked  upon  as  performing 
the  part  of  division  or  of  corps-artillery.  The  superfluous 
cavalry  brigade  also  was,  at  all  events,  not  calculated  to 
affect  the  suitable  training  of  the  divisional  infantry,  whether 
it  were  appropriated  by  the  divisional  commander  to  serve 
his  own  purposes,  or  whether  he  considered  it  as  by  chance 
in  his  neighborhood  during  the  action. 

But  viewing  this  matter  from  a  cavalry  stand-point  it 
bears  a  different  aspect.  The  following  experience  of  the 
late  most  instructive  war,  more  perhaps  than  any  other, 
strikes  the  tactical  inquirer:  the  rush  (if  we  may  so  say) 
made  of  late  by  this  arm  to  resume  once  more  its  position 
on  equal  terms  with  the  sister  arms  even  in  actual  battle— 
a  field  in  theory  closed  against  it,  and  from  which  it  was 
considered  to  be  quite  shut  out.  The  part  which  it  played 
on  the  German  side  with  so  much  distinction  -  that  of  veil — 
appears  to  it  now  in  peace  no  longer  sufficient,  and  it  again 
aims  at  doing  in  addition  to  this  its  old  work  as  wedge. .  It 
appears  to  promise  itself,  thereby  digging  its  own  grave,  the 
recovery  of  that  influence  of  which  it  has  been  robbed  by 
the  rapidity  and  accuracy  of  rifle  fire,  through  the  looseness 
of  infantry  formation  which  that  very  fire  has  promoted. 
To  be  able  to  break  in  among  the  enemy's  "footmen,"  scat- 
tered as  they  will  be  in  thin  lines,  with  masses  of  rapidly- 
moving  horsemen  following  one  another,  squadron  upon 
squadron,  this  is  the  dream  which  our  cavalry  have  brought 
back  by  way  of  war-experience  to  the  peace-garrisons,  and  to 
realize  which  they  now  ask  for  mass-training  during  peace. 

It  is  not  our  part  to  inquire  in  this  "study"  into  the  pros 
and  cons  for  these  aspirations,  which  only  interest  us  here, 


*  A  Prussian  field  battery  only  turns  out  four  guns  and  thirty  seven  horses  in  peace 
time.— (TB.) 


The  Great  Manoeuvres.  173 

as  perhaps  it  is  more  likely  that  in  consequence  thereof  a 
modification  of  the  autumn  arrangements  may  result.  But 
if  the  annual  concentration  of  a  cavalry  division  within  the 
army-corps  for  independent  exercise  is  to  be  the  invariable 
rule,  the  annual  concentration  of  the  army-corps  itself,  even 
if  only  for  a  few  days'  general  exercise,  must  in  consequence 
soon  appear  absolutely  necessary,  so  as  to  give  this  body, 
which  will  then  alone  have  the  power  of  practising  the  em- 
ployment of  the  three  arms  in  battle,  the  opportunity  for 
instruction  indispensably  necessary. 

But  also  quite  independent  of  this  influence  upon  our 
peace-training,  which  is  perhaps  more  a  matter  of  chance, 
and  the  necessity  for  which  will  not  be  absolutely  admitted 
everywhere,  it  will  be  impossible  much  longer  to  avoid 
recognising  that,  with  the  actual  conditions  of  warfare,  a 
more  frequent  assemblage  of  the  larger  masses  of  troops  is 
indispensable  to  the  thorough  and  complete  preparation  for 
every  emergency  of  our  own  and  of  every  other  army,  and 
that  this  measure  cannot  be  delayed  any  longer  without  mis- 
chief. 

Do  what  you  will,  these  exercises  will  be  very  far  indeed 
behind  what  is  wanted  to  represent  the  realities  of  war,  but 
the  performances  of  peace  and  the  requirements  of  war  must 
at  least  approximate,  if  any  profit  is  to  be  obtained,  and  if 
there  is  not  to  be  a  pure  waste  of  strength. 

Again  and  again  we  consider  it  necessary  to  give  our 
warning  against  the  tendency  to  view  the  performances  of 
large  bodies  as  simply  the  sum  of  the  performances  of 
their  smaller  composite  parts ;  on  the  contrary,  we  should 
be  inclined  to  maintain  that  the  former  are  with  regard  to 
difficulty  as  the  square  of  the  latter. 

Considering  the  migration  of  peoples  which  our  modern 
wars  represent,  we  cannot  consider  it  an  exorbitant  demand 
that  at  least  as  many  battalion,  squadron  and  battery-^dra, 
without  attempting  even  to  raise  them  to  a  war  strength, 
may  temporarily  be  assembled  for  our  peace  manoeuvres  as 


1 74  Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 

must  be  assumed  to  be  engaged  against  one  another  in  the 
smallest  battles  of  the  present  day.  If  also  financial  con- 
siderations should  not  admit  of  such  comparatively  consid- 
erable concentrations  to  take  place  yearly,  as  in  the  time  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  when,  in  the  four  "inspections"  (dis- 
tricts) a  fourth  always  of  the  whole  peace-army  was  assem- 
bled, an  army  much  stronger  than  the  present  one  in  pro- 
portion to  the  size  of  state  at  that  time ;  it  is  yet  excessively 
desirable  that  the  rule  should  be  that  every  other  year  there 
should  either  be  a  concentration  of  the  whole  of  the  troops 
of  an  "inspection"  or  of  the  army-corps. 

These  great  manoeuvres  need  indeed  never  last  very  long, 
their  object  being,  in  substance,  only  to  give  the  troops  an 
idea  of  how  they  are  handled  in  masses,  and  to  form  officers 
for  high  command,  who,  if  only  these  reviews  became  of 
regular  occurrence,  would,  in  the  course  of  their  service, 
have  repeated  opportunities  for  accustoming  themselves  to 
what  is  required  of  them  in  this  respect. 

Even  the  Potsdam  reviews,  which  all  Europe  used  to  at- 
tend, lasted  only  three  days  each  time,  and  although  always, 
taking  place  on  almost  precisely  the  same  ground  with  the 
same  number  of  thirty-eight  battalions  and  fifty  squadrons, 
they  show  so  much  variety,  a  thing  more  difficult  to  attain 
then  even  than  now,  that  not  one  of  the  twenty-four  battle- 
exercises  in  the  fourteen  successive  annual  courses  which 
have  come  down  to  us  is  like  another.  If  so  it  must  be  then, 
this  example  may  at  least  set  our  minds  at  rest  so  far  as  to 
convince  us  that  such  exercises  need  not  be  made  monoto- 
nous, even  if  we  were  compelled  to  conduct  them  for  a  long 
series  of  years  from  a  standing  camp  on  one  and  the  same 
ground. 

But  the  following  "idea"  comes  out  pretty  often  in  the 
reports  of  these  field-days  just  alluded  to — one  to  be  recom- 
mended as  useful  by  way  of  change,  "  the  next  day  his 
Majesty  showed  how  such  an  attack  (or  something  of  the 
sort)  might  have  been  better  managed." 


The  Great  Manoeuvres. 


175 


Considerations  of  expense  may  (and  of  this  we  have  no 
means  of  judging)  induce  our  rulers  to  confine  such  manoeu- 
vres to  certain  localities,  and  may  render  the  formation  of 
camps  necessary.  But  even  if  such  should  be  the  case,  this 
measure  would  not  be  subject  to  those  objections  which  one 
often  hears  urged  against  it,  always  supposing  the  camps  to 
be  used  only  for  a  short  time,  and  by  one  and  the  same 
body  of  troops.  But  we  hope,  in  the  interests  of  a  healthy, 
soldier-like  life,  that  our  army  may  be  spared  the  trial  of 
having  its  greater  manoeuvres,  especially  those  of  the  divis- 
ion, tied  down  on  principle  to  such  camps.  We  should  be 
sorry  to  exchange  our  old  privilege  of  the  shifting  canton- 
ment, of  free  intercourse  with  nature,  as  we  might  almost 
say,  for  an  arrangement  which,  if  continued  permanently, 
would  infallibly  be  fatal  to  the  healthy  circulation,  and 
would  poison  the  fresh  and  cheery  spirit  of  our  army. 

Once  more ;  if  it  must  be  so,  and  if  by  no  other  means  the 
great  concentrations  of  troops,  which  are  so  urgently  neces- 
sary, can.be  managed,  at  least,  let  the  measure  only  be  ap- 
plied to  these,  and  in  every  case  only  for  a  short  time. 

We  return  to  our  starting  point  in  these  studies. 

To  take  early  account  of  the  requirements  of  the  new  tac- 
tics in  our  "peace-school"  must,  we  thought,  be  recognised 
as  a  necessity  not  to  be  deferred ;  changes  merely  of  a  formal 
nature  could  not  be  considered  sufficient  for  this  purpose. 
They  would  burden  the  short  period  for  peace-training  with 
an  additional  quantity  of  work  which  could  not  be  done  jus- 
tice to  in  face  of  the  extraordinary  rise  of  the  standard  of 
quality.  We  were  compelled,  on  the  contrary,  to  admit  that 
the  absolute  amount  of  training  in  externals  must  be  re- 
duced to  a  minimum,  both  for  the  individual  and  the  corps, 
so  that,  what  is  of  much  more  importance  now-a-days,  the 
thorough  proficiency  of  each  man  in  what  he  is  actually 
taught,  might  be  attained. 

The  principle  of  classification,  with  regard  to  the  higher 
training  of  the  mass  of  our  Infantry,  thus  showed  itself  to 


1 76 


Preparation  for  War  in  Peace. 


be  the  necessary  consequence,  and  one  which  would  answer 
all  demands — a  principle  which  would  not  make  the  efficiency 
of  a  corps  depend  solely  upon  the  efficiency  of  each  of  its 
members.  But,  in  order  to  be  equal  even  to  the  highest 
exigencies,  it  was,  we  thought,  incumbent  upon  us  to  accus- 
tom the  officers  of  all  ranks  to  their  war  duties,  by  giving 
them  the  most  varied  "battle-exercises"  in  the  field,  and 
thereby  training  them  to  rapid  and  just  tactical  judgment 
respecting  the  "what"  as  well  as  the  "how." 

Finally,  remembering,  as  we  did,  that  the  true  fruit  of 
even  the  most  brilliant  bloom  of  peace-instruction  will  only 
be  seen  to  ripen  on  the  battle-field,  we  thought  it  advisable 
to  recommend  manoeuvres  in  great  masses,  with,  at  least,  a 
resemblance  to  war,  from  which  alone  we  dare  to  hope  that 
we  may  in  peace  get  the  best  possible  idea  of  Battle. 


THE    END. 


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Spooner's  Military  Library  is  a  re-print  of  the  best 
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The  first  number,  containing  Boguslawski's  "Tactical 
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GALL'S  "MODERN  TACTICS." 
Clery's  "  MINOR  TACTICS." 
Trench's  "CAVALRY  IN  MODERN  WAR." 
Von  Schmidt's  "CAVALRY  INSTRUCTION." 
Denison's  "HISTORY  OF  CAVALRY." 
ETC.,  ETC.,  ETC. 

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